We offer a holistic view (and formal representation) of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), in which the national objectives of the states emerge in terms of trade-off between control and respect of the asylum seekers' human rights. Control of access implies spillover of the flows towards neighbouring states and rivalries between the states in a non-cooperative game. An asylum system is a set of rules designed to settle rivalries, balancing out the national objectives. Thus, on the basis of a Pareto (unanimity) criterion, one system is preferred to another if all the states are better able to achieve their national objectives. We examine the conditions under which a relocation system based on quotas may be preferable to the Dublin rules, and the reasons why closer harmonisation of standards can favour adoption of such a system. Finally, we comment on the possible outcomes when unanimity is not achieved.
Rossi, E. (2014). Balancing national objectives and settling rivalries: towards a new European asylum system? [Working paper].
|Citazione:||Rossi, E. (2014). Balancing national objectives and settling rivalries: towards a new European asylum system? [Working paper].|
|Settore Scientifico Disciplinare:||Settore SPS/04 - Scienza Politica|
|Data di pubblicazione:||2014|
|Titolo:||Balancing national objectives and settling rivalries: towards a new European asylum system?|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||99 - Altro|