According to John McDowell, to be autonomous implies to be responsive to reasons, to inhabit the logical space of reasons. To challenge that thesis, one could argue that: 1) any attempt to mark the boundary of the “space of reasons” fails, due to the admission of something that is beyond the received view of Reason; 2) plain fitness, at a naturalistic level, is a good reason to act; 3) in some respect, autonomy depends on the difference between the abilities of cognitive systems and the features of their environment. It is questionable whether a similar “autonomy” could be traced in a pure logical space; presumably, we must dwell in a ruder space, where physical, biological and psychological properties perform specific tasks.
Giannoli, G. (2009). Autonomy: its burdens, bonds, and vagueness. In Autonomy of Reason? Proceedings of the V Meeting Italian-American Philosophy (pp. 200-205). Wien : Lit Verlag.
Autori: | ||
Autori: | Giannoli, G | |
Titolo: | Autonomy: its burdens, bonds, and vagueness | |
Data di pubblicazione: | 2009 | |
Settore Scientifico Disciplinare: | Settore M-FIL/02 - Logica e Filosofia della Scienza | |
Lingua: | English | |
Rilevanza: | Rilevanza internazionale | |
Tipo: | Capitolo o saggio | |
Tipologia: | Contributo in libro | |
Citazione: | Giannoli, G. (2009). Autonomy: its burdens, bonds, and vagueness. In Autonomy of Reason? Proceedings of the V Meeting Italian-American Philosophy (pp. 200-205). Wien : Lit Verlag. | |
Appare nelle tipologie: | 03 - Contributo in libro |
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