This article shows that reverse discrimination policies can find a justification purely on efficiency grounds. We study the optimal provision of education when households belong to different groups, differing in the distribution of the potential to benefit from education among individuals, which is private information. The main result is that high-potential individuals from groups with relatively few high-potential individuals should receive more education than otherwise identical individuals from groups with a more favorable distribution of these benefits.
DE FRAJA, G. (2005). Reverse discrimination and efficiency in education. INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW, 46(3), 1009-1031.
Reverse discrimination and efficiency in education
DE FRAJA, GIOVANNI
2005-01-01
Abstract
This article shows that reverse discrimination policies can find a justification purely on efficiency grounds. We study the optimal provision of education when households belong to different groups, differing in the distribution of the potential to benefit from education among individuals, which is private information. The main result is that high-potential individuals from groups with relatively few high-potential individuals should receive more education than otherwise identical individuals from groups with a more favorable distribution of these benefits.| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
|---|---|---|---|
|
De Fraja IER 2005.pdf
accesso aperto
Descrizione: PDF articolo
Dimensione
171.98 kB
Formato
Adobe PDF
|
171.98 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizza/Apri |
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
