We consider a setting where a decision-maker has to resolve a dispute between two parties. On demand of the losing party, the decision may be subject to review by an appellate body. The decision-maker has discretionary power and may be opportunistic. Depending on the institution design, information on the dispute is provided either by the parties themselves or by an independent investigator. We show that information provision by the parties generates more efficient monitoring through appeals and less opportunism by the decision-maker than information provision by the investigator. We discuss our results in light of the adversarialversus- inquisitorial controversy.

Iossa, E., Palumbo, G. (2007). Information provision and monitoring of the decision-maker in the presence of an appeal process. JOURNAL OF INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECONOMICS, 163, 657-682.

Information provision and monitoring of the decision-maker in the presence of an appeal process

IOSSA, ELISABETTA;
2007-01-01

Abstract

We consider a setting where a decision-maker has to resolve a dispute between two parties. On demand of the losing party, the decision may be subject to review by an appellate body. The decision-maker has discretionary power and may be opportunistic. Depending on the institution design, information on the dispute is provided either by the parties themselves or by an independent investigator. We show that information provision by the parties generates more efficient monitoring through appeals and less opportunism by the decision-maker than information provision by the investigator. We discuss our results in light of the adversarialversus- inquisitorial controversy.
2007
Pubblicato
Rilevanza internazionale
Articolo
Sì, ma tipo non specificato
Settore SECS-P/01 - ECONOMIA POLITICA
Settore SECS-P/01 - ECONOMIA POLITICA
English
Con Impact Factor ISI
information provision, appeals, discretion, adversarial and inquisitorial systems.
Iossa, E., Palumbo, G. (2007). Information provision and monitoring of the decision-maker in the presence of an appeal process. JOURNAL OF INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECONOMICS, 163, 657-682.
Iossa, E; Palumbo, G
Articolo su rivista
File in questo prodotto:
File Dimensione Formato  
Iossa Palumbo JITE.pdf

solo utenti autorizzati

Dimensione 267.3 kB
Formato Adobe PDF
267.3 kB Adobe PDF   Visualizza/Apri   Richiedi una copia

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2108/10647
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus 15
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? 14
social impact