Law-breaking activities within firms are widespread but difficult to uncover, making whistleblowing by employees desirable. We investigate if and how monetary incentives and expectations of social approval or disapproval from the public, and their interactions, affect an employee’s decision to blow the whistle when the social damage from the reported misbehavior is more or less salient. Our analysis also has implications for the design and management of firms’ internal whistleblowing channels.
Butler, J.v., Serra, D., Spagnolo, G. (2020). Motivating whistleblowers. MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 66(2), 605-621 [10.1287/mnsc.2018.3240].
Motivating whistleblowers
Spagnolo G.
2020-01-01
Abstract
Law-breaking activities within firms are widespread but difficult to uncover, making whistleblowing by employees desirable. We investigate if and how monetary incentives and expectations of social approval or disapproval from the public, and their interactions, affect an employee’s decision to blow the whistle when the social damage from the reported misbehavior is more or less salient. Our analysis also has implications for the design and management of firms’ internal whistleblowing channels.| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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