Third-party audit provides incentives to an agent whose actions affect the value of an asset. When audit intensity and outcome are unverifiable, we show that with interim-participation constraints the optimal mechanism may use only the auditor's report, disregarding the agent's information. Furthermore, the auditor obtains the asset and the agent a monetary compensation, when a high asset value is reported. This suggests regulating renewable resources or utility networks by giving entrants the option to buy the right to use the asset at a predetermined price, and financially rewarding incumbents for good performance.
Iossa, E., Legros, P. (2004). Auditing and property rights. RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 35, 356-372.
Auditing and property rights
IOSSA, ELISABETTA;
2004-01-01
Abstract
Third-party audit provides incentives to an agent whose actions affect the value of an asset. When audit intensity and outcome are unverifiable, we show that with interim-participation constraints the optimal mechanism may use only the auditor's report, disregarding the agent's information. Furthermore, the auditor obtains the asset and the agent a monetary compensation, when a high asset value is reported. This suggests regulating renewable resources or utility networks by giving entrants the option to buy the right to use the asset at a predetermined price, and financially rewarding incumbents for good performance.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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