Corporate governance in Italian listed firms: an overview

The paper provides an overview of the Italian corporate governance problem, which takes into account the key features of the ownership structure of domestic firms listed at the Milan Stock Exchange in 2004. Basically, it is argued that, although in recent years significant rules were issued to improve the Italian corporate governance system, effective and prompt reforms seem still urgent in the national research agenda. The paper is divided as follows. In section 2, some evidence concerning the general ownership structure of Italian listed firms is provided. In this regard, recent data would confirm the concentration of ownership as the basic feature of Italian listed firms, with 32% as the mean share of the majority shareholder. In section 3, some specific terms of the corporate governance problem for Italian listed firms are set. Basically, it is argued that the overall effectiveness of both external and internal controls might be, at some level, negatively influenced by the shareholders’ meeting, more deeply by the majority shareholder. In this regard, some evidence from the traditional governance structure of listed joint-stock companies is shown.