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Huaping Lu-Adler: Kant and the Science of Logic. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. 271 p., ISBN 978-0-19-921538-5.

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Huaping Lu-Adler provides a much-needed book on Immanuel Kant's logic that considers a number of controversies that have been at play for more than fifty years, namely since the publication of Gerhard Lehmann's edition of Kant's *Vorlesungen über Logik* as volume 24 of the Akademie-Ausgabe in 1966. Strangely enough, while Benno Erdmann and Erich Adickes are remembered for their work on the *Reflexionen* (203), Lehmann does not receive any mention – not even for criticizing the accuracy of his edition, which is indeed not easy to defend. The editors of the later-discovered *Vorlesungen* likewise receive no mention. This does not take anything away, however, from the useful notes on sources and abbreviations that open the volume, which in fact is not about editing Kant's logical texts but rather about providing a complete account of his philosophy of logic.

Lu-Adler sets off with the argument that, due to the peculiar challenges posed by Kant's logic corpus, it is convenient to take the approach of the *history of philosophical problems* (see Marco Sgarbi, "Concepts vs. Ideas vs. Problems", in: *Begriffs-, Ideen- und Problemgeschichte im 21. Jahrhundert*, Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2011, 69–80), which is the most apt for reconstructing a theory of logic that is maximally coherent, philosophically interesting and historically original. One cannot disagree with Manfred Kuehn that Kant, "like many of his contemporaries, dared to think for himself", with the aim of being a *Selbstdenker* "in the service of science and humanity, not [a] member[.] of some sect" (18). However, against Lu-Adler's claim that there "is no ready version of a history of problems in reference to which Kant's conception of logic might stand out as original" (17), one ought to point out that the problem of providing an introduction to logic is very old. It dates back to Galen's *Institutio logica*, received an effective systematization in the Renaissance in the short treatise *De natura logicae* by Jacopo Zabarella, and was again reiterated after Kant by G. W. F. Hegel in the first pages of the *Wissenschaft der Logik*. Put very simply, the conundrum at the basis of the problem runs as follows: if logic is supposed to introduce the whole of philosophy, how can one provide a philosophical introduction to logic? (see Hans-Friedrich Fulda, *Das Problem einer Einleitung in Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik*, Frankfurt a. M.: Klostermann, 1965; Riccardo Pozzo, *Kant und das Problem einer Einleitung in Kants Logik*, Frankfurt a. M.: Lang, 1989).

In chapter two, Lu-Adler takes up the approach of the *history of controversies* (see Marcelo Dascal, *Interpretation and Understanding*, Amsterdam: Benjamins, 2003) and sketches a history of themes on the "nature and place of logic," beginning with Aristotle, Epicurus and the early Stoics and ending with the late sixteenth century, whereby attention is given to Aquinas (48–51) and Jacopo Zabarella (53–54), the latter being the one who "helped to crystalize the major philosophical issues about logic that had been debated over the preceding centuries" (53). At issue is the question posed in the title of the book, namely (1) "Is logic a science (*scientia*), instrument (*organon*), standard of assessment (*canon*), or a mixture of these?". This is followed by three further questions: (2) "If logic is a (theoretical) science, what is the subject matter that separates it from other sciences, particularly metaphysics?"; (3) "If logic is a necessary instrument to all philosophical inquiries, how is it entitled to this position? What is the end (*finis*) of logic?"; and (4) "If logic is both a science and an instrument, how are these two roles related?" (65).

Chapter three considers how certain early modern philosophers approached the questions that constitute the problem of introducing logic, with special attention to Francis Bacon, for his notion of the destiny of the human intellect, John Locke, for his facultative logic and for his *Conduct of the Understanding* (with which Kant was familiar from the German translation of his colleague Georg David Kypke, Königsberg, Hartung, 1755), and naturally Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Christian Wolff, for their understanding of logic as a demonstrative science. For Wolff, logic had become "scientific" in as far as (1) "*logica artificialis* is but a distinct representation of *logica naturalis* and is identical with the latter in content"; (2) "logic *qua scientia* draws its fundamental principles from ontology and psychology"; (3) "logic has a practical part that shows how the rules of theoretical logic can be used to obtain knowledge in all other sciences"; and (4) "both philosophical and mathematical methods are rooted in the syllogism-centric logic of certitude" (96–97). In the following pages, Lu-Adler argues that Kant eventually rejects each of Wolff's four theses.

Chapter four is dedicated to the existing accounts of logic during the decade between the mid-1760 s and the mid-1770 s, until Kant finally found his voice. A big part of this is the comparison between G. F. Meier and Kant (104–121), in which, however, no attention is given to the reason for Kant's failure to consider Meier's expositions of *gelehrte Sprache* and *Character eines Gelehrten* (G. F. Meier, *Extract*, London: Bloomsbury, 2017, 102–133). Finally, the *evolving narrative* of the long-debated question of the "emergence of transcendental logic and its implications for Kant's theory of logic" is dealt with at length by Lu-Adler by recalling a number of pertinent quotes from the *Reflexionen* and the *Vorlesungen über Metaphysik* (121–138).

The last chapter is about logic and the demands of Kantian *science*. Here, Lu-Adler studies Kant's account of logic in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Given that not only *pure reason* but also *pure general logic* needs a *critique*, Lu-Adler looks into Kant's arguments for showing that logic can be considered both a subjective and an objective theory of the understanding, a position that Kant did not develop further but that was taken up by his immediate follower, J. G. K. C. Kiesewetter, in his *Grundriß einer allgemeinen Logik nach Kantischen Grundsätzen* (2 vols., Berlin: Lagarde, 1791–1797).

Wrapping up, Lu-Adler reminds the reader that her book traces a history of philosophy of logic that turns on the following questions: (1) Is logic a distinct branch of philosophy? (2) If it is a science, is it a theoretical or a practical science? (3) If it is a theoretical science, does it meet the standards of a strict *scientia* (in a Wolffian sense)? (4) If it is a practical science, what is the defining utility that makes it so? These questions can be reduced, Lu-Adler concludes, to two fundamental ones: (a) "insofar as logic is a theoretical science, what is the subject matter that makes it distinct vis-à-vis other sciences and on what principles must it be grounded if it is correct and demonstratively certain, as the strict notion of a *scientia* demands?"; (b) "insofar as logic is useful, how (if at all) is it related to ethical concerns on the one hand and to the study of nature on the other?" (199).

That the intent of this volume is not doxoscopic is confirmed by Lu-Adler's reiterated claim that her book is "a history of logic told from a Kantian perspective", whereby the historical developments that the book unfolds can be set aside when it is "finally time to zero in on Kant's theory of logic", at which point we may "pass clear-eyed judgments about its place in history, its unique philosophical elements, and its limitations" (7).