In a laboratory experiment we investigate whether bad behavior in anonymous environments results from more lenient social norms or a reduction in the size of the role played by social norms in decision-making. We elicit social norms in two dictator games with different levels of anonymity, estimate subjects' willingness-to-pay to adhere to norms, and test for treatment differences in each factor. Overall, it is a large reduction in the role played by social norms, which results in more unfair dictator choices when anonymous. Interestingly, however, females find making an unfair decision less acceptable when the dictator is unidentified. (JEL A13, C91, Z10)
Krysowski, E., Tremewan, J. (2021). WHY DOES ANONYMITY MAKE US MISBEHAVE: DIFFERENT NORMS OR LESS COMPLIANCE?. ECONOMIC INQUIRY, 59(2), 776-789 [10.1111/ecin.12955].
WHY DOES ANONYMITY MAKE US MISBEHAVE: DIFFERENT NORMS OR LESS COMPLIANCE?
Tremewan, J.
2021-01-01
Abstract
In a laboratory experiment we investigate whether bad behavior in anonymous environments results from more lenient social norms or a reduction in the size of the role played by social norms in decision-making. We elicit social norms in two dictator games with different levels of anonymity, estimate subjects' willingness-to-pay to adhere to norms, and test for treatment differences in each factor. Overall, it is a large reduction in the role played by social norms, which results in more unfair dictator choices when anonymous. Interestingly, however, females find making an unfair decision less acceptable when the dictator is unidentified. (JEL A13, C91, Z10)File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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Economic Inquiry - 2020 - Krysowski - WHY DOES ANONYMITY MAKE US MISBEHAVE DIFFERENT NORMS OR LESS COMPLIANCE.pdf
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