We consider a simple overlapping generations economy where the behavior of intermediaries, in a market characterized by asymmetric information and moral hazard, may give rise to cyclical equilibria. When capital increases output and savings also increase, and therefore more capital will be available in the following period. At the same time, however, interest rates also decrease and this induces intermediaries to reduce the amount of resources devoted to monitoring. A larger number of firms will select low quality projects and, because of this, less capital will be produced in the following period. For some parameter values this second effect may prevail over the first one and the stock of capital in period t+1 may actually be lower than the stock of capital in period t. The model provides a rigorous interpretation of the view associated with Hyman Minsky , Charles Kindleberger, and Henry Kaufman, according to which expansions come to an inevitable end because of excessive or ill-considered lending that took place during the boom
Mattesini, F. (2005). Financial intermediation as a source of aggregate instability.
|Citazione:||Mattesini, F. (2005). Financial intermediation as a source of aggregate instability.|
|Data di pubblicazione:||lug-2005|
|Titolo:||Financial intermediation as a source of aggregate instability|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||99 - Altro|