Environmental non-compliance is affected by the decentralized shaping of environmental policy by local governments and enforcement actions by public bodies. Illegal waste disposal is examined in a relevant national case, by means of an original regionally disaggregated panel dataset for Italy, a country which witnesses heterogeneous environmental performances across regions and a decentralized policy system. Our empirical analysis produces two main insights of strong policy interest. First, commitment to a more stringent waste policy tends to increase illegal disposal of waste. Second, a nonlinear bell shaped relationship exists between the number of inspections and the quantity of illegal disposal. The key message is that deterrence might only result after a relatively high level of controls is implemented.
D'Amato, A., Mazzanti, M., Nicolli, F., Zoli, M. (2018). Illegal waste disposal: Enforcement actions and decentralized environmental policy. SOCIO-ECONOMIC PLANNING SCIENCES, 64, 56-65 [10.1016/j.seps.2017.12.006].
Illegal waste disposal: Enforcement actions and decentralized environmental policy
D'Amato A.;Zoli M.
2018-01-01
Abstract
Environmental non-compliance is affected by the decentralized shaping of environmental policy by local governments and enforcement actions by public bodies. Illegal waste disposal is examined in a relevant national case, by means of an original regionally disaggregated panel dataset for Italy, a country which witnesses heterogeneous environmental performances across regions and a decentralized policy system. Our empirical analysis produces two main insights of strong policy interest. First, commitment to a more stringent waste policy tends to increase illegal disposal of waste. Second, a nonlinear bell shaped relationship exists between the number of inspections and the quantity of illegal disposal. The key message is that deterrence might only result after a relatively high level of controls is implemented.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
---|---|---|---|
1_DAmato_Mazzanti_Nicolli_Zoli.pdf
solo utenti autorizzati
Tipologia:
Versione Editoriale (PDF)
Licenza:
Copyright dell'editore
Dimensione
557.3 kB
Formato
Adobe PDF
|
557.3 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizza/Apri Richiedi una copia |
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.