An agent gathers information on productivity shocks and accordingly produces on behalf of a principal. Information gathering is imperfect and whether it succeeds or not depends on the agent's effort. Contracting frictions come from the fact that the agent is pessimistic on the issue of information gathering, and there are both moral hazard in information gathering, private information on productivity shocks and moral hazard on operating effort. An optimal menu of linear contracts mixes high-powered, productivity-dependent screening options following “good news” with a fixed low-powered option otherwise.

Iossa, E., Martimort, D. (2015). Pessimistic information gathering. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 91, 75-96 [10.1016/j.geb.2015.03.014].

Pessimistic information gathering

Iossa, Elisabetta
;
2015-01-01

Abstract

An agent gathers information on productivity shocks and accordingly produces on behalf of a principal. Information gathering is imperfect and whether it succeeds or not depends on the agent's effort. Contracting frictions come from the fact that the agent is pessimistic on the issue of information gathering, and there are both moral hazard in information gathering, private information on productivity shocks and moral hazard on operating effort. An optimal menu of linear contracts mixes high-powered, productivity-dependent screening options following “good news” with a fixed low-powered option otherwise.
2015
Pubblicato
Rilevanza internazionale
Articolo
Esperti anonimi
Settore SECS-P/01 - ECONOMIA POLITICA
English
Con Impact Factor ISI
Information gathering Moral hazard Asymmetric information Pessimism
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825615000639?via=ihub
Iossa, E., Martimort, D. (2015). Pessimistic information gathering. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 91, 75-96 [10.1016/j.geb.2015.03.014].
Iossa, E; Martimort, D
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2108/204157
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