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EnglishI analyse a two-stage location-price duopoly game under uniform delivered pricing when firms produce homogenous goods and are unable to ration the supply. Two tie-breaking rules (TBR) are studied: consumers either buy from the nearest firm or buy from either firms with equal probabilities. Under the first TBR, I find multiple single-price equilibria. Equilibrium locations are shown to be symmetric and to be such that the distance between firms increases (decreases) with the transportation cost (c) when c is high (low). Under the second TBR, firms cluster to the centre of the market line and choose the price that gives them zero profits. Surprisingly, when c is low, consumers are better off when they randomly select from which firm to buy.
Iozzi, A. (2000). Prices and locations in a spatial duopoly under uniform delivered pricing.
| Tipologia: | Altro |
| Citazione: | Iozzi, A. (2000). Prices and locations in a spatial duopoly under uniform delivered pricing. |
| Lingua: | en |
| Settore Scientifico Disciplinare: | Settore SECS-P/01 - Economia Politica |
| Data di pubblicazione: | dic-2000 |
| Titolo: | Prices and locations in a spatial duopoly under uniform delivered pricing |
| Autori: | Iozzi, Alberto |
| Autori: | |
| Appare nelle tipologie: | 99 - Altro |
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|---|---|---|---|---|
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