Using micro-level data on local Italian elections and exploiting a discontinuity at a population cutoff, I study the effect of electoral systems on politician selection and re-election. Evidence shows that the mayor’s probability of re-election is 25 percentage points higher in majoritarian systems than in proportional systems. Ruling coalitions elected under the majoritarian system enjoy a stable and long-lasting majority, attract more central transfers, and invest more in public libraries. While mayors elected under the two different electoral systems do not differ in any observable characteristics, they do tend to embark on a different political careers once they lose their municipal office. Surprisingly, mayors elected under the proportional system have a higher probability of being elected to regional offices after their mandate

Gulino, G. (2020). Electoral Systems, Selection, and Re-election: Evidence from Italian Municipalities. THE JOURNAL OF LAW ECONOMICS & ORGANIZATION, 37(3), 534-570 [10.1093/jleo/ewaa024].

Electoral Systems, Selection, and Re-election: Evidence from Italian Municipalities

Giorgio Gulino
2020-01-01

Abstract

Using micro-level data on local Italian elections and exploiting a discontinuity at a population cutoff, I study the effect of electoral systems on politician selection and re-election. Evidence shows that the mayor’s probability of re-election is 25 percentage points higher in majoritarian systems than in proportional systems. Ruling coalitions elected under the majoritarian system enjoy a stable and long-lasting majority, attract more central transfers, and invest more in public libraries. While mayors elected under the two different electoral systems do not differ in any observable characteristics, they do tend to embark on a different political careers once they lose their municipal office. Surprisingly, mayors elected under the proportional system have a higher probability of being elected to regional offices after their mandate
2020
Pubblicato
Rilevanza internazionale
Articolo
Esperti anonimi
Settore SECS-P/01 - ECONOMIA POLITICA
English
Con Impact Factor ISI
Difference-in-discontinuities design.
Electoral rules
Incumbency
Political selection
https://academic.oup.com/jleo/article/37/3/534/6032799?guestAccessKey=bf333958-f892-4b3e-8fc6-3322d33b2b84
Gulino, G. (2020). Electoral Systems, Selection, and Re-election: Evidence from Italian Municipalities. THE JOURNAL OF LAW ECONOMICS & ORGANIZATION, 37(3), 534-570 [10.1093/jleo/ewaa024].
Gulino, G
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2108/312263
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