This paper investigates interactions between waste and enforcement policies in the presence of a corruptible bureaucrat. We set up a repeated game obtained by an infinite repetition of a three stage game, where a firm producing illegal waste can bribe a bureaucrat in charge of monitoring its disposal choices. The bureaucrat may accept or not the bribe and chooses whether to hide illegal waste disposal to a national waste authority. We study conditions under which corruption can arise in equilibrium, and find that illegal disposal is larger under corruption, while, surprisingly, the bribe does not necessarily decrease with the punishment for detected corruption. Finally, our analysis suggests that increasing the interactions between the regulated firm and the bureaucrat increases illegal disposal via corruption.

Cesi, B., D'Amato, A., Zoli, M. (2019). Corruption in environmental policy: the case of waste. ECONOMIA POLITICA, 36(1), 65-78 [10.1007/s40888-017-0087-x].

Corruption in environmental policy: the case of waste

Cesi B.;D'Amato A.;Zoli M.
2019-01-01

Abstract

This paper investigates interactions between waste and enforcement policies in the presence of a corruptible bureaucrat. We set up a repeated game obtained by an infinite repetition of a three stage game, where a firm producing illegal waste can bribe a bureaucrat in charge of monitoring its disposal choices. The bureaucrat may accept or not the bribe and chooses whether to hide illegal waste disposal to a national waste authority. We study conditions under which corruption can arise in equilibrium, and find that illegal disposal is larger under corruption, while, surprisingly, the bribe does not necessarily decrease with the punishment for detected corruption. Finally, our analysis suggests that increasing the interactions between the regulated firm and the bureaucrat increases illegal disposal via corruption.
2019
Pubblicato
Rilevanza internazionale
Articolo
Esperti anonimi
Settore SECS-P/02 - POLITICA ECONOMICA
Settore SECS-P/03 - SCIENZA DELLE FINANZE
English
Con Impact Factor ISI
Waste management Illegal disposal Corruption Enforcement
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40888-017-0087-x
Cesi, B., D'Amato, A., Zoli, M. (2019). Corruption in environmental policy: the case of waste. ECONOMIA POLITICA, 36(1), 65-78 [10.1007/s40888-017-0087-x].
Cesi, B; D'Amato, A; Zoli, M
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2108/214581
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