We wonder whether different game experiences are associated with significant differences in experimental behavior and, more specifically, whether expert bridge players, due to their habit of playing with partners and seldom for money, are more likely to adopt cooperative behavior than expert poker players. Evidence from trust games shows that bridge players make more polarized choices and choose the maximum trustor contribution significantly more often. Our findings are similar across incentivized and non-incentivized experiments and thereby support the hypothesis that behavior in simulated experiments resembles that in experiments with monetary payoffs.

Becchetti, L., Fiaschetti, M., Marini, G. (2014). Card games and economic behavior. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 88, 112-129 [10.1016/j.geb.2014.08.003].

Card games and economic behavior

BECCHETTI, LEONARDO;FIASCHETTI, MAURIZIO;MARINI, GIANCARLO
2014-01-01

Abstract

We wonder whether different game experiences are associated with significant differences in experimental behavior and, more specifically, whether expert bridge players, due to their habit of playing with partners and seldom for money, are more likely to adopt cooperative behavior than expert poker players. Evidence from trust games shows that bridge players make more polarized choices and choose the maximum trustor contribution significantly more often. Our findings are similar across incentivized and non-incentivized experiments and thereby support the hypothesis that behavior in simulated experiments resembles that in experiments with monetary payoffs.
2014
Pubblicato
Rilevanza internazionale
Articolo
Esperti anonimi
Settore SECS-P/01 - ECONOMIA POLITICA
English
Con Impact Factor ISI
randomized experiment, trust games
Becchetti, L., Fiaschetti, M., Marini, G. (2014). Card games and economic behavior. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 88, 112-129 [10.1016/j.geb.2014.08.003].
Becchetti, L; Fiaschetti, M; Marini, G
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2108/137877
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