In this paper we propose a model in which there are ideological and strategic voters who vote under proportional rule. We prove that the behavior of ideological voters matters for the determination of the outcome. We show that a subset of strategic voters partially counteracts the votes of the ideological voters.
Ferraris, L., De Sinopoli, F., Iannantuoni, G. (2011). The effect of ideology in proportional representation systems. MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES, 62(2), 87-90 [10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.05.001].
The effect of ideology in proportional representation systems
FERRARIS, LEO;
2011-01-01
Abstract
In this paper we propose a model in which there are ideological and strategic voters who vote under proportional rule. We prove that the behavior of ideological voters matters for the determination of the outcome. We show that a subset of strategic voters partially counteracts the votes of the ideological voters.File in questo prodotto:
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