Il corpo, la luce e l'insieme dei due. Una proposta esegetica di Plotino, enn. I 1 [53], 6, 14-7, 6

In enn. I 1 [53], 6, 14–7, 6, Plotinus describes the coming to be of the living being capable of feeling and experiencing passions, and identifies its constitution in the connection of three factors: (a) a transcendent soul; (b) „something like light” which proceeds from the transcendent soul; (c) a body. It is the συναμφότερον that feels – he states – „because such a soul [i.e. the transcendent soul], starting from such a body and from something like a light given by it, produces the nature of the living as something else [...]”. The nature of the body mentioned here, however, appears particularly problematic: is it a body which already possesses an elementary form of life received by the soul of the cosmos, as a widespread interpretation would have it, or is it made alive when the soul gives its light to it? Through an analysis of the passage in the light of the similar text of VI 4 [22], 15, 8–18, the second option is proposed here: before being illuminated by „something like light”, this body has only received the formal reasons that proceed from the soul of the cosmos and consequently has a morphological structure. Although it cannot be said to be lifeless like a piece of wood, which is „only body”, it is not endowed with multiple movements and does not perform vital functions. It has an „aptitude” to receive life and it is only when the soul gives its light to it that it becomes alive, fulfills the primary functions to keep itself alive, and experiences passions and basic sensations.