We estimate a transcendental logarithmic (translog) short-run variable cost function for the Italian railway company, Ferrovie dello Stato (FS), using data on the years 1980-1995. Within the study period, we show that: (a) the translog function represents a good approximation of the underlying technology of FS; (b) all production factor demands are inelastic; (c) FS has a limited ability to substitute between inputs; (d) FS operates with diseconomies of density. A major implication of these findings is that the rail network is not used optimally, so that either a cut in the frequency of trains or a rise in capital investments seems to be indicated. Since the estimated cost function is super-additive at the relevant output levels, we derive that rail service provision in Italy would not behave as a natural monopoly in the absence of regulation. Indeed, allocative efficiency indicates that there is enough room for a duopolistic industry where joint or specialized production of passenger and freight carryings would be pursued, mainly depending on firm size.
Mancuso, P., Reverberi, P. (2003). Operating costs and market organization in railway services: the case of Italy, 1980-1995. TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH PART B-METHODOLOGICAL, 37(1), 43-61 [10.1016/S0191-2615(01)00044-3].
Operating costs and market organization in railway services: the case of Italy, 1980-1995
Mancuso, P.;
2003-01-01
Abstract
We estimate a transcendental logarithmic (translog) short-run variable cost function for the Italian railway company, Ferrovie dello Stato (FS), using data on the years 1980-1995. Within the study period, we show that: (a) the translog function represents a good approximation of the underlying technology of FS; (b) all production factor demands are inelastic; (c) FS has a limited ability to substitute between inputs; (d) FS operates with diseconomies of density. A major implication of these findings is that the rail network is not used optimally, so that either a cut in the frequency of trains or a rise in capital investments seems to be indicated. Since the estimated cost function is super-additive at the relevant output levels, we derive that rail service provision in Italy would not behave as a natural monopoly in the absence of regulation. Indeed, allocative efficiency indicates that there is enough room for a duopolistic industry where joint or specialized production of passenger and freight carryings would be pursued, mainly depending on firm size.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.


