Intentionality and Referentiality in Plato's Cratylus

The paper aims to show that in Plato’s conception of names, and more generally of language, there is room for a differentiation between referentiality and intentionality. Firstly, Plato’s account in the Cratylus of the relationship between names and named things is taken into consideration, in order to highlight the nature and the limits of the connection between linguistic units and reality. Secondly, particular attention is paid to Plato’s awareness of the distinction between the epistemic and the merely communicative function of language, which vividly shows how language works even in the absence of knowledge of the true essence of things (and, consequently, in the absence of referentiality). Thirdly, and on this basis, it is argued for the possibility of distinguishing within Plato’s ontological framework between intentionality, understood as the dynamis of linguistic units (i.e. their capability to address something), and referentiality, intended as the effectiveness of the relationship of those units with things named. Fourthly, the fruitfulness of this interpretative approach is pointed out by its application to the pages 237b-239a of the Sophist, which focuses on the problematic notion of medamos on.