We give a negative answer to the question of whether our conviction about the truth of the Gödel sentence G involves a theory of truth beyond the deflationary theories. After discussing and dismissing Neil Tennant’s deflationary account of incompleteness, we show how a new deflationary construal of the incompletability of formal systems can be framed in the setting of Peano Arithmetic augmented to include a constructive version of the ω-rule based on Herbrand’s notion of prototype proof.
Piazza, M., Pulcini, G. (2015). A Deflationary Account of the Truth of the Gödel Sentence G. In From Logic to Practice (pp. 71-90). Springer [10.1007/978-3-319-10434-8_5].
A Deflationary Account of the Truth of the Gödel Sentence G
Pulcini, Gabriele
2015-01-01
Abstract
We give a negative answer to the question of whether our conviction about the truth of the Gödel sentence G involves a theory of truth beyond the deflationary theories. After discussing and dismissing Neil Tennant’s deflationary account of incompleteness, we show how a new deflationary construal of the incompletability of formal systems can be framed in the setting of Peano Arithmetic augmented to include a constructive version of the ω-rule based on Herbrand’s notion of prototype proof.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
