Wealth Effects, the Taylor Rule and the Liquidity Trap

Barbara Annicchiarico Giancarlo Marini Alessandro Piergallini


This paper can be downloaded without charge from the Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection: http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=986129
Wealth Effects, the Taylor Rule, and the Liquidity Trap

Barbara Annicchiarico†
University of Rome “Tor Vergata”
Giancarlo Marini‡
University of Rome “Tor Vergata”
Alessandro Piergallini§
CeFiMS, University of London

March 2007

Abstract

This paper analyzes the dynamic properties of the Taylor rule with the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate in an optimizing monetary model with overlapping generations. The main result is that the presence of wealth effects is not sufficient to rule out the possibility of infinite equilibrium paths with decelerating inflation. In particular, the operation of wealth effects does not avoid the occurrence of liquidity traps when the central bank implements a Taylor-type interest-rate feedback rule.

Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E31, E52.
Keywords: Wealth Effects, Taylor Rules, Liquidity Traps.

---

*We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the FIRB project.
†Corresponding Author: Department of Economics, University of Rome ‘Tor Vergata’, Via Columbia 2, 00133 Roma, Italy. E-mail: barbara.an nicchiarico@uniroma2.it. Phone: +390672595731. Fax: +39062020500.
‡Department of Economics, University of Rome ‘Tor Vergata’, Via Columbia 2, 00133 Roma, Italy. E-mail: marini@uniroma2.it.
§Centre for Financial & Management Studies, University of London, Thornhaugh Street, London WC1H 0XG, UK. E-mail: ap50@soas.ac.uk.
1 Introduction

The dynamic effects of Taylor-style policy rules (Taylor, 1993, 1999) have arguably been one of the most debated issues in modern monetary economics. When fiscal solvency is guaranteed, active monetary policies, i.e., interest rate feedback rules increasing the nominal interest rate rule by more than a raise in inflation, have often been proved to induce local rational-expectations equilibrium uniqueness, thus ruling out sunspot fluctuations (e.g., Leeper, 1991; McCallum, 2003; Woodford, 2003). However, it is well known, at least since the seminal contributions by Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2001a, 2001b, 2002), that interest rate rules of Taylor’s type, ensuring the respect of the zero lower bound for the nominal interest rate, are likely to lead to multiple steady-state equilibria and global indeterminacy. In particular, in a dynamic optimizing general equilibrium framework with infinite horizon, Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2001b) demonstrate the existence of an infinite number of equilibrium paths originating around the steady state at which monetary policy is active and converging to a liquidity trap.

The main purpose of the present paper is to investigate whether wealth effects are sufficient to rule out trajectories spiraling down into a liquidity trap when the monetary authorities implement Taylor-type interest rate rules. The stabilizing role of wealth effects in preventing the liquidity trap dates back to the seminal works by Pigou (1943, 1947) and Patinkin (1965). However, the implications of wealth effects for the liquidity trap have not been investigated in modern theoretical setups for monetary analysis, that combine dynamic optimizing general equilibrium modeling with monetary
policy rules targeting the short-term nominal interest rate.

In order to rigorously micro-found wealth effects in an optimizing framework, we construct a flexible price money-in-the-utility-function version of the Yaari (1965)-Blanchard (1985)-Weil (1989) overlapping generations (OLG) setup, extended to the more general case of non-separable preferences. The model we adopt embeds the standard infinitely lived representative agent formulation as a special case and can be usefully employed to consider the issue of global macroeconomic stability under the Taylor rule when wealth effects are operative. In an OLG framework à la Weil (1989), Ireland (2005) shows how the real balance effect is capable of eliminating the liquidity trap when the money supply is the policy instrument. Our model, on the other hand, examines the implications of wealth effects under the assumption that the monetary authority adopts a Taylor rule with the zero bound on nominal interest rates.¹

We demonstrate how wealth effects fail to act as automatic stabilizers and can generate an additional source of multiple steady-state equilibria. Our main result is that in the neighborhood of the steady states at which the interest rate feedback rule is active, the operation of wealth effects is not sufficient to avoid multiple perfect-foresight equilibrium trajectories leading the economy to a deflationary trap.

The conventional wisdom that the presence of wealth effects is capable of ruling out the liquidity trap does not hold in a dynamic general equilibrium optimizing framework if the central bank adopts the Taylor rule. Our results

¹In an OLG model à la Weil (1989), Bénassy (2000, 2005) analyzes the issue of price level determinacy under interest rate pegs and a conventional Taylor rule.
thus provide additional theoretical support to the original findings obtained by Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2001b) in the context of the infinite-horizon representative agent paradigm. The possibility of liquidity traps under the Taylor rules is a robust result, which still holds in the presence of wealth effects.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a monetary model with wealth effects and describes the monetary and the fiscal regimes. Section 3 develops the steady state analysis. Section 4 studies the model equilibrium dynamics and examines the issue of liquidity traps. The concluding Section 5 summarizes the main findings.

2 The Model

The economy is described by a flexible-price monetary version of the Yaari (1965)-Blanchard (1985)-Weil (1989) OLG framework. Each individual faces an age-independent instantaneous probability of death, \( \mu > 0 \). Population is assumed to grow at a constant rate \( n \). At each instant \( t \) a new generation is born and the birth rate is defined as \( \beta = n + \mu \).

Let \( N_t \) denote population at time \( t \). For analytical convenience, population at time \( t = 0 \) is normalized to one, \( N_0 = 1 \). Given the birth rate \( \beta \) and the death rate \( \mu \), the size of the generation born at time \( t \) is \( \beta N_t = \beta e^{nt} \), while the size of the surviving cohort born at time \( s \leq t \) is \( \beta N_s e^{-\mu(t-s)} = \beta e^{-\mu t} e^{\beta s} \). Therefore, total population at time \( t \) is \( N_t = \beta e^{-\mu t} \int_{-\infty}^{t} e^{\beta s} ds \).

The economy is characterized by absence of dynastic altruism. Hence, financial wealth of newly born agents is zero. Individuals alive supply one
unit of labor inelastically, which is transformed one-for-one into output.

The representative agent of the generation born at time \( s \leq 0 \) chooses the time path of consumption, \( \bar{c}_{s,t} \), and of real money balances, \( \bar{m}_{s,t} \), in order to maximize the following expected lifetime utility function:

\[
E_0 \int_0^\infty \log \Omega(\bar{c}_{s,t}, \bar{m}_{s,t}) e^{-\rho t} dt,
\]

(1)

where \( \rho > 0 \) is the rate of time preference. The sub-utility function, \( \Omega(\cdot) \), is strictly increasing, strictly concave and linearly homogenous.\(^2\) Consumption and real money balances are Edgeworth complements, hence \( \Omega_{cm} > 0 \), and the elasticity of substitution between the two is less than one.\(^3\) Individuals accumulate their financial wealth, \( \bar{a}_{s,t} \), in the form of real money balances and interest bearing government bonds, \( \bar{b}_{s,t} \). Let \( R_t \) denote the nominal interest rate, \( \pi_t \) the inflation rate and \( \bar{\tau}_{s,t} \) real lump-sum taxes. Since the probability at time 0 of being alive at time \( t \geq 0 \) is given by \( e^{-\mu t} \), equation (1) can be rewritten as:

\[
\int_0^\infty \log \Omega(\bar{c}_{s,t}, \bar{m}_{s,t}) e^{-(\mu + \rho)t} dt,
\]

(2)

The consumer’s instantaneous budget constraint is given by:

\[
\dot{\bar{a}}_{s,t} = (R_t - \pi_t + \mu) \bar{a}_{s,t} + \bar{y}_{s,t} - \bar{\tau}_{s,t} - \bar{c}_{s,t} - R_t \bar{m}_{s,t},
\]

(3)

where \( \mu \bar{a}_{s,t} \) is an actuarial fair payment that individuals receive from a per-

---

\(^2\)The assumption of linear homogeneity of the sub-utility function makes aggregation of individual variables across all cohorts analytically tractable.

\(^3\)This assumption ensures that money is always essential. See Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983) for details.
fectly competitive life insurance company as long as they survive. After their death, the total amount of their financial wealth accrues to the insurance company. In other words, insurance companies collect financial assets from deceased members of the population and pay fair premia to surviving individuals (Yaari, 1965). The operation of a life insurance market rules out the possibility for individuals of passing away leaving unintended bequest to their heirs.

The condition precluding agents’ Ponzi-games must also be satisfied:

$$\lim_{t \to \infty} \sigma_{s,t} e^{-\int_{0}^{t}(R_k - \pi_k)dk} \geq 0. \quad (4)$$

The individual maximization problem can be solved using a two-stage budgeting procedure. Let $\overline{z}_{s,t}$ denote total consumption at time $t$ for the agent born at time $s$, defined as physical consumption plus the interest for-gone on real money holdings, $\overline{z}_{s,t} = c_{s,t} + R_t m_{s,t}$. In the first stage, consumers solve an intra-temporal problem of choosing the optimal allocation between consumption and real money holdings, in order to maximize their instantaneous utility function, $\Omega(\cdot)$, for a given level of total consumption, $\overline{z}_{s,t}$. At the optimum the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and real money holdings is equal to the nominal interest rate:

$$\frac{\Omega_m (c_{s,t}, \overline{m}_{s,t})}{\Omega_c (c_{s,t}, \overline{m}_{s,t})} = R_t. \quad (5)$$

Since preferences are linearly homogenous, the optimal portfolio equilibrium

\footnote{There is uncertainty at the individual level, but not in aggregate. For this reason there is scope for a life insurance market to be operative. See Yaari (1965) for details.}
condition (5) is of the form:

\[ \bar{v}_{s,t} = \Gamma(R_t)\bar{m}_{s,t}, \quad (6) \]

where \( \Gamma(\cdot) \) is such that \( \Gamma'(R_t) > 0 \) and \( \Gamma(R_t) - R_t\Gamma'(R_t) > 0 \).\(^5\)

In the second stage of maximization, consumers solve the intertemporal problem of deriving the optimal time path of total consumption, \( \bar{z}_{s,t} \), in order to maximize their lifetime utility function (2), given the constraints (3), (4) and the optimal condition (6). At the optimum the time path of individual total consumption is (see Appendix B):

\[ \dot{z}_{s,t} = (R_t - \pi_t - \rho)z_{s,t}. \quad (7) \]

Using the equation of motion of total consumption (7) and condition (6), and recalling that \( \bar{z}_{s,t} = \bar{v}_{s,t} + R_t\bar{m}_{s,t} \), one can derive the optimal path of individual consumption:

\[ \dot{v}_{s,t} = (R_t - \pi_t - \rho)v_{s,t} - \frac{L'(R_t)}{L(R_t)} R_t v_{s,t}, \quad (8) \]

where \( L(R_t) \equiv 1 + \frac{R_t}{\Gamma(R_t)} \) and \( L'(R_t) > 0 \). Note that the optimal consumption growth rate is the same for all generations.

\(^5\)Condition \( \Gamma'(R_t) > 0 \) follows from \( \Omega_{cc} - \Omega_{cm}\Omega_c/\Omega_m < 0 \) and \( \Omega_{mm} - \Omega_{cm}\Omega_m/\Omega_c < 0 \); whereas the sign of \( \Gamma(R_t) - R_t\Gamma'(R_t) \) depends on the the elasticity of substitution between consumption and real money balances. See Appendix A for details.
2.1 Aggregation

The population aggregate for a generic economic variable at individual level, \( \bar{x}_{s,t} \), is defined as \( X_t = \beta e^{-\mu t} \int_{-\infty}^{t} \bar{x}_{s,t} e^{\beta s} ds \), while the corresponding quantity in per capita terms is \( x_t = X_t e^{-nt} \).

Assuming that each agent faces identical age-independent income and tax flows, \( \bar{y}_{s,t} = \bar{y}_t \) and \( \tau_{s,t} = \tau_t \), for analytical convenience, and recalling that the wealth of newly born consumers is zero, \( \bar{a}_{s,s} = 0 \), we can express the budget constraint (3) and the optimal time path of consumption in per capita terms (8) as (see Appendix C for details):

\[
\begin{align*}
\dot{a}_t &= (R_t - \pi_t - n) a_t + y_t - \tau_t - c_t - R_t m_t, \\
\dot{c}_t &= (R_t - \pi_t - \rho) c_t - \frac{L'(R_t) R_t}{L(R_t)} \dot{R}_t - \frac{\beta (\rho + \mu)}{L(R_t)} a_t.
\end{align*}
\]

The rate of change of per capita consumption depends on the level of financial wealth \( a_t \). Ricardian equivalence is not verified, since future cohorts’ consumption is not valued by agents alive today. Total government liabilities are net wealth for private agents. Older generations are wealthier than younger generations and consume more. Since at each instant of time a new generation is born with no financial wealth, the rate of growth of per capita consumption is lower than individual consumption growth. If the birth rate \( \beta \) were equal to zero, consumption would evolve as in the infinitely-lived representative agent case.
2.2 Monetary and Fiscal Regimes

Following Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2001b), monetary policy is conducted according to an interest rate feedback rule of the form:

$$R_t = R(\pi_t) \equiv R^* e^{(A/R^*)(\pi_t - \pi^*)},$$ (11)

where $\pi^*$ is the target level of inflation, $A > 0$ and $R^* = \pi^* + \rho$. Rule (11) stipulates the impossibility for the monetary authorities to force the nominal interest rate below zero.

**Definition 1.** An interest rate rule $R_t = R(\pi_t)$ is active (passive) if $R'(\pi_t) > (<) 1$.

According to **Definition 1**, the interest rate rule (11) is active (passive) at $\pi^*$ if $A > (<) 1$.

The flow budget constraint of the government in per capita terms is:

$$\dot{a}_t = (R_t - \pi_t - n) a_t - \tau_t - R_t m_t,$$ (12)

where for expositional simplicity public expenditure is set equal to zero at all times. Taxes are an increasing function of government liabilities adjusted for interest savings on the monetary base, as in Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2001a, 2001b):

$$\tau_t + R_t m_t = \theta a_t,$$ (13)

where $\theta > 0$. This parameter restriction ensures that fiscal policy is “Ricardian”, that is, the present discounted value of per-capita total government
liabilities converges to zero for all possible, equilibrium and off-equilibrium, sequences of endogenous variables, namely the price level, the money supply, inflation, and the nominal interest rate:

\[ \lim_{t \to \infty} a_t e^{-\int_0^t (R_k - \pi_k - n) \, dk} = 0. \]  

(14)

To make the implications of our model as much comparable as possible with the results of the standard theory on Taylor rules, we assume \( \theta > R(\pi^*) - \pi^* - n \). This parameter restriction is necessary to guarantee that fiscal policy is “passive” (see Leeper, 1991) or “locally Ricardian” (see Woodford, 2003) around the steady state at which the inflation rate is at its target level, \( \pi^* \). In other words, the dynamics of per capital total government liabilities remains bounded for any bounded path of endogenous variables.

### 2.3 Equilibrium

Total output is assumed to grow at the constant rate \( n \), without loss of generality. It follows that per capita output is constant and can be normalized to one, \( y_t = y = 1 \), for analytical convenience. Equilibrium in the goods market requires that \( c_t = y = 1 \).

Using the equation of motion of per capita consumption (8), we obtain an expression for the equilibrium real interest rate:

\[ R_t - \pi_t = \rho + \frac{L'(R_t) R_t}{L(R_t)} + \frac{\beta(\rho + \mu)}{L(R_t)} a_t. \]  

(15)

The interest rate rule (11) allows us to derive the following dynamic equation
for the inflation rate:

\[ \dot{\pi}_t = [R(\pi_t) - \pi_t - \rho] \frac{L[R(\pi_t)]}{L'[R(\pi_t)] R'(\pi_t)} - \frac{\beta(\rho + \mu)}{L'[R(\pi_t)] R'(\pi_t)} a_t. \quad (16) \]

Substituting (11) and (13) into (12) gives:

\[ \dot{a}_t = [R(\pi_t) - \pi_t - n - \theta] a_t. \quad (17) \]

The initial level of per capita government liabilities \(a_0\) must satisfy \(a_0 = a^n_0/P_0\), where \(a^n_0\) is the nominal value of the initial per capita liabilities and \(P_0\) the initial price level.

A perfect-foresight equilibrium of the model can be defined as follows.

**Definition 2.** A perfect-foresight equilibrium is a set of sequences \(\{\pi_t, a_t\}\) and an initial price level \(P_0 > 0\) satisfying (14), (16) and (17), given an initial stock of government liabilities, \(a^n_0 > 0\).

### 3 Steady State Analysis

Steady state equilibria are defined from equations (16) and (17) setting \(\dot{\pi}_t, \dot{a}_t = 0\). In the general case with a positive birth rate and \(A \neq 1\), the model exhibits four steady-state equilibria.\(^6\)

Let \((\pi^*, a^*)\) and \((\bar{\pi}, \bar{a})\) indicate the pair of steady states characterized by zero net financial wealth, \(a^* = \bar{a} = 0\), and by inflation rates such that

\(^6\)The system of equations (16) and (17) displays a degenerate Bogdanov-Takens bifurcation at \(A = 1\) and \(\theta = \rho - n\). See Appendix E for the proof.
\[ R(\pi^*) - \pi^* = R(\pi) - \pi = \rho, \] where \( \pi^* > (\leq) \pi \) if \( A > (\leq) 1 \). From equation (8), at these steady states individual consumption is constant over time, since the real interest rates, \( r^* = R(\pi^*) - \pi^* \) and \( \tau = R(\pi) - \pi \), are equal to the rate of time preference \( \rho \). The steady states \((\pi^*, a^*)\) and \((\pi, a)\) replicate the equilibrium in which generations are not linked and aggregate consumption is optimally distributed among those alive: each individual only consumes her endowment at all times, so that individual marginal utilities of consumption and real money balances are identical across all generations.

Let \((\tilde{\pi}, \tilde{a})\) and \((\hat{\pi}, \hat{a})\) denote the pair of steady states characterized by inflation rates such that \( R(\tilde{\pi}) - \tilde{\pi} = R(\hat{\pi}) - \hat{\pi} = n + \theta \) and by a positive level of per capita wealth, \( \tilde{a} = (n + \theta - \rho) L \left[ R(\tilde{\pi}) \right] / \beta (\mu + \rho) \) and \( \hat{a} = (n + \theta - \rho) L \left[ R(\hat{\pi}) \right] / \beta (\mu + \rho) \), respectively. Let \( \hat{\pi} < (\geq) \tilde{\pi} \) if \( A > (\leq) 1 \). It follows that \( \hat{a} < (\geq) \tilde{a} \) if \( A > (\leq) 1 \). At the steady states \((\tilde{\pi}, \tilde{a})\) and \((\hat{\pi}, \hat{a})\), the real interest rates, \( \tilde{\tau} = R(\tilde{\pi}) - \tilde{\pi} \) and \( \hat{\tau} = R(\hat{\pi}) - \hat{\pi} \), are higher than the rate of time preference \( \rho \). As a result of equation (8), individual consumption is increasing over time, as agents accumulate financial wealth during their life. An asymmetric distribution of aggregate consumption among different generations emerges. Older individuals consume more than the young.

From the interest rate rule (11), using the fact that \( \theta > \rho - n \), we can state the following proposition.

**Proposition 1.** The steady state equilibria of the model (16) and (17) satisfy the following inequalities: \( \tilde{\pi} > \pi^* > \pi > \hat{\pi} \) and \( \tilde{a} > \hat{a} > 0 \) if \( A > 1 \); \( \tilde{\pi} < \pi^* < \pi < \hat{\pi} \) and \( 0 < \tilde{a} < \hat{a} \) if \( A < 1 \).
4 Dynamic Analysis and Liquidity Traps

We now analyze local and global equilibrium dynamics making use of the following definitions.

**Definition 3.** The model displays nominal determinacy (indeterminacy) around a steady state if for any set of perfect-foresight equilibrium sequences \( \{\pi_t, a_t\} \), there exists a unique price level (an infinite number of initial price levels) \( P_0 > 0 \) consistent with a perfect-foresight equilibrium.

**Definition 4.** The model displays real determinacy (indeterminacy) around a steady state if there exists a unique (an infinite) set of perfect-foresight equilibrium sequences \( \{\pi_t, a_t\} \) converging asymptotically to the steady state.

Close inspection of (16) and (17) reveals that nominal determinacy occurs because, given an equilibrium sequence of the inflation rate \( \{\pi_t\} \), evolving according to equation (16), and an initial level of nominal liabilities, \( a_0 \), there exists a unique price level \( P_0 > 0 \) consistent with the equilibrium sequence.\(^7\)

By contrast, in the infinite horizon representative agent setup where \( \beta = 0 \), inflation dynamics do not depend on the time path of real government liabilities. The unique equilibrium sequence \( \{\pi_t\} \) would be consistent with infinite possible initial price levels and the model would display nominal indeterminacy (see Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2001a).

Let \( J_{(\pi_t, a_t)} \) be the Jacobian matrix of the system of equations (16) and

\(^7\)This result is consistent with the findings obtained by Bénassy (2005) in the context of an OLG monetary model à la Weil (1989) when monetary policy is conducted according to a conventional Taylor rule.
At the steady states \((\pi^*, a^*)\), \((\bar{\pi}, \bar{a})\), \((\tilde{\pi}, \tilde{a})\) and \((\hat{\pi}, \hat{a})\), the Jacobians are, respectively:

\[
J_{(\pi^*, a^*)} = \begin{pmatrix}
[R'(\pi^*) - 1] \frac{L[R(\pi^*)]}{L'[R(\pi^*)]R'(\pi^*)} & -\beta \frac{(\rho + \mu)}{L'[R(\pi^*)]R'(\pi^*)} \\
0 & \rho - n - \theta
\end{pmatrix},
\]

(18)

\[
J_{(\pi, a)} = \begin{pmatrix}
[R'(\pi) - 1] \frac{L[R(\pi)]}{L'[R(\pi)]R'(\pi)} & -\beta \frac{(\rho + \mu)}{L'[R(\pi)]R'(\pi)} \\
0 & \rho - n - \theta
\end{pmatrix},
\]

(19)

\[
J_{(\tilde{\pi}, \tilde{a})} = \begin{pmatrix}
[R'(\tilde{\pi}) - 1] \frac{L[R(\tilde{\pi})]}{L'[R(\tilde{\pi})]R'(\tilde{\pi})} & [R(\tilde{\pi}) - \tilde{\pi} - \rho] - \frac{\beta(\rho + \mu)}{L'[R(\tilde{\pi})]R'(\tilde{\pi})} \\
0 & \rho - n - \theta
\end{pmatrix},
\]

(20)

\[
J_{(\hat{\pi}, \hat{a})} = \begin{pmatrix}
[R'(\hat{\pi}) - 1] \frac{L[R(\hat{\pi})]}{L'[R(\hat{\pi})]R'(\hat{\pi})} & [R(\hat{\pi}) - \hat{\pi} - \rho] - \frac{\beta(\rho + \mu)}{L'[R(\hat{\pi})]R'(\hat{\pi})} \\
0 & \rho - n - \theta
\end{pmatrix},
\]

(21)

In the system of equations (16) and (17), \(\pi_t\) is a jump variable and \(a_t\) is predetermined. Hence the system exhibits a unique convergent solution around a steady state if the real parts of the eigenvalues are of opposite sign (real determinacy), has multiple convergent solutions if the real parts of both eigenvalues are negative (real indeterminacy) and is unstable if they are positive.

Recalling that if \(A > (\rho)1\), \(R'(\pi^*)\), \(R'(\bar{\pi}) > (\rho)1\) and \(R'(\tilde{\pi}), R'(\hat{\pi}) < (\rho)1\), matrices (18)-(21) enable us to establish the following propositions.
Proposition 2. If $A > 1$, the model displays real determinacy around $(\pi^*, a^*)$ and $(\hat{\pi}, \hat{a})$, instability around $(\bar{\pi}, \bar{a})$ and real indeterminacy around $(\bar{\pi}, \bar{a})$.

Proof. If $A > 1$, the model displays real determinacy around $(\pi^*, a^*)$ and $(\hat{\pi}, \hat{a})$, instability around $(\bar{\pi}, \bar{a})$ and real indeterminacy around $(\bar{\pi}, \bar{a})$ since $\det J(\pi^*, a^*)$, $\det J(\hat{\pi}, \hat{a}) < 0$ and $\det J(\bar{\pi}, \bar{a}) > 0$, with $\text{tr} J(\pi, \bar{a}) < 0$ and $\text{tr} J(\bar{\pi}, \bar{a}) > 0$.

Proposition 3. If $A < 1$, the model displays real determinacy around $(\bar{\pi}, \bar{a})$ and $(\hat{\pi}, \hat{a})$, instability around $(\pi, a)$ and real indeterminacy around $(\pi^*, a^*)$.

Proof. If $A < 1$, the model displays real determinacy around $(\bar{\pi}, \bar{a})$ and $(\hat{\pi}, \hat{a})$, instability around $(\pi, a)$ and real indeterminacy around $(\pi^*, a^*)$ since $\det J(\pi, a)$, $\det J(\hat{a}, \hat{\pi}) < 0$ and $\det J(\pi^*, a^*) > 0$, with $\text{tr} J(\hat{a}, \hat{\pi}) > 0$ and $\text{tr} J(\pi^*, a^*) < 0$.

The results stated in Propositions 2 and 3 have the following interpretations. At the two steady states $(\pi^*, a^*)$ and $(\bar{\pi}, \bar{a})$ characterized by zero net financial wealth all individuals have the same level of consumption, i.e. there is no intergenerational inequality. Examining the Jacobian matrices (18) and (19), when $\pi_t$ and $a_t$ remain in a small neighborhood around the steady states $(\pi^*, a^*)$ and $(\bar{\pi}, \bar{a})$, inflation does not affect the dynamics of per capita real government liabilities, since at $(\pi^*, a^*)$ and $(\bar{\pi}, \bar{a})$ $\partial a_t / \partial \pi_t = 0$, and hence does not generate redistributions of wealth across generations. In these cases, the determinacy results obtained in the infinitely lived representative agent setup are replicated. An active monetary policy yields local
equilibrium determinacy. A passive monetary policy causes the equilibrium to be locally indeterminate.

However, there exist two additional steady states, \((\tilde{\pi}, \tilde{a})\) and \((\hat{\pi}, \hat{a})\), with positive non-human wealth. At this pair of steady states individual consumption varies across individuals of different generations. Examining the Jacobian matrices (20) and (21), it emerges that in a small neighborhood around the steady states \((\tilde{\pi}, \tilde{a})\) and \((\hat{\pi}, \hat{a})\), inflation does affect real financial wealth dynamics, since at \((\tilde{\pi}, \tilde{a})\) \(\frac{\partial a_t}{\partial \pi_t} = [R'(\tilde{\pi}) - 1] \frac{(n+\theta-\rho)L[R(\tilde{\pi})]}{\beta(\rho + \mu)} \neq 0\) and at \((\hat{\pi}, \hat{a})\) \(\frac{\partial a_t}{\partial \pi_t} = [R'(\hat{\pi}) - 1] \frac{(n+\theta-\rho)L[R(\hat{\pi})]}{\beta(\rho + \mu)} \neq 0\), thereby giving rise to redistributions of wealth across generations. In particular, a positive deviation of inflation from its steady state value produces a redistribution of real financial wealth from currently alive private agents to future generations. Inflation decreases the current amount of per capita government liabilities in real terms, thus reducing the need for future fiscal restrictions necessary to guarantee the respect of the public solvency condition. The wealth effect tends to dampen the current value of per capita consumption and there is no need for the central bank to implement a more than proportional increase in the nominal interest rate to ensure equilibrium uniqueness. The determinacy results under interest rate policies break down. Passive monetary policy rules generate local determinacy. Under active monetary policy rules, on the other hand, there is no local perfect-foresight equilibrium in which the sequences \(\{\pi_t, a_t\}\) converge asymptotically to the steady state.

In order to show how perfect-foresight self-fulfilling deflationary paths characterize global equilibrium dynamics in the presence of wealth effects, we consider particular functional forms for preferences and perform a numerical
Let the instantaneous utility function be a CES aggregate of consumption and real money balances of the form:

$$\Omega(c_{s,t}, m_{s,t}) = \left[ \eta c_{s,t}^{\gamma_{s,t}} + (1 - \eta) m_{s,t}^{\gamma_{s,t}} \right]^{\frac{1}{\gamma_{s,t}}} ,$$

(22)

where $0 < \eta < 1$ and $\gamma < 0$. The elasticity of substitution between consumption and real money balances is $\sigma \equiv 1/(1 - \gamma)$. It follows that $\Gamma(R_t) = [\eta/(1 - \eta)]^\sigma R_t^\sigma$. The model is calibrated under the assumption that each instant of time corresponds to a quarter of a year. We set $\eta = 0.94$ and $\sigma = 0.39$, consistently with the estimates by Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2000). We calibrate the instantaneous probability of death at $\mu = 0.02$ and the rate of population growth at $n = 0.004$. The fiscal parameter $\theta$ is set at 0.0015. When monetary policy is active at $\pi^*$ the interest rate rule policy parameter $A$ is set equal to 1.5 (see Taylor, 1993, 1999). We set $\pi^* = 0.042/4$ and $\rho = 0.018/4$, as in Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2001b). Table 1 reports the baseline calibration.

Figure 1 plots the associated phase diagram. The four steady states of our model, $(\pi^*, a^*)$, $(\bar{\pi}, \bar{a})$, $(\tilde{\pi}, \tilde{a})$, and $(\hat{\pi}, \hat{a})$, are denoted by SS1, SS2, SS3, and SS4, respectively. The figure reveals the existence of a number of decelerating inflation paths that originate around SS1 and SS4, at which monetary policy is active, and converge either to SS2 or to SS3, at which monetary policy is passive. The decelerating inflation trajectories characterizing the model global dynamics appear to be robust to changes in the baseline parameter values, as shown in Figures 2 and 3.
The economic intuition of our results can be explained as follows. Suppose agents expect a decrease in inflation. If the central bank follows the Taylor rule, agents must also expect a decrease in the nominal interest rate. The expected decrease in the opportunity cost of holding money brings about an expected increase in the demand for real balances. According to equation (10), for a given level of current real financial wealth, the expected increase in real balances generates an expected aggregate excess demand for goods. Equilibrium in the goods market requires a fall in the current real interest rate (see equation 15). Since monetary policy is active according to the Taylor rule, the decrease in the current real interest rate can occur only if current inflation falls. The decline in inflation is not offset by the presence of wealth effects on aggregate demand since the decrease in the real interest rate has a negative impact on the aggregate accumulation of total real financial wealth (see equation 17), hence amplifying the deflationary pressures over time. Under the Taylor rule, the associated self-fulfilling decelerating inflation path is exacerbated by the operation of wealth effects.

5 Conclusions

We have analyzed the role of wealth effects in a general equilibrium model with overlapping generations where the monetary authorities adopt interest-rate feedback rules of the Taylor-type. Since the original contributions by Pigou (1943, 1947) and Patinkin (1965), wealth effects have been regarded as a channel to avoid the liquidity trap. We demonstrate that this channel is not at work in our optimizing model. The explicit consideration of these effects
implies the existence of four steady-state equilibria under feedback monetary policy rules, that set the nominal interest rate as an increasing function of inflation, with the zero bound on nominal interest rates. The main conclusion of our analysis is that, also in the presence of wealth effects, the Taylor rule gives rise to an infinite number of perfect-foresight equilibrium paths, in the vicinity of the steady states at which the interest rate rule is active, leading the economy to a liquidity trap.

There are indeed “perils” in adopting Taylor rules, as originally demonstrated by Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2001b). Liquidity traps can occur since the automatic stabilizing role of the Pigou-Patinkin effects is not at work when Taylor rules are implemented.

References


**Appendix A**

Function $\Gamma(\cdot)$ is such that $\Gamma'(R_t) > 0$ and $\Gamma(R_t) - R_t \Gamma'(R_t) > 0$, where the latter condition follows from the assumption that the elasticity of substitution between consumption and real money balances, $\sigma = \frac{d \frac{c_{s,t}}{m_{s,t}}}{d R_t} \frac{R_t}{m_{s,t}}$, is less than one. From (6), in fact:

$$d \frac{c_{s,t}}{m_{s,t}} = \Gamma'(R_t) dR_t. \quad (23)$$

Dividing both sides of (23) by $\frac{c_{s,t}}{m_{s,t}}$ and using (6) yield:
It follows that the elasticity of substitution between consumption and real money balances can be expressed as:

$$\sigma = \frac{d \frac{\bar{c}_{s,t}}{\bar{m}_{s,t}}}{d R_t} = \frac{\Gamma' (R_t)}{\Gamma (R_t)} \frac{R_t}{R_t}. \tag{25}$$

### Appendix B

In the second stage of the individual optimization problem, the representative consumer born at time $s$ solves an intertemporal optimization problem and derives the optimal time path of total consumption, $\bar{z}_{s,t}$, to maximize the lifetime utility function (2), given (6) and the constraints (3) and (4). Using the definition of total consumption, $\bar{z}_{s,t} = \bar{c}_{s,t} + R_t \bar{m}_{s,t}$, and the optimal intra-temporal condition (6), the instantaneous utility function can be expressed in function of total consumption:

$$\log \Omega (\bar{c}_{s,t}, \bar{m}_{s,t}) = \log q_t + \log \bar{z}_{s,t}, \tag{26}$$

where $q_t \equiv \Omega \left( \frac{\Gamma (R_t)}{\Gamma (R_t) + R_t}, \frac{1}{\Gamma (R_t) + R_t} \right)$ can be interpreted as the utility-based cost of living index of the basket of physical goods and real balances.

Using this result, the intertemporal optimization problem can be stated as follows:

$$\max_{(\bar{z}_{s,t})} \int_0^\infty (\log q_t + \log \bar{z}_{s,t}) e^{-\left(\mu + \rho \right)t} dt, \tag{27}$$
subject to
\begin{equation}
\dot{\bar{a}}_{s,t} = (R_t - \pi_t + \mu) \bar{a}_{s,t} + \bar{y}_{s,t} - \bar{\pi}_{s,t} - \bar{z}_{s,t}, \tag{28}
\end{equation}
and given \( \bar{a}_{s,t} \).

The optimal solution yields the Euler equation characterizing the optimal path of total consumption for an individual:
\begin{equation}
\dot{\bar{z}}_{s,t} = (R_t - \pi_t - \rho) \bar{z}_{s,t}. \tag{29}
\end{equation}

Integrating forward the instantaneous budget constraint (28), given the transversality condition (4), and using (29) we can formulate total consumption as a linear function of total wealth:
\begin{equation}
\bar{z}_{s,t} = (\mu + \rho) \left( \bar{a}_{s,t} + \bar{h}_{s,t} \right), \tag{30}
\end{equation}
where \( \bar{h}_{s,t} \) is human wealth, defined as the present discounted value of after-tax labor income,
\begin{equation}
\bar{h}_{s,t} = \int_t^{\infty} (\bar{y}_{s,v} - \bar{\tau}_{s,v}) e^{-\int_t^v (R_k - \pi_k + \mu) dk} dv.
\end{equation}

Using the definition of total consumption and recalling (6) give:
\begin{equation}
\bar{z}_{s,t} = L(R_t) c_{s,t}, \tag{31}
\end{equation}
where \( L(R_t) = 1 + \frac{R_t}{\Gamma(R_t)} \) with \( L'(R_t) = \frac{\Gamma(R_t) - R_t \Gamma'(R_t)}{[\Gamma(R_t)]^2} \).

Time-differentiating (31) yields:
\begin{equation}
\dot{\bar{z}}_{s,t} = L'(R_t) c_{s,t} R_t + L(R_t) \dot{c}_{s,t}. \tag{32}
\end{equation}

Using the above results, it is straightforward to obtain the following dy-
namic equation for individual consumption:

\[ \dot{c}_{s,t} = \left( R_t - \pi_t - \rho \right) \overline{c}_{s,t} - \frac{L'(R_t)R_t}{L(R_t)} \overline{c}_{s,t}. \]  

(33)

This shows equation (8).

### Appendix C

By definition, per capita aggregate financial wealth is:

\[ a_t = \beta \int_{-\infty}^{t} \overline{a}_{s,t} e^{\beta(s-t)} ds. \]  

(34)

Differentiating with respect to time the above equation using Leibnitz’s rule, one obtains:

\[ \dot{a}_t = \beta \overline{a}_{t,t} - \beta a_t + \beta \int_{-\infty}^{t} \dot{\overline{a}}_{s,t} e^{\beta(s-t)} ds, \]  

(35)

where \( \beta \overline{a}_{t,t} \) is the newborns’ financial wealth and is equal to zero by assumption (agents are born with zero wealth since there is no bequest motive).

Using (3), (35) can be re-written as:

\[ \dot{a}_t = -\beta a_t + \mu a_t + (R_t - \pi_t) a_t + y_t - \tau_t - c_t - R_t m_t \]  

(36)

\[ = (R_t - \pi_t - n) a_t + y_t - \tau_t - c_t - R_t m_t. \]

This shows (9).

Substituting (6) into (31) and using the definition of total consumption,

23
The individual consumption function is obtained as:

\[ c_{s,t} = \theta + \rho L(R_t) (\alpha_{s,t} + h_{s,t}) \]  

(37)

The per capita consumption is thus given by:

\[ c_t = \frac{\mu + \rho}{L(R_t)} (\alpha_t + h_t), \]  

(38)

where \( h_t = \int_t^{\infty} (y_v - \tau_v) e^{-\int_t^v (R_k - \eta_k + \mu) dk} dv \). Differentiating with respect to time the definition of per capita consumption, \( c_t = \beta e^{-\beta t} \int_{-\infty}^t \tau_{s,t} e^{\beta s} ds \), yields:

\[ \dot{c}_t = \beta \tau_{t,t} - \beta c_t + \beta \int_{-\infty}^t \tau_{s,t} e^{\beta(s-t)} ds, \]  

(39)

where the term \( \beta \tau_{t,t} \) denotes consumption of the newborn generation and is equal to \( \beta \tau_{t,t} = \beta(\mu + \rho)h_t/L(R_t) \). Using (8) and (38) into (39) results in the following time path of consumption per unit of labor:

\[ \dot{c}_t = (R_t - \pi_t - \rho) c_t - \frac{L'(R_t)}{L(R_t)} \dot{R}_t - \frac{\beta(\rho + \mu)}{L(R_t)} \alpha_t. \]  

(40)

This shows (10).

**Appendix D**

In order to translate the interior equilibrium to the origin and simplify notation, we set \( \iota_t \equiv \pi_t - \pi^* \) and \( \ell_t \equiv -\frac{\beta(\rho + \mu)}{L(R_t)} \alpha_t \). The model (16)-(17) given
the Taylor rule (11) can be re-written as:

\[
\begin{align*}
\dot{\ell}_t & = \left[ R^* e^{(A/R^*)\ell_t} - \ell_t - \pi^* - \rho \right] \frac{L \left[ R^* e^{(A/R^*)\ell_t} \right]}{L' \left[ R^* e^{(A/R^*)\ell_t} \right] A e^{(A/R^*)\ell_t}} + L' \left( R^* \right) A \frac{L' \left( R^* \right) A}{\beta (\rho + \mu)} \ell_t \\
\dot{\ell}_t & = \left[ R^* e^{(A/R^*)\ell_t} - \ell_t - \pi^* - n - \theta \right] \frac{L' \left( R^* \right) A}{\beta (\rho + \mu)} \ell_t
\end{align*}
\] (41, 42)

At (0, 0), for \( A = 1 \) and \( \theta = \rho - n \), there is a double zero eigenvalue. In fact, the Jordan block is of the form:

\[
J = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 \end{pmatrix},
\] (43)

which is a necessary condition for a Bogdanov-Takens bifurcation.

The bifurcation scenario near the Bogdanov-Takens point depends on the coefficients of the critical normal form on the two-dimensional center manifold which is of the form (Kuznetsov, 2004, 2005):

\[
\begin{align*}
\dot{u}_1 & = u_2, \\
\dot{u}_2 & = \sum_{k \geq 2} \left( a_k u_1^k + b_k u_1^{k-1} u_2 \right).
\end{align*}
\] (44, 45)

In order to compute the simplest normal form of this Bogdanov-Takens singularity, we use the matching pursuit technique proposed by Yu and Yuan (2003) under the assumption that the sub-utility function is of the form
\[ \Omega(c_{s,t}, m_{s,t}) = \left[ \eta c_{s,t}^\gamma + (1 - \eta)m_{s,t}^\gamma \right]^{1/\gamma}. \]

We get the following result:

\[ \begin{align*}
\dot{u}_1 &= u_2, \\
\dot{u}_2 &= b_1 u_1 u_2 + b_2 u_1^2 u_2 + a_4 u_1^4.
\end{align*} \tag{46, 47} \]

where

\[ \begin{align*}
b_1 &\equiv \frac{\pi^* + \left( \frac{\eta}{1 - \eta} \right)^\sigma (\pi^* + \rho)^\sigma + \rho}{(\pi^* + \rho)(1 - \sigma)}, \\
b_2 &\equiv \frac{(\pi^* + \rho)^\sigma \left( \frac{\eta}{1 - \eta} \right)^\sigma (3\sigma - 2) + (2 - \sigma)(\pi^* + \rho)}{2(\pi^* + \rho)^2(1 - \sigma)}, \\
a_4 &\equiv -\frac{1}{4} \frac{\pi^* + \left( \frac{\eta}{1 - \eta} \right)^\sigma (\pi^* + \rho)^\sigma + \rho}{(\pi^* + \rho)^2(1 - \sigma)}.\end{align*} \]

Since \( a_2 = 0 \), the Bogdanov-Takens bifurcation at \((0,0)\) for \( A = 1 \) and \( \theta = \rho - n \) is of a degenerate type (Kuznetsov, 2005).
Table 1: Baseline Calibration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rate of population growth</td>
<td>$n$</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probability of death</td>
<td>$\mu$</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate of time preference</td>
<td>$\rho$</td>
<td>0.018/4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elasticity of substitution between consumption and real money balances</td>
<td>$\sigma$</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weight of consumption in the utility function</td>
<td>$\eta$</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monetary policy parameter</td>
<td>$A$</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiscal rule parameter</td>
<td>$\theta$</td>
<td>0.0015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target inflation rate</td>
<td>$\pi^*$</td>
<td>0.042/4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1: Phase Diagram under the Baseline Calibration
Figure 2: Sensitivity Analysis

- $A=1.2$
- $\pi=0.005$
- $\theta=0.001$
- $\pi=0.03$
- $\theta=0.002$
- $A=2$

Graphs showing the sensitivity analysis for different parameters and values.
Figure 3: Sensitivity Analysis

σ=0.2

σ=0.6

n=0.0035

n=0.005

µ=0.01

µ=0.03