We characterize and prove the existence of Nash equilibrium in a limit order market with a finite number of risk-neutral liquidity providers. We show that if there is suffi- cient adverse selection, then pointwise optimization (maximizing in p for each q) in a certain nonlinear pricing game produces a Nash equilibrium in the limit order market. The need for a sufficient degree of adverse selection does not vanish as the number of liquidity providers increases. Our formulation of the nonlinear pricing game en- compasses various specifications of informed and liquidity trading, including the case in which nature chooses whether the market-order trader is informed or a liquidity trader. We solve for an equilibrium analytically in various examples and also present examples in which the first-order condition for pointwise optimization does not define an equilibrium, because the amount of adverse selection is insufficient.

Baruch, S.n., Back, K. (2013). Strategic liquidity provision in limit order markets. ECONOMETRICA, 81(1), 363-392 [10.3982/ECTA10018].

Strategic liquidity provision in limit order markets

Shmuel Baruch;
2013-01-01

Abstract

We characterize and prove the existence of Nash equilibrium in a limit order market with a finite number of risk-neutral liquidity providers. We show that if there is suffi- cient adverse selection, then pointwise optimization (maximizing in p for each q) in a certain nonlinear pricing game produces a Nash equilibrium in the limit order market. The need for a sufficient degree of adverse selection does not vanish as the number of liquidity providers increases. Our formulation of the nonlinear pricing game en- compasses various specifications of informed and liquidity trading, including the case in which nature chooses whether the market-order trader is informed or a liquidity trader. We solve for an equilibrium analytically in various examples and also present examples in which the first-order condition for pointwise optimization does not define an equilibrium, because the amount of adverse selection is insufficient.
2013
Pubblicato
Rilevanza internazionale
Articolo
Esperti anonimi
Settore SECS-P/09 - FINANZA AZIENDALE
English
Market microstructure, limit orders, liquidity, market makers, dealers, trading game, nonlinear pricing.
Baruch, S.n., Back, K. (2013). Strategic liquidity provision in limit order markets. ECONOMETRICA, 81(1), 363-392 [10.3982/ECTA10018].
Baruch, Sn; Back, K
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2108/313778
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