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EnglishWe apply the idea of relation contracting to a very simple problem of regulating a single-product monopolistic firm when the regulatory instrument is a fixed-price contract, and quality is endogenous and observable, but not verifiable. We model the interaction between the regulator and the firm as a dynamic game, and we show that, provided both players are su±ciently patient, there exist self-enforcing regulatory contracts in which the firm prefers to produce the quality mandated by the regulator, while the regulator chooses to leave the firm a positive rent as a reward to its quality choice. We also show that the socially optimal self-enforcing contract implies a distortion from the second best, which is greater the more impatient is the ¯rm and the larger is the (marginal) e®ect of the contractual price on the pro¯ts the ¯rm would make by deviating from the o®ered contract. Whenever the punishment pro¯ts are strictly positive, even if the ¯rm were in- ¯nitely patient, the optimal contract would ensure a Ramsey condition but with positive pro¯ts to the ¯rm. Our result also illustrates that, whenever the firm's output has some unverifiable component, optimal regulatory lag in fixed-price contract should be reduced to limit the reward of the firm's opportunistic behaviour.
Cesi, B., Iozzi, A., & Valentini, E. (2009). Regulating unverifiable quality by fixed-price contracts [Working paper].
| Tipologia: | Altro |
| Citazione: | Cesi, B., Iozzi, A., & Valentini, E. (2009). Regulating unverifiable quality by fixed-price contracts [Working paper]. |
| URL: | http://www.u-cergy.fr/IMG/2009-14.pdf |
| Lingua: | English |
| Settore Scientifico Disciplinare: | Settore SECS-P/01 - Economia Politica |
| DCMI: | Working paper |
| Rilevanza: | Rilevanza internazionale |
| Data di pubblicazione: | nov-2009 |
| Titolo: | Regulating unverifiable quality by fixed-price contracts |
| Autori: | Cesi, B; Iozzi, A; Valentini, E |
| Autori: | |
| Appare nelle tipologie: | 99 - Altro |
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