To what extent does a more competent public bureaucracy contribute to better economic outcomes? We address this question in the context of the US federal procurement of services and works, by combining contract-level data on procurement performance and bureau-level data on competence and workforce characteristics. We use the death occurrences of specific types of employees as instruments and find that an increase in bureau competence causes a significant and economically important reduction in (a) time delays, (b) cost overruns, and (c) number of renegotiations. Cooperation within the office appears to be a key driver of the findings. (JEL D73, H11, H57, L26).
Decarolis, F., M Giuffrida, L., Iossa, E., Mollisi, V., Spagnolo, G. (2020). Bureaucratic Competence and Procurement Outcomes. THE JOURNAL OF LAW ECONOMICS & ORGANIZATION, 36(3), 537-597 [10.1093/jleo/ewaa004].
Bureaucratic Competence and Procurement Outcomes
Elisabetta Iossa
;Giancarlo Spagnolo
2020-11-01
Abstract
To what extent does a more competent public bureaucracy contribute to better economic outcomes? We address this question in the context of the US federal procurement of services and works, by combining contract-level data on procurement performance and bureau-level data on competence and workforce characteristics. We use the death occurrences of specific types of employees as instruments and find that an increase in bureau competence causes a significant and economically important reduction in (a) time delays, (b) cost overruns, and (c) number of renegotiations. Cooperation within the office appears to be a key driver of the findings. (JEL D73, H11, H57, L26).| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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