We present a model where a society elects candidates belonging to two parties to a national parliament. The electoral rule determines the seats distribution between the two parties. The policy outcome is a function of the number of seats the two parties win in the election. We analyze two electoral rules, multidistrict majority and single district proportional. We prove that under both systems there is a unique pure strategy perfect equilibrium outcome. We compare the outcomes under the two systems.
Ferraris, L., De Sinopoli, F., Iannantuoni, G. (2013). Electing a Parliament. SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, 40(3), 715-737 [10.1007/s00355-011-0635-1].
Electing a Parliament
FERRARIS, LEO;
2013-01-01
Abstract
We present a model where a society elects candidates belonging to two parties to a national parliament. The electoral rule determines the seats distribution between the two parties. The policy outcome is a function of the number of seats the two parties win in the election. We analyze two electoral rules, multidistrict majority and single district proportional. We prove that under both systems there is a unique pure strategy perfect equilibrium outcome. We compare the outcomes under the two systems.| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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