IRIS

Abstract: Building on a partner-switching mechanism, we experimentally test two theories that posit different reasons why promises breed trust and cooperation. The expectation-based explanation (EBE) operates via belief-dependent guilt aversion, while the commitment-based explanation (CBE) suggests that promises offer commitment power via a (belief-independent) preference to keep one’s word. Previous research performed a similar test, which we however argue should be interpreted as concerning informal agreements rather than (unilateral) promises.

Building on a partner-switching mechanism, we experimentally test two theories that posit different reasons why promises breed trust and cooperation. The expectation-based explanation (EBE) operates via belief-dependent guilt aversion, while the commitment-based explanation (CBE) suggests that promises offer commitment power via a (belief-independent) preference to keep one’s word. Previous research performed a similar test, which we argue should be interpreted as concerning informal agreements rather than (unilateral) promises.

Dufwenberg, M., Di Bartolomeo, G., Papa, S. (2023). Promises and partner-switch. JOURNAL OF THE ECONOMIC SCIENCE ASSOCIATION, 9, 77-89 [10.1007/s40881-023-00128-4].

Promises and partner-switch

Stefano Papa
2023-03-01

Abstract

Building on a partner-switching mechanism, we experimentally test two theories that posit different reasons why promises breed trust and cooperation. The expectation-based explanation (EBE) operates via belief-dependent guilt aversion, while the commitment-based explanation (CBE) suggests that promises offer commitment power via a (belief-independent) preference to keep one’s word. Previous research performed a similar test, which we argue should be interpreted as concerning informal agreements rather than (unilateral) promises.
mar-2023
Pubblicato
Rilevanza internazionale
Articolo
Esperti anonimi
Settore SECS-P/01 - ECONOMIA POLITICA
English
Con Impact Factor ISI
Abstract: Building on a partner-switching mechanism, we experimentally test two theories that posit different reasons why promises breed trust and cooperation. The expectation-based explanation (EBE) operates via belief-dependent guilt aversion, while the commitment-based explanation (CBE) suggests that promises offer commitment power via a (belief-independent) preference to keep one’s word. Previous research performed a similar test, which we however argue should be interpreted as concerning informal agreements rather than (unilateral) promises.
Promises, partner-switching, expectations, commitment, guilt, informal agreements.
Promises · Partner-switching · Expectations · Commitment · Guilt · Informal agreements
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40881-023-00128-4
Dufwenberg, M., Di Bartolomeo, G., Papa, S. (2023). Promises and partner-switch. JOURNAL OF THE ECONOMIC SCIENCE ASSOCIATION, 9, 77-89 [10.1007/s40881-023-00128-4].
Dufwenberg, M; Di Bartolomeo, G; Papa, S
Articolo su rivista
01 - Articolo su rivista
File in questo prodotto:
File Dimensione Formato  
s40881-023-00128-4 (2).pdf

accesso aperto

Dimensione 756.89 kB
Formato Adobe PDF
Visualizza/Apri
756.89 kB Adobe PDF Visualizza/Apri
JESA 2023.pdf

accesso aperto

Tipologia: Versione Editoriale (PDF)
Licenza: Creative commons
Dimensione 775.21 kB
Formato Adobe PDF
Visualizza/Apri
775.21 kB Adobe PDF Visualizza/Apri

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2108/300847
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus ND
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? 2
social impact