This paper presents a critical review of the Costly State verification framework and shows how this framework provides the best conditions to obtain optimality results of debt contract.

Campioni, E., Attar, A.k. (2002). Costly state verification and debt contracts.

Costly state verification and debt contracts

CAMPIONI, ELOISA;ATTAR, ANDREA KAMAL
2002-09-01

Abstract

This paper presents a critical review of the Costly State verification framework and shows how this framework provides the best conditions to obtain optimality results of debt contract.
set-2002
debt contract
mechanism design
costly state verification
Campioni, E., Attar, A.k. (2002). Costly state verification and debt contracts.
Campioni, E; Attar, Ak
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2108/272
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