Intentionality and Referentiality in Plato’s Conceptual Apparatus

The notions of intentionality and referentiality are applied to Plato’s conceptual apparatus in the conviction that they can profitably shed light on some aspects of Plato’s epistemology and ontology and that, conversely, their use as an exegetical tool in Plato’s thought can provide some interesting insights into their nature and function. From this perspective, the Platonic notions of dianoia and nous will be considered in succession: they will be read in the light of the fundamental concept of syngeneia and the idea that for Plato the deep structure of reality is configured as a network of elementary ontological units (Forms and gene). Consequently, the notions of intentionality and referentiality will also be applied to this structure of reality. In conclusion, a comparison will be proposed between the results of these analyses and Tim Crane's use of the notions in question, and from the outcome of this comparison some implications will be drawn, by way of example, with reference to two themes of contemporary epistemology.