Cecità e sordità in Platone : controprova di un dispositivo metaforico

Although sight and hearing are considered by Plato to be more prestigious than the other senses from an epistemological point of view, it is well-known that he accorded a clear preference to sight over hearing as well. The paper aims to make a contribution to the understanding of this privilege through the analysis of the way in which blindness and deafness are taken into consideration and dealt with in Plato’s dialogues. In fact, sight and hearing share common characteristics in many Platonic passages and are often associated, while there is a big difference in the treatment that Plato deserves to blindness and deafness. It will be shown that the reason why blindness is mentioned more frequently than deafness is its stronger metaphorical power and its greater epistemological relevance. This helps to understand that the gap that separates blindness from deafness (and sight from hearing) is grounded on the different intentional structure of the two senses and on the different way in which they relate to their respective objects.