Pricing decisions are increasingly in the “hands” of artificial algorithms. Scholars and competition authorities have voiced concerns that those algorithms are capable of sustaining collusive outcomes more effectively than can human decision makers. If this is so, then our traditional policy tools for fighting collusion may have to be reconsidered. We discuss these issues by critically surveying the relevant law, economics, and computer science literature.

Denicolò, V., Calzolari, G., Calvano, E., Pastorello, S. (2019). Algorithmic Pricing: What Implications for Competition Policy?. REVIEW OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, 55(1), 155-171 [10.1007/s11151-019-09689-3].

Algorithmic Pricing: What Implications for Competition Policy?

Emilio Calvano;
2019-01-01

Abstract

Pricing decisions are increasingly in the “hands” of artificial algorithms. Scholars and competition authorities have voiced concerns that those algorithms are capable of sustaining collusive outcomes more effectively than can human decision makers. If this is so, then our traditional policy tools for fighting collusion may have to be reconsidered. We discuss these issues by critically surveying the relevant law, economics, and computer science literature.
2019
Pubblicato
Rilevanza internazionale
Articolo
Esperti anonimi
Settore SECS-P/01 - ECONOMIA POLITICA
English
Algorithmic pricing · Competition policy · Artificial intelligence · Machine learning · Collusion
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11151-019-09689-3
Denicolò, V., Calzolari, G., Calvano, E., Pastorello, S. (2019). Algorithmic Pricing: What Implications for Competition Policy?. REVIEW OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, 55(1), 155-171 [10.1007/s11151-019-09689-3].
Denicolò, V; Calzolari, G; Calvano, E; Pastorello, S
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2108/303885
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