In this paper we address a particular generalisation of the Assignment Problem (AP) in a Multi-Agent setting, where distributed agents share common resources. We consider the problem of determining Pareto-optimal solutions that satisfy a fairness criterion (equilibrium). We show that the solution obtained is equivalent to a Kalai Smorodinsky solution of a suitably defined bargaining problem and characterise the computational complexity of finding such an equilibrium. Additionally, we propose an exact solution algorithm based on a branch-and-bound scheme that exploits bounds obtained by suitably rounding the solutions of the corresponding linear relaxation, and give the results of extensive computational experiments. Copyright © 2009, Inderscience Publishers.

Felici, G., Mecoli, M., Mirchandani, P., Pacifici, A. (2009). Equilibrium in a two-agent assignment problem. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH, 6(1), 4-26 [10.1504/IJOR.2009.026241].

Equilibrium in a two-agent assignment problem

PACIFICI, ANDREA
2009-01-01

Abstract

In this paper we address a particular generalisation of the Assignment Problem (AP) in a Multi-Agent setting, where distributed agents share common resources. We consider the problem of determining Pareto-optimal solutions that satisfy a fairness criterion (equilibrium). We show that the solution obtained is equivalent to a Kalai Smorodinsky solution of a suitably defined bargaining problem and characterise the computational complexity of finding such an equilibrium. Additionally, we propose an exact solution algorithm based on a branch-and-bound scheme that exploits bounds obtained by suitably rounding the solutions of the corresponding linear relaxation, and give the results of extensive computational experiments. Copyright © 2009, Inderscience Publishers.
2009
Pubblicato
Rilevanza internazionale
Articolo
Esperti anonimi
Settore MAT/09 - RICERCA OPERATIVA
English
Competitive assignment; Equilibrium; Pareto-optimality
Felici, G., Mecoli, M., Mirchandani, P., Pacifici, A. (2009). Equilibrium in a two-agent assignment problem. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH, 6(1), 4-26 [10.1504/IJOR.2009.026241].
Felici, G; Mecoli, M; Mirchandani, P; Pacifici, A
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2108/34747
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