The Growth of the Italian Executive

Since 1994, the new electoral rules have strengthened the Executive's constitutional position vis à vis Parliament. There is thus a growing concern amongst public lawyers that the constitutional balance of powers between Parliament and the Executive has been altered. This opinion reflects the dominant tradition in legal and political studies of Italian institutions which is based on the idea that Parliament is (almost) omnipotent insofar as it is vested with popular sovereignty. The legitimacy of all other institutions is, in contrast, indirect since it is drawn from Parliament. Every departure from such a model represents a violation of the Constitution. A different point of view emphasises that the actions of public institutions are not established once and for all by law but are inevitably marked by conflict. The ups and downs of the more traditional Parliamentary power to decide the budget provide the best support for such an approach. Whilst the first cultural tradition has received considerably more attention from legal academics, this paper intends to develop certain aspects inspired by the second As a result, the article will not only focus on the relationship between Parliament and the Executive, but it will also consider the wider institutional framework, including the evolution of the relationship between central and decentralised government.