In this article, we consider a two-period pure exchange economy with idiosyncratic uncertainty, moral hazard and multiple consumption goods. We analyze two different market structures: contingent commodity markets and financial plus spot commodity markets. We propose a competitive equilibrium concept for each market structure and verify that it is possible to decentralize constrained efficient allocations as equilibria with contingent markets. Moreover, we characterize the conditions which prevent constrained efficient allocations from being decentralized as equilibria with financial markets.

Panaccione, L. (2007). Pareto optima and competitive equilibria with moral hazard and financial markets. THE B.E. JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL ECONOMICS, 7(1), 36 [10.2202/1935-1704.1358].

Pareto optima and competitive equilibria with moral hazard and financial markets

PANACCIONE, LUCA
2007-01-01

Abstract

In this article, we consider a two-period pure exchange economy with idiosyncratic uncertainty, moral hazard and multiple consumption goods. We analyze two different market structures: contingent commodity markets and financial plus spot commodity markets. We propose a competitive equilibrium concept for each market structure and verify that it is possible to decentralize constrained efficient allocations as equilibria with contingent markets. Moreover, we characterize the conditions which prevent constrained efficient allocations from being decentralized as equilibria with financial markets.
2007
Pubblicato
Rilevanza internazionale
Articolo
Esperti anonimi
Settore SECS-P/01 - ECONOMIA POLITICA
English
Con Impact Factor ISI
Panaccione, L. (2007). Pareto optima and competitive equilibria with moral hazard and financial markets. THE B.E. JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL ECONOMICS, 7(1), 36 [10.2202/1935-1704.1358].
Panaccione, L
Articolo su rivista
File in questo prodotto:
File Dimensione Formato  
pareto-optimality-separability.pdf

solo utenti autorizzati

Licenza: Copyright dell'editore
Dimensione 232.95 kB
Formato Adobe PDF
232.95 kB Adobe PDF   Visualizza/Apri   Richiedi una copia

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2108/34838
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus 2
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? 3
social impact