The (limited) constitutional provisions concerning the Government are the result of a debate within the Constitutional Assembly, that found its roots and tried to provide answers to the specific role that the executive played from the unification (1861) to World Word II, and in particular during the fascist regime. The extremely cautious approach in shaping the Constitutional attributions of the Government, coupled with the fragmentation and instability of the Italian political system, led to the perception, at the end of the 70s, that Italy was lacking a Government. Similarly to the general tendency that characterizes the executives in modern democracies, however, also in Italy the growth of the Executive has been outstanding, both from the point of view of the size and the type of powers. By contrast, the instruments of political accountability have not changed remarkably, despite several attempts of reforming them. On the contrary, the discipline of criminal responsibility has been changed, in order to subject criminal responsibility to ordinary justice. Lastly, what appears to have been increasing over time is the use of legal instruments of accountability aimed at measuring the effective implementation of the program of the executive, in order to ensure accountability towards the European institutions.
De Bellis, M. (2024). Italy. In M. Morabito, G. Tusseau (a cura di), Comparative Accountability of the Executive Power in Europe. Perspectives from Law, History and Political Science (pp. 83-102). Routledge.
Italy
De Bellis, M
2024-01-01
Abstract
The (limited) constitutional provisions concerning the Government are the result of a debate within the Constitutional Assembly, that found its roots and tried to provide answers to the specific role that the executive played from the unification (1861) to World Word II, and in particular during the fascist regime. The extremely cautious approach in shaping the Constitutional attributions of the Government, coupled with the fragmentation and instability of the Italian political system, led to the perception, at the end of the 70s, that Italy was lacking a Government. Similarly to the general tendency that characterizes the executives in modern democracies, however, also in Italy the growth of the Executive has been outstanding, both from the point of view of the size and the type of powers. By contrast, the instruments of political accountability have not changed remarkably, despite several attempts of reforming them. On the contrary, the discipline of criminal responsibility has been changed, in order to subject criminal responsibility to ordinary justice. Lastly, what appears to have been increasing over time is the use of legal instruments of accountability aimed at measuring the effective implementation of the program of the executive, in order to ensure accountability towards the European institutions.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
