Is dishonest behavior contagious? We answer this question by studying whether corruption scandals affect the propensity of supermarket customers to steal while using a self-service checkout system. Crucially, this system allows shoppers to engage in dishonest behavior by under-reporting the value of their shopping cart. Exploiting data from random audits on shoppers, we show that the probability of stealing increases by 16% after a local corruption scandal breaks. This effect is not driven by any change in material incentives. Suggestive evidence shows that it is driven by a reduction in the self-imposed cost of stealing.

Gulino, G., Masera, F. (2023). Contagious Dishonesty: Corruption Scandals and Supermarket Theft. AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL. APPLIED ECONOMICS, 15, 218-251 [10.1257/app.20210446].

Contagious Dishonesty: Corruption Scandals and Supermarket Theft

Giorgio Gulino
;
2023-10-01

Abstract

Is dishonest behavior contagious? We answer this question by studying whether corruption scandals affect the propensity of supermarket customers to steal while using a self-service checkout system. Crucially, this system allows shoppers to engage in dishonest behavior by under-reporting the value of their shopping cart. Exploiting data from random audits on shoppers, we show that the probability of stealing increases by 16% after a local corruption scandal breaks. This effect is not driven by any change in material incentives. Suggestive evidence shows that it is driven by a reduction in the self-imposed cost of stealing.
ott-2023
Pubblicato
Rilevanza internazionale
Articolo
Esperti anonimi
Settore SECS-P/01 - ECONOMIA POLITICA
English
Con Impact Factor ISI
Corruption
Crime
Consumer behavior
Norms
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/app.20210446&from=f
Gulino, G., Masera, F. (2023). Contagious Dishonesty: Corruption Scandals and Supermarket Theft. AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL. APPLIED ECONOMICS, 15, 218-251 [10.1257/app.20210446].
Gulino, G; Masera, F
Articolo su rivista
File in questo prodotto:
File Dimensione Formato  
17973.pdf

solo utenti autorizzati

Descrizione: Preview (AEA members only)
Tipologia: Documento in Pre-print
Licenza: Copyright dell'editore
Dimensione 488.96 kB
Formato Adobe PDF
488.96 kB Adobe PDF   Visualizza/Apri   Richiedi una copia
17974.pdf

solo utenti autorizzati

Descrizione: Online Appendix
Tipologia: Documento in Pre-print
Licenza: Copyright dell'editore
Dimensione 1.86 MB
Formato Adobe PDF
1.86 MB Adobe PDF   Visualizza/Apri   Richiedi una copia

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2108/312265
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus 0
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? 0
social impact