La duplice accezione dell’espressione me esti nella 5. e nella 6. ipotesi del Parmenide

The paper focuses on the incipit of the fifth and sixth hypotheses and examines the role played by the semantic value of the expression me esti in the initial arrangement of the two hypotheses. The analysis starts from the incipit of the sixth hypothesis. The occurrences of verba dicendi in these lines which have as their object the expression me esti indicate that the argumentation of this hypothesis is located in a linguistic dimension: “not-being” is here considered primarily as the referent of a linguistic locution. The incipit of the fifth hypothesis has different characteristics: its initial arrangement is not linguistic; instead it involves a cognitive act: “not-being” is understood as an object of thought. An interesting aspect of these two ways of arrange the hypotheses deserves attention: the hypotheses propose the same characteristics as a passage of the Sophist (237b7-239a11), in which the question of “not-being” is addressed for the first time in the dialogue through a sequence of three arguments. The paper shows the correspondences between the sixth hypothesis and the first argument and between the fifth hypothesis and the second argument. In the light of this parallelism, the two hypotheses are further evidence of a phase of reflection by Plato on the use of the verb “to be” and of negation. Albeit in the aporetic perspective that characterizes the whole pragmateia, the initial arrangements of the two hypotheses is a sign of Plato’s awareness that the question of not-being cannot be addressed or set aside by limiting it to a purely linguistic or cognitive dimension. For the language, with its double face – (cognitive) intentionality and (presumedly linguistic) referentiality –, presents us with radically conflicting, irreconcilable and inconclusive options.