We extend the protection for sale model of Grossman and Heiman (1994) by introducing a general model of monopolistic competition with variable markups and incomplete pass-through. We show that the structure of protection emerging in the political equilibrium not only depends on the weight attached by the government to consumer welfare when making its policy decision, but also on the degree of market power of firms and on the terms-of-trade variations due to the degree of pass-through. Our results highlight the importance of preferences in shaping the structure of protection and are consistent with the occurring of protectionism also in unorganized industries.

Annicchiarico, B., Marvasi, E. (2019). Protection for sale under monopolistic competition: Beyond the CES. EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 60, 101802 [10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2019.06.003].

Protection for sale under monopolistic competition: Beyond the CES

Annicchiarico B.
Writing – Original Draft Preparation
;
2019-01-01

Abstract

We extend the protection for sale model of Grossman and Heiman (1994) by introducing a general model of monopolistic competition with variable markups and incomplete pass-through. We show that the structure of protection emerging in the political equilibrium not only depends on the weight attached by the government to consumer welfare when making its policy decision, but also on the degree of market power of firms and on the terms-of-trade variations due to the degree of pass-through. Our results highlight the importance of preferences in shaping the structure of protection and are consistent with the occurring of protectionism also in unorganized industries.
2019
Pubblicato
Rilevanza internazionale
Articolo
Esperti anonimi
Settore SECS-P/01 - ECONOMIA POLITICA
Settore SECS-P/02 - POLITICA ECONOMICA
English
Protection for sale; Monopolistic competition; Incomplete pass-through; Endogenous markups
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176268019300096?via=ihub
Annicchiarico, B., Marvasi, E. (2019). Protection for sale under monopolistic competition: Beyond the CES. EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 60, 101802 [10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2019.06.003].
Annicchiarico, B; Marvasi, E
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2108/232342
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