We study the incentives of regulated firms to acquire costly information under price cap regulation. We show that revenue sharing plans, in the spirit proposed by Sappington and Weisman [Inf. Econ. Policy 8 (1996) 229], can provide greater incentives for information acquisition than pure price capping and increase social welfare.
Iossa, E., Stroffolini, F. (2005). Price cap regulation, revenue sharing and information acquisition. INFORMATION ECONOMICS AND POLICY, 17(2), 217-230 [10.1016/j.infoecopol.2004.06.001].
Price cap regulation, revenue sharing and information acquisition
IOSSA, ELISABETTA;
2005-01-01
Abstract
We study the incentives of regulated firms to acquire costly information under price cap regulation. We show that revenue sharing plans, in the spirit proposed by Sappington and Weisman [Inf. Econ. Policy 8 (1996) 229], can provide greater incentives for information acquisition than pure price capping and increase social welfare.File in questo prodotto:
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