The essay analyzes the proposed reform of the Civil Code rule that currently provides for the liability of the members of the board of auditors jointly and severally with the directors of the company, when the act of damage-producing mala gestio also depended on the improper fulfillment of their supervisory duties. The proposal - strongly supported, and indeed promoted by the Association of Certified Public Accountants - aims not only to overcome the principle of joint and several liability, but also to provide for caps on liability, represented by multiples of the annual compensation received. The essay is highly critical of the reform proposal, outlining the reasons why it is unreasonable and objectively unjustified, and thus seems only to want to indulge demands of a professional category, heedless of the serious systemic aporia to which the new rule would lead.
Il saggio analizza la proposta di riforma della norma del codice civile che attualmente prevede la responsabilità dei componenti del collegio sindacale in solido con gli amministratori della società, allorché il fatto di mala gestio produttivo di danno sia dipeso anche dal non corretto adempimento dei loro doveri di controllo. La proposta - fortemente sostenuta, e anzi promossa dall'ordine dei dottori commercialisti - intende non solo superare il principio della responsabilità solidale, ma anche prevedere dei cap alla responsabilità, rappresentati da multipli del compenso annuo percepito. Il saggio si esprime in senso fortemente critico sulla proposta di riforma, illustrando le ragioni che la rendono irragionevole e oggettivamente non giustificata, e che dunque sembra solo voler assecondare richieste di una categoria professionale, incurante della grave aporia sistematica cui la nuova norma condurrebbe.
Guizzi, G. (2024). Lobbying e diritto societario: note critiche intorno alla proposta di riforma dell’art. 2407 c.c. RIVISTA DELLE SOCIETÀ, LXIX(2-3), 251-268.
Lobbying e diritto societario: note critiche intorno alla proposta di riforma dell’art. 2407 c.c.
Guizzi, G
2024-01-01
Abstract
The essay analyzes the proposed reform of the Civil Code rule that currently provides for the liability of the members of the board of auditors jointly and severally with the directors of the company, when the act of damage-producing mala gestio also depended on the improper fulfillment of their supervisory duties. The proposal - strongly supported, and indeed promoted by the Association of Certified Public Accountants - aims not only to overcome the principle of joint and several liability, but also to provide for caps on liability, represented by multiples of the annual compensation received. The essay is highly critical of the reform proposal, outlining the reasons why it is unreasonable and objectively unjustified, and thus seems only to want to indulge demands of a professional category, heedless of the serious systemic aporia to which the new rule would lead.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
---|---|---|---|
Giuseppe Guizzi.pdf
solo utenti autorizzati
Tipologia:
Versione Editoriale (PDF)
Licenza:
Copyright dell'editore
Dimensione
332.18 kB
Formato
Adobe PDF
|
332.18 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizza/Apri Richiedi una copia |
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.