The generalized Vickrey auction is analysed as a mechanism for setting prices of digital goods. A selection of models of the bidders' behaviour (embodied by the probability distribution of their bids' values) are employed to derive the optimal auctioneer's choice as to the number of items to sell. The satisfaction levels of both the auctioneer and the bidders are taken into account through the evaluation of the expected revenues, the percentage of winning bidders and their aggregated utilities under each of the probabilistic scenarios considered. (C) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Naldi, M., D'Acquisto, G. (2008). Performance of the Vickrey auction for digital goods under various bid distributions. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION, 65(1), 10-31 [10.1016/j.peva.2007.02.002].
Performance of the Vickrey auction for digital goods under various bid distributions
NALDI, MAURIZIO;
2008-01-01
Abstract
The generalized Vickrey auction is analysed as a mechanism for setting prices of digital goods. A selection of models of the bidders' behaviour (embodied by the probability distribution of their bids' values) are employed to derive the optimal auctioneer's choice as to the number of items to sell. The satisfaction levels of both the auctioneer and the bidders are taken into account through the evaluation of the expected revenues, the percentage of winning bidders and their aggregated utilities under each of the probabilistic scenarios considered. (C) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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