Is dishonest behavior contagious? We answer this question by studying whether corruption scandals affect the propensity of supermarket customers to steal while using a self-service checkout system. Crucially, this system allows shoppers to engage in dishonest behavior by under-reporting the value of their shopping cart. Exploiting data from random audits on shoppers, we show that the probability of stealing increases by 16% after a local corruption scandal breaks. This effect is not driven by any change in material incentives. Suggestive evidence shows that it is driven by a reduction in the self-imposed cost of stealing.
Gulino, G., Masera, F. (2023). Contagious Dishonesty: Corruption Scandals and Supermarket Theft. AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL. APPLIED ECONOMICS, 15, 218-251 [10.1257/app.20210446].
Contagious Dishonesty: Corruption Scandals and Supermarket Theft
Giorgio Gulino
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2023-10-01
Abstract
Is dishonest behavior contagious? We answer this question by studying whether corruption scandals affect the propensity of supermarket customers to steal while using a self-service checkout system. Crucially, this system allows shoppers to engage in dishonest behavior by under-reporting the value of their shopping cart. Exploiting data from random audits on shoppers, we show that the probability of stealing increases by 16% after a local corruption scandal breaks. This effect is not driven by any change in material incentives. Suggestive evidence shows that it is driven by a reduction in the self-imposed cost of stealing.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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