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Community Development and Communication: Preliminary Case Studies in Italy

Andrea Volterrani

University of Rome Tor Vergata, Rome, Italy

The article initially develops a theoretical reflection on the relationships between local community development and deep media practices with particular reference to the processes of building community social relations through communications and media. The possible consequences of a communication strategy on increasing social capital and social cohesion are also discussed. It then analyzes and deepens the characteristics of the various types of interconnection between local communities, active communication of citizens, mediated practices and processes, and citizen media (interpersonal proximity communication, communicative trust and participation, connecting communication, communication with the territory, mutualistic communication). Finally, it analyzes some experiences of communication processes for community development in the Italian context.

Keywords: community development, community building, mediatized community, citizen media

Mediatized Community, Translocality, and Citizen Media

Is it possible to imagine a community that does not communicate? And is it possible to imagine that communication can actually be the heart of the community development of such communication?

The question is not academic or speculative, but rather is closely related to a different way of living everyday life in the communities in which we are all immersed, real, and virtual. First, because the continuity between online and offline spaces is now established both in research (Boccia Artieri, 2016; Boccia Artieri et al., 2017) and in personal experiences that highlight a continuous game of smoke and mirrors between what happens online and what we perceive as the main reality of our life, our vision of the territory that surrounds us, and what we experience with all our senses. And the distinction will become increasingly blurred in the near future with the possibility of full immersion in augmented reality, either real or virtual, with all our senses through embedded technological devices, such as subcutaneous chips, so that the dystopian storytelling of the famous BBC *Black Mirror* television series will seem like the technological equivalent of cave painting. Real communities and virtual communities now go “hand in hand” and they will continue going more and more in this way because it will no longer be possible to distinguish between the two worlds, both “full of reality”. Second, “social space is not a thing among things, but a relationship between things, something that encompasses their interrelationship in their coexistence and simultaneity” (Lefebvre, 1991). As Couldry and Hepp (2017, p. 86) stated, “the increasing complexity and variety of how, in our contemporary modernities, social and economic relations are sustained across space through globalized communication and exchange

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means that many spatial relations are today not strongly anchored in particular places or localities”. One of the themes is translocality, namely the mediated interrelations between various localities (Hepp, 2015).

Localities do not dissolve: as embodied human beings, we have no choice but to act from a certain locality, even if the resources on which action from that place relies are themselves distributed. But these localities change their meaning in a social world made up of ever more complex translocal connections. (Couldry & Hepp, 2017, p. 87)

For our reasoning, it is important to emphasize that:

[localities] ... are, in the first place, not something that is a given physically but are instead created by people in repeated interaction.... Localities are, materially and physically, socio-culturally defined places with shared space for human interaction. Secondly, the construction of this kind of locality is not something that can simply be contrasted to media usage. It is more likely that nowadays localities are created by practices linked to the media, and so are in this sense themselves mediatized. Thirdly, when considering the localities of media appropriation, it is vital to keep in mind that these are themselves translocally unbounded by the act of media appropriation, linked into communications networks that go beyond the local. To borrow a term from cultural anthropology, we need to take a *multisited* approach. In considering localities of media appropriation we need to keep in mind networks transcending the local to which these localities are open—whether this involves reciprocal, produced, or virtualized media communication. (Hepp, 2015, p. 187)

Still Hepp (2015) told us:

... of the possibility that in contemporary media cultures we can detect de facto an interaction of local and translocal communalization and corresponding communities. Local communitizations¹ remain central, since humans as physical beings live in a particular place, and local communitizations continue to be the most important means for conveying a sense of belonging. The advance of mediatization does not, therefore, obliterate local communitizations; something else takes place. In fact, in many parts of the world even local communitizations and corresponding communities are mediatized, in the sense that their articulation of a shared sense of belonging is effected through media. Local communitizations are not today “media-free” zones. (p. 208)

What interests us is that:

... local communitizations—whether as pure reception communitizations situatively, or as a lived community situationally comprehensive—are in this way articulated today through their joint appropriation of media, and can therefore refer to mediatized communities. Mediatized communities are all forms of communities that, in their present form, relate to media but for which media communication is not constitutive, as, for example, with families, friendship groups, and so forth. (Hepp, 2015, p. 209)

It is from this extremely ambivalent (unambiguous) reality that we begin our brief journey into the possible relationships between communication and community development.

Tackling community development today is not simple because it seems that the theme does not excite academic and social debate: It is placed in the past, if it is a matter (but only in some cases) of international cooperation, has an intimate and local flavor, and is seemingly far from the themes and problems of globalization. Yet since the end of the last century, the fate of all communities (ethnic, media, local, and virtual) has become deeply intertwined with the growing globality. Appaduraj (1996) foreshadowed changes that would become much more widespread in our contemporaneity as a result of the impact of not only globalization processes, but also those of communication as well as financial and commercial.

¹ The term communitization was coined by Max Weber, who introduced the term “communitization” (*Vergemeinschaftung*) to describe the processes that might result in more stable communities: “A social relationship will be called a ‘communitization’ (*Vergemeinschaftung*) if and to the extent that the orientation of social action rests—in the individual instance, or on average, or as a pure type—upon a subjectively felt (affectual or traditional) mutual sense of belonging among those involved (Weber, 1999)”.

In the context, we have described the idea of communicative citizenship action, which is communicative actions through which spaces of communication change or through which new spaces of communication dealing with public issues open up (Hepp, 2015, p. 222), is essential, together with the concept of citizen media, to be restricted to individuals and to collective action. In the first case, as explained by Baker and Blaagaard (2016):

The concept of citizen media encompasses the physical artefacts, digital content, practices, performative interventions and discursive formations of affective sociality produced by unaffiliated citizens as they act in public space(s) to effect aesthetic or socio-political change or express personal desires and aspirations, without the involvement of a third party or benefactor. It also comprises the sets of values and agendas that influence and drive the practices and discourses through which individuals and collectivities position themselves within and in relation to society and participate in the creation of diverse publics. (p. 16)

In the second case, Rodríguez (2011) extended to collective subjectivities and focused attention on local communities:

... communication spaces where citizens can learn to manipulate their own languages, codes, signs, and symbols empowering them to name the world in their own terms. Citizens' media trigger processes that allow citizens to recodify their contexts and themselves. These processes ultimately give citizens the opportunity to restructure their identities into empowered subjectivities strongly connected to local cultures and driven by well-defined, achievable utopias. Citizens' media are the media citizens use to activate communication processes that shape their *local communities*. (p. 24)

Rodríguez, Benjamin, and Shamas (2014) then went on to characterize the multiple ways in which collective citizen media can be described in relation to media technologies:

Many different terms are used to label media technologies appropriated and used by social movements, citizens' groups and grassroots collectives, including: alternative media, social movements media, participatory media, community media, radical media, grassroots media, autonomous media, the French term *médias libres*, the Spanish term *medios populares*, and citizens' media. (p. 151)

It is starting from this intertwining of mediatized communities, translocality, and citizen media that we propose a reflection based on some experiences in progress of social community development to elaborate possible roles of communication processes in a potentially profound cultural and social change.

What Is Community Development: The Density of Relationships Becomes a Resource for Citizens

Community development is the ability to increase social capital and social cohesion of a community in the direction of, on the one hand, a greater relational density and, on the other hand, to make the community a resource for citizens. Going even deeper, we can also use the term collectivity, which is any figuration of individuals that share a certain meaningful belonging and that provide a basis for action—and orientation—in common (Couldry & Hepp, 2017, p. 168).

If the description is relatively theoretically simple, operationally, the activation of a development process is very difficult and tiring.

There are at least three media roles involved to take into account (Couldry & Hepp, 2017, p. 175):

- (1) Media content become important resources for defining collectivities.
- (2) Media are means for constructing collectivities.
- (3) Media trigger dynamics in collectivities.

According to Couldry and Hepp (2017), all three elements are relevant to understanding the central role of the media in building communities together with a:

... shift from “collectivities of pure co-presence” to “collectivities of multi-modal communication”.... Based on and shaped by a diverse media ensemble, less rooted in direct experience but in shared processes of mediated communication, these “collectivities of multi-modal communication” become communities when they build up a “common we” as well as long-term structures. An important characteristic of deep mediatization is the variable intensity of such collectivities and the role that choices between media modalities play in the formation of distinctive collectivities. Far from general switch-over to purely “personal” networks, in an age of deep mediatization we see a more differentiated range of collectivities, in part because even older collectivities of co-presence have now become mediatized. (Couldry & Hepp, 2017, pp. 175-176)

Let us try to imagine what happens when we activate a process of social community development that starts from participant observation in the territory and ends with the protagonism of citizens, both through a different culture of citizenship and communicative citizenship action, and through communicative acts of citizenship, as we shall later see.

Interpersonal Proximity Communication: Listening Without the Pretension of Change

When activating anthropological field work the first step in social community development (interviews with privileged witnesses, participant observation, neighborhood walks, physical presence in public spaces and public places in the neighborhood, contacts with people to collect needs aspirations, lifestyles, and ways of living in the community) is the interpersonal communication of proximity that takes on centrality.

It is a communication that must build empathy and reciprocity at the same time, a readiness to listen without this being intended as a resolution of problems. It is also an approach that anthropologists who have worked in the field in contexts of extraneous completions have assimilated into their training processes (Russell Bernard, 2017). Here, in fact, not only the competences related to interpersonal communication are generally understood to be at stake, but, rather, those that are contextualized, on the one hand, in the territorial community in its articulations (neighborhoods, squares, streets, and buildings), and, on the other hand, within the mediatized community (local media, social media, and local participatory platforms). These skills are the heart of proximity interpersonal communication and are often undervalued because they presuppose an egalitarian and fair dynamic among the participants and, above all, contain a simple and popular natural language as well as being metaphorically explanatory to most of the inhabitants of the community itself (Ervás, Gola, & Rossi, 2017).

It is more difficult to confront it for those (public social workers or NGO organizations) who have in their toolbox the aid relationship as the main instrument of intervention. A first cultural change is not indifferent and could have positive consequences not only on community development but also on social work as well.

Communicative Trust and Participation

The same wavelength is the question of participation that is essential for communication processes (Volterrani, 2018). Participation in community development has three major issues to be addressed: How to make citizens protagonists, how to promote and take care of the places of participation, and how to promote participation.

How to Make the Citizens Protagonists

For the first question, trust and reliability are two fundamental elements to increase social capital and social cohesion (Burt, Cook, & Lin, 2001). In contexts where there is a widespread and consolidated

social capital, both aspects are part of the cultural heritage and need only be re-activated. In poor contexts of social capital, the construction of an active protagonism of citizens passes first from the diffusion of the idea that it is possible to do something starting from the bottom and from simple activities. This can be activated both through a path composed of basic communication acts that favor the participation of the inhabitants as protagonists of the change of their community and through a different way of understanding citizen media.

In the first case, the main obstacle is distrust and possible accusations of naivety or of not having a sense of reality: plots, corruption, clientele of various kinds and genres, and/or hidden interests that move people to do certain things. All of which are situations that most people have known in their daily lives, undergoing the consequences, as real or presumed as they are. An unfavorable cultural climate changes only if communication and participatory processes of opposite signs are activated, which make people trust again in the communities, and in the institutions. Probably those who have read these words up to this point will say that they are just, in fact, words. But the possibility of rebuilding trust and social capital is not impossible.

An example of the construction of trust and participatory communication. The goal must be limited, as in the case of the project Com.in.3.0 where groups were built as small embryos of micro-social capital in many territories of the regions of Southern Italy among people who dealt (and continue to deal) with migrants².

The maintenance of these embryos of social capital, if there are no imminent project objectives, is very difficult. We are not used to forming relationships without necessarily having specific interests and objectives. Therefore, activating a communicative trust also means letting the people involved be patient; it means the ability to recognize that a relationship is often worth more than a project because it has no end and is not a means to achieving something else.

Communication in this case has been and is central to the slow development of the territorial communities. The support provided by the ad hoc online participatory platform has also made it possible to socialize those of advanced age or poor digital skills in the online world with practices different from those of social media, thanks to the intervention of the other members of the micro-group.

The “way” of citizen media. An alternative way to construct trust and participatory communication is constituted by citizen media and in particular by media practices that have as their objective the construction of a way of being public and citizen which is different from the traditional one.

Stephansen (2016, p. 24) described the path a community can follow using citizen media, citing Rodríguez (2001, p. 20),

Referring to “citizens’ media” implies first that a collectivity is enacting its citizenship by actively intervening in and transforming the established mediascape; second, that these media are contesting social codes, legitimized identities, and institutionalized social relations; and third, that these communication practices are empowering the community involved, to the point where these transformations and changes are possible.

All this is possible through concrete practices that are capable of involving the people of the community. For example, as pointed out by Stephansen (2016) in reference to the World Social Forum,

Shared communication involves mobilization, movement-building and the proliferation of alternative communication

² The project Com.in.3.0 (FAMI promoted by five regions of Southern Italy with an enacting subject the Nova Consortium) had as its objective the establishment, strengthening of skills, and the social capacity of heterogeneous groups (coming from public, private, and third sector organizations) of 18 cities in five southern regions on the topic of migrants.

practices, as well as the circulation of media content. It involves a laborious process of constructing social relationships, involving new actors in the production of media content and setting in motion dynamics in the places where the WSF is held. (p. 32)

But it is in the description of the practice of shared communication that we understand what the useful elements applicable to community development are:

Shared communication activists engage in a distinct set of organizational practices oriented towards the creation of collaborative production processes that stimulate exchange of ideas, skills and experiences. As part of their commitment to strengthening movement-based communication processes, activists also engage in capacity-building practices aimed at equipping grassroots activists with the skills they need to produce their own media. Both of these sets of practices underpin broader practices of network formation: by creating spaces of sociality and involving new actors in collaborative processes of media production, activists aim to strengthen links among communicators and build networks of solidarity. Such practices, in turn, have been consolidated through a range of movement-building practices aimed at strengthening struggles for media democratization and developing a sense of collective identity among communication activists. (Stephansen, 2016, p. 33)

The set composed of the sharing of practices, collaborative training, and network construction is one of the ways in which it is possible to imagine the strengthening of fiduciary and participatory communication also going in the direction of the construction of an audience (of the community and of the media) that have a different critical perspective (Stephansen, 2016, pp. 38-39).

The Places of Participation

The care of the places of participation is all-round communication. Not only making known where you can participate, but how you can participate and, above all, how you can feel good in a context where there are people who are participating both physically and aesthetically. The aesthetic part of the places of participation in a context of community development is not secondary. If the aesthetic part is not taken care of, as we well know, then the social and aesthetic degradation grow and, unfortunately, legitimize each other. But the care of the places of participation also passes from the care of the online spaces that involve the participatory platforms where the main problem is certainly that of understanding the mechanisms with which the platforms managed directly and indirectly by the Big Five³ work (Van Dijck, Poell, & De Waal, 2018, pp. 31-48), but also and above all identify what can be done to counter the sharing economy through, for example, the platform cooperativism (Scholz, 2016). However, we must take into account that platform cooperativism may work well for small-scale communities, but it will not spread automatically to other cities and countries, so it remains dubious whether they can present a countervailing power to the Big Five's dominant position (Van Doorn, 2017; Van Dijck et al., 2018, p. 152). In community development, it is essential to combine three different needs: the ability to take care of the physical spaces of participation at the same time as those online, which are often built ad hoc; the ability to build a connection between local and global through participatory platforms that is attractive and easily accessible for the people who take part; and the ability to build participatory spaces close to the realities of local communities. It is at the crossroads between these different needs, which are also contradictory to each other, where it is possible to imagine communicative processes adequate to a completely transformed and made complex participation also thanks to media coverage (Carpentier, 2016; Couldry & Hepp, 2017).

An example of communicative care of a physical space of participation. In the old town of Lamezia, Italy, Literary Coffee, run by a heterogeneous grouping of associations, cooperatives, and foundations, is first

³ The Big Five companies are: Alphabet-Google, Facebook, Apple, Amazon, and Microsoft (Van Dijck et al., 2018, p. 12).

and foremost a beautiful space to see as well as a good place to have a cup of coffee, eat something, and meet someone. It is a place of participation certainly shared by the promoters, but a place where anyone can find a space to express themselves.

An example of communicative care of an online participation space. FQTS is a set of training practices for managers of third sector organizations in Southern Italy⁴. The place of connection of the training practices is an e-learning platform based on Moodle that has evolved in a participatory sense, both internally and alongside a Loomio platform. The online space has been taken care of from an aesthetic point of view as well as from a strictly communicative point of view. In the second direction, the participants were “forced” to interact with each other and with the teachers through the platform which, slowly, became appropriate and was elected as a place for conversation and even free discussion. Certainly, it does not yet have the appeal of global social media platforms, but the presence of a large number of participants along with active and participatory teaching methods has had a strong transformative and communicative impact on the territorial communities to which the participants belong.

Promote Participation

Finally, the third issue, the promotion of participation, is closely related to the construction of communicative trust. If we have established good fiduciary relationships, we will have to confront the (not easy to resolve) issue of the continuity of communication. It is easy, on the emotional wave of a positive moment and an unexpected success, to affirm that people participate even without telling them anything. After a short time, though they need to be recovered through methods and communication tools that were incorporated and shared previously, even a bulletin board in the middle of a square, if well managed, can represent a place of promotion if it has been shared as well as an A4-sized informational flyer distributed on a neighborhood street. The problem in this case is not the use of sophisticated and mediatised tools, but rather that of having shared socialized and simple tools in their use (Baker & Blaagaard, 2016). Often, however, we prefer to go in the other direction because we think that is the road to involvement, for example, using only social media. If in a community development process, we have shared social media as a tool to involve and promote participation, then that will be the instrument, but not because “it is not possible not to use social media today”, but because the choice of that tool has come through a participatory path. People enjoy information and communication processes, often mixing many different tools for different goals and contexts that live and act. If, in that specific community, social media are the main tool that is used for involvement and participation, then it is appropriate to share and use it. Otherwise, it is the collective creativity that has to experiment with the most appropriate communication tools for that territorial community as well as building the most appropriate formative moments.

Connecting Communication

In community development, an important phase is that of the reconstruction of simple and complex bonds. The breakdown or, more frequently, the loosening of social ties is one of the aspects on which it is essential to concentrate once trust and reciprocity are rebuilt.

⁴ FQTS (Training of Manager of the Southern Italy Third Sector) is a 10-year training program promoted by the Forum of the Third National Sector (an association of Italian non-profit organizations) and by CsvNet (Italian national association of service centers for volunteering) and funded by the Con il Sud Foundation.

The simple bonds are those of neighborhood, those that help to solve needs and problems of daily life without resorting to intervention or structured service. Also, in this case, it is not a return to a romantic idea of community, but rather, to be able to identify in a specific context (neighborhood and street) what could be the individual and collective resources that can be shared by the community. This sharing is in extreme need of a connecting communication capable of bringing together problems and resources with fluidity and simplicity day after day. It is a communication that, at least at the beginning, should not be formalized because it would lose the freshness necessary to be able to quickly enter the relevant public spaces of the community. It is only later that, by increasing complexity, more sophisticated means of interaction may be necessary, but never forgetting their origins of neighborhood and proximity.

Complex bonds, on the other hand, need a more structured communication even if at the beginning the communication has the same characteristics described previously. The more structured communication concerns the collective structures (committees and associations) that can arise from the action of community development, while the more fluid communication can concern the informal groups. In both cases, a qualitative leap is emphasized in the self-perception of the community which begins a work that is more organized and continuous. This is also the moment in which a comparison can be made with local public institutions.

Communication With the Territory: The Mood Boards of the Community

The involvement of the relevant community actors is another decisive moment for community development to take a more solid form. Public actors are of primary importance as a guarantee of universality. This is not always possible due to the specific conditions of the local context (for example, commissariats or infiltrations, if not real occupations, of organized crime), but it is, however, a dialogue that must be opened and built upon.

Dialogue with institutions for those who build community involvement from below is always difficult because the communication codes are completely different and sometimes even contradictory (Van Dijck et al., 2018, pp. 155-162). The first is rational, patient, and balanced; the second is pragmatic, informal, and fast. It is not a value judgment that we want to make, but rather a difference to be emphasized in order to find a way that can be shared. First of all, the timing. Communicating with institutions means taking the view of having to wait for political representation. Whoever legitimately directs the local institutions must respond to all citizens and, unless the community development concerns the entire citizenship (e.g., small countries), must build balanced interventions on the territory. This does not mean, however, that it is not possible to build up an integration of public policies launched as a result of the actions of community development. Knowing how to describe well the actions accomplished, giving life and meaning to what has been possible due to the protagonism of people, is one of the objectives to be achieved at this stage. Knowing how to recount these actions requires the ability to acquire the basics of storytelling as well as the ability to collect the daily stories that “make” a community. You should also learn how to do what American screenwriters do in order to convince producers of the greatness of their work: Build so-called mood boards which are video remixes that show what the script would be like once made using images and videos taken from other media products. The mood boards of the community are those that tell what has been done, and what could be done for sharing with institutions as well as with the third sector organizations and the companies of the territory. The production capacity of these products does not require a high level of professionalism and all the tools (assembly software, images, and videos) are available on the network without access restrictions and easily usable. In this context, we can

realize the ability to be producers and consumers of multimedia products as theorized by Jenkins, Purushotma, Weigel, Clinton, and Robison (2006) who in this case, unlike fandoms, sees groups of citizens of communities with scarce digital skills as protagonists.

A mode which can be even more interesting when viewed from the perspective of the social responsibility of local businesses, which can become more aware if they are able to perceive those aspects that often risk being hidden from a path of community development.

In short, communication with the territory is a communication that must aim for involvement to increase perception and knowledge in public and private actors and to change opinions, attitudes, and behaviors with respect to the community of reference. Furthermore, it must be able, as far as possible, to widen the boundaries of community development to disseminate and share with other parts of the territory possible methods, tools, and results.

If viewed from the point of view of institutions, communication with citizens cannot detach from the method that produces bottom-up involvement. Basically, it is essential that those with public responsibilities know how to observe and read what the communication flows relevant to the community are, trying to support and channel them with attention and respect. Continuing with the example of mood boards, these can also be built for what concerns services and exquisitely public actions in order to get “in tune” with the citizens of the community that is using them to narrate from below. But it is also possible to think that the “traditional” tools of institutional communication, such as newsletters, can be transformed into moments of community participation if the editors that create them are open to the contributions of its citizens.

What is envisaged is a system of communication flows that does not originate from below or from above, but is rather a “middle ground” of community communication.

Back to the Past, Mutualistic Communication

A final reference to community development is with respect to territorial mutuality. This represents an idea of advanced community development where people of the community even build financial devices capable of intervening—like the workers’ societies of mutual aid of the late 19th century—in difficult situations while preserving the dignity of the people and families involved.

In this case, the cultural aspect of mutuality is perhaps the one that most needs to be communicated. The idea that we can provide resources for a community and that perhaps we will not receive an immediate personal advantage from this act is difficult to understand and accept in many contexts where a very accentuated individualism is widespread. But this is precisely the role of mutualistic communication, cultural change: changing individual and collective culture by leveraging the possible results that can be achieved both in the informal mutuality of the street, neighborhood, and community as mentioned at the beginning, and in the territorial one that may also imply a commitment to grant financial support. By building territorial mutuality one can imagine developing a shared idea of the community on small services related to educational policies, such as support for academic performance or parental support outside of nursery or kindergarten services. These ideas are not born if there has not been a process of mutual participation of a strong and lasting informal type that has highlighted what the real problems were. Subsequently, the participant decides that an individual financial contribution is necessary in order to imagine supporting those activities, assuming that only part of the community will benefit from them. This repeated aspect on other issues builds that incentive to the construction of differentiated mutual funds that can be the basis for building a more rooted territorial mutuality.

Conclusions: A Guide for the Future

A community that is culturally changing is one that can build social cohesion, social development, and economic development. In a territorial community, cultural change is deeply intertwined with social change: Without seeing and touching the effects of social change, it is not easy for people to change their minds about what their new role might be in the community. Communication in the nuances that we have tried to tell so far assumes a strategic value often underestimated because we tend to privilege the concrete and pragmatic aspects of the interventions without taking into account that if you do not build sharing, relationships, mutual recognition, and opportunities for knowledge, it is almost impossible to give continuity to what has been undertaken within the community.

In the era of deep mediatization (Couldry & Hepp, 2017), the development of community, on the one hand, is built through the communication processes and, on the other hand, can be interrupted by the communication processes themselves if they are substantially driven exclusively by the global market. The challenge in the coming years will be precisely to tackle these problems with a bottom-up approach capable of grasping the challenges of contemporary capitalism.

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A Pilot Study for Estimation of Environmental Losses of Pastoral Area Within Mineral Exploitation: A Case Study in Urat Rear Banner, Inner Mongolia, China*

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In grassland areas subject to pollution caused by mining, such as the Urat Rear Banner in Inner Mongolia, a reasonable compensation scenario for local herders should be considered. Willingness to pay (WTP) was assessed with the use of Contingent Valuation (CV) methodology to estimate the value for environmental losses. The results indicated that: (1) The local environmental problem included water pollution, dust, vegetation degradation, and waste pollution; (2) 65.79% of herders were not satisfied with the compensation and 56.41% of herders disagreed mining in grassland; and (3) the WTP has been estimated at 641.18 yuan annually per household. The total WTP in the mining area of Urat Rear Banner was estimated to 15,771,104.5 yuan annually with interval estimates of 8,036,331.84 yuan and 25,918,104.9 yuan.

Keywords: mineral exploitation, Contingent Valuation, ecological compensation, grassland pollution

Introduction

The total area of grassland in Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (IM) is about 870,000 km², accounting for half the total land area of the whole region. The grassland extends more than 1,000 kilometers, spanning across three climatic regions: the temperate sub-humid, semi-arid, and arid region. It is not only the base of animal husbandry and an important ecological barrier, but also rich in mineral resource (Da & Zheng, 2006, p. 438). Up to 2017, there have been 145 kinds of minerals discovered in IM, accounting for 84.3% of all kinds of minerals that have been discovered in China. The mineral resources are distributed throughout all cities in IM. From the 21st century onward, with the economic development and the implementation of the western development strategy in China, mining in grassland has become a common practice in IM. With rich mineral resources, Inner Mongolia has gradually developed a number of pillar industries of energy, non-ferrous metals, rare earth, and others, which have laid a solid foundation for the development of modern mining industry in IM, and have made great contribution to the national and regional economic development. From 2000, mining industry has become the major industry in IM. Its profit has increased from about 0.16 billion in 2000 to 70.423 billion in 2014 with its ratio for the total industry has increased from 9.94% to 54.20% (Zhang, 2016a, pp. 59-66). However, the externality of mineral exploitation has not only exerted the negative

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influence on the well-being and development of pastoralists (Wang, 2010, p. 4), but also increased the risks that pastoralists will have to endure in the future (Daia & Ulgiatib, 2014, pp. 146-153). In addition, mineral exploration made the environment destroyed, and especially made great harm on the grassland and reduced the number of livestock. For those who rely on livestock, reducing numbers result in reduced development opportunities, and may affect social and cultural status (Carson, Flores, & Meade, 2001, pp. 173-210). The herdsmen get very little directly benefits by receiving the compensation and donation from exploration companies. In the long run, they have to bear the ecological cost and social cost which makes them “overall loss” (Zhang, 2016b, pp. 836-843). Even worse, the gap between the rich and the poor would be consequently out of control, and contradiction among different ethnic groups would be intensified progressively (Da & Yu, 2015, pp. 84-93). Therefore, a reasonable compensation scenario for herders must be considered in mining area. However, this proves difficult for policy makers and administrators, partly due to lack of the amount of ecological environment loss within mineral exploitation. The general objective of this study was to evaluate the utilization of Contingent Valuation (CV) as a method for assessing the willingness of local herdsmen to contribute to public good provision with focus on grassland protection within mineral exploitation, and look forward to solving the contradiction between environmental protection and mining development in Inner Mongolia grassland. The study also can be used as a quantitative basis for internalizing the external cost of environment by taxation.

Methods

Study Area

This survey was carried out in Urat Rear Banner¹ (URB), which lies on the northwest of IM, ranging from east longitudes of 105°14' to 107°36', and north latitudes of 40°40' to 42°33' with a total area of 25,276 square kilometers. The altitude ranges from 1,500 m to 2,365 m with an annual average temperature of 3.8 °C (ranging from -34.6 °C in January to 35.2 °C in July), and 130 frost days annually. The average annual rainfall generally ranges between 96 mm and 105.9 mm. Most of the rainfall occurs in July and August. The grassland ecosystem is about 2,422,820 ha located in URB. The grassland area provides both local resources (forage for animals; a place to live) and acts as a natural ecological buffer and water conservation. The grassland types include mountain steppe (10.6%), hilly steppe (61.0%), and desert steppe (28.4%).

There are various abundant mineral resources in URB: lead metal with a content 1,200 million tons of zinc metal, 500 million tons of copper, nearly 1.4 million tons of iron ore, nearly 30 million tons of sulfur, 7,731 tons of nickel, and 50 million tons of molybdenum (Urat Rear Banner Local Chronicles Compilation Committee, 2005, p. 11). Although beginning at the end of 1960s, the mining industry did not have too much effect on the local economy for a long period. In the late 1990s, URB grasped the opportunities that the national developmental strategy transferred from east to west, building a large scale of industry projects with metal as the center. An increasing number of mining factories are being built in grasslands to generate revenues through large scale mineral exploitation. Mineral exploitation is the main force of the GDP growth in URB. Based on government figures (data from Statistical Yearbook of URB 2018), there were 58 mining factories, which produced 4.92 billion yuan GDP, which accounting for 72.57% of total GDP. The per capita GDP of URB

¹ In the administrative organization of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, banner, sum, and gachaa correspond to county, township, and village in the provinces.

amounts to 15,117 dollars and reached the level of per capita GDP of a developed country. URB has become an important mineral town in IM.

URB contains two sums, three towns, and 51 gachaas. UP to 2018, it has 65,000 people, 20 percent of which is Mongolians. Historically, herds in URB have been engaged in animal husbandry and are referred to as “the nationality on horseback”. Due to serious desertification and the scattered distribution of vegetation, local herds still keep the tradition of the nomadic grazing and tame the five major kinds of the livestock, including horse, cattle, camel, sheep, and goat. By the end of 2018, there are a total of 394 thousand animal numbers in URB, including 10,000 cattle, 25,000 camels, 355,000 goats, and others. It is also worth noting that Erlangshan white goat, which grows the finest cashmere in China, is a local breed by long term selection at the specific area and environment. In recent years, mineral exploitation directly affected herdsmen’s livelihood through occupying their pastures and indirectly by decreasing grassland ecosystem functions. The livelihoods of many local herds are threatened by mining.

Method: Contingent Valuation

Ecological compensation can be regarded as the price paid for individuals or regions to sacrifice their development opportunities in order to protect ecology and the environment (Liu, Wan, Zhang, & Cai, 2008, pp. 84-93). Since Davis (1963) put forward the Contingent Valuation Method (CVM), it has been a popular and flexible non-market valuation method for ecological compensation. Despite its numerous psychological, philosophical, and technical challenges, Contingent Valuation Methods have been widely used to measure values associated with public and non-market goods (Ready, Buzby, & Hu, 1996, pp. 397-411). With CVM, a contingent scenario is constructed and then direct money measures for the changes in welfare are elicited. CV involves the direct elicitation of respondents’ willingness to pay (WTP) or willingness to accept (WTA) payment for changes in the quantity or quality of a public good or service (Fried, Adams, & Bergland, 1995, pp. 680-686). In economics, willingness to accept (WTA) is the minimum amount of money that a person is willing to accept to abandon a good or to put up with something negative, such as pollution. It is equivalent to the minimum monetary amount required for sale of a good or acquisition of something undesirable to be accepted by an individual. Willingness to pay (WTP) is the maximum amount that people would be willing to pay for the resource or to avoid any damages that might be sustained by the resource. Economists have been using the method for well over three decades in many countries. In China, this method has been widely used in the study of natural and environmental resources’ value, ecological value, social value, and people’s willingness (Cao, Holden, & Song, 2012, pp. 533-537; Qu & Li, 2012, pp. 73-80; Lu, Chen, & Zhu, 2018, pp. 208-214). However, there is lack of comprehensive analysis about the CVM on mining in grassland.

In many empirical CV studies, large difference between WTP and WTA has been demonstrated. WTA is usually substantially higher than WTP (Horowitz & McConnell, 2002, pp. 426-447). An enormous literature documents that WTP is less than WTA a monetary amount for an object, a phenomenon called the endowment effect (Chapman, Ortoleva, & Snowberg, 2017, p. 21). Some China’s empirical studies indicate that WTP is better than WTA because the Chinese respondents tend to make the WTA higher than reality (Li, 2014, p. 256). In pastoral areas of URB, we opt to use WTP method. Firstly, in the long-term social practice, local herdsmen thought that they could not easily be compensated for the destruction of the ecological environment. Secondly, many herdsmen lack trust in the government. They think that even if there are compensation, it will be withheld or misappropriated by the government. It is impossible to give them the full amount. Thirdly, from the cultural

perspective of morphology, Mongolian mode of production, value orientation, and cognitive system are the important carrier of the traditional culture (Gegengaowa, 2004, p. 192). Hence, most of Mongolian herdsmen think it should be their duty to protect the grassland under cultural influence of Mongolian.

Questionnaire Design and Field Study

The types of questionnaires on CVM include Iterative Bidding Game, Open-Ended, Payment Card, and Dichotomous Choice (DC). According to the local current situation of ecological environment and the basic principle of CVM, we applied the Payment Card (PC) to estimate the WTA of local herdsmen. The advantages of the PC approach are obvious: First, respondents' WTP values can be determined directly from the original data; second, PC respondents tend to state WTP values they are confident about (Ready, Navrud, & Dubourg, 2001, pp. 315-326); third, WTP values estimated by a PC approach are more robust than those relying on a DC approach (Ready et al., 2001, pp. 315-326); and fourth, there is no starting point bias affecting the PC approach (Mitchell & Carson, 1993, p. 142).

The questionnaire structure is designed to three parts in this study. The first part of the questionnaire is about the basic family situation of herds (population structure, household situation). The second part is about the understanding of grassland ecological environment and herd's attitude toward mining in grassland. The third part is the WTP question, which format used for the payment was direct payment through a "payment card", as it is assumed that this allows the user to behave as they would in a context where a product is sold at different prices (Shiell & McIntosh, 2008, pp. 287-292). With the use of PC, respondents are given a range of values to select from bids. Respondents were given the WTP scenario and asked if they were willing to pay a certain predetermined amount (bid), i.e., a discrete yes/no bid. Respondents selected payment bids ranging from 1,000 yuan, 500 yuan, and 100 yuan from which they had to select a bid that indicates their willingness to pay for annually.

Between July and August 2019, 16 undergraduate students from the School of Ethnology and Sociology of Inner Mongolia University conducted one field questionnaires on the mining grassland of URB. We had investigated five gachaas of Sarula, Biqier, Ublig, Bayinula, and Mandula irrespectively. The selection of the gachaas was based on their proximity to the mining enterprises. The survey was deployed to a sample of 150 families selected with the use of randomized cluster sampling. At least 30 households were chosen from each gachaa. We should also note here that the households selected were particular areas that experienced the most direct impact of mineral exploitation. A total of 150 households were surveyed by face-to-face. The effective number of questionnaires was 125. The effective rate of the questionnaires was 83.3%.

Results

Socioeconomic Characteristics of the Respondents

The basic socio-economic information of the respondents is shown in Table 1. Of the 125 respondents, 74 (54.3%) were male and 51 (45.7%) female. In terms of nationality structure, there are 59 Hans and 66 Mongolians. The mean age was 56.63 years old, ranging from 18 to 85 years old; 34 were illiterate with no formal education and five respondents had a college education. The average income a family was 51,213 RMB per year.

Table 1

Socioeconomic Characteristics of the Respondents

| Item | N |
|--|----|
| Sex | |
| Male | 74 |
| Female | 51 |
| Nationality | |
| Han | 59 |
| Mongolian | 66 |
| Age (yr) | |
| < 20 | 1 |
| 20-29 | 3 |
| 30-39 | 5 |
| 40-49 | 27 |
| ≥ 50 | 89 |
| Education | |
| Illiterate | 34 |
| Elementary | 35 |
| Senior | 40 |
| Higher | 11 |
| Associate degree and above | 5 |
| Financial characteristics income (x 10,000 RMB) | |
| < 1 | 13 |
| 1-2 | 13 |
| 2-3 | 18 |
| 3-4 | 10 |
| 4-5 | 19 |
| 5-6 | 25 |
| 6-7 | 14 |
| > 7 | 13 |


The Influence of Mining on Respondents

Figure 1. What was the perception of herders who think the main environmental problem caused by mining?




Figure 2. Did the herdsman satisfy with the compensation they received from the mining enterprise?




Figure 3. What was the opinion of herdsman regarding the mining in grasslands?

The pollution of mineral exploitation on grassland is multifaceted. According to Figure 1, the main environmental problem caused by mining included water pollution (57.14%), dust (14.29%), vegetation degradation (14.29%), and waste pollution (14.29%). Waste-rock piles and tailing repositories are a significant concern at large to medium-scale mining operations. A study indicates that the tailing water by mining directly affects the stream water and indirectly affects groundwater through recharge processes (Battogtokh, Lee, & Woo, 2014, pp. 3363-3374). Resulting in destruction of the vegetation, exacerbating soil erosion and land desertification, it is also likely making the fragile grassland ecosystem never return to its initial state. This process not only directly causes large areas of grazing grassland to collapse in mined-out areas, but also leads to the degradation of arable land, even causing these lands to become unproductive. Local herds also complained that the contaminated water had affected on both the growth of plants in the surrounding mining area and the availability of drinkable water for people and livestock. Blowing tailing dust is also a serious environmental issue. Dust can be caused by metallic ore crushing operations, drilling operations and trucks being driven on unsealed roads, wind blowing over areas disturbed by mining. Regular dust from mining operations will cover plant foliage that livestock have to consume for their survival and cause eye injury, bronchial complaints, and silicosis. Even local sheep have developed respiratory problems and died after eating poisoned grass. URB is in the transition zone of grassland and desertification areas. The grassland ecological environment system is fragile and sensitive. However, that road construction during the development of the mining areas caused obvious damage to vegetation. The grassland indices of coverage, biomass, and bio-abundance within the radius of 500 m of the mining areas were much lower in value than those in other areas (Bai, Wu, & Shen, 2016, pp. 178-186). Herds

also regarded that the closer to the mining area, the more serious the grassland degradation. Mines produce large amounts of waste because the ore is only a small fraction of the total volume of the mined material (Dudka & Adriano, 1997, pp. 590-602). A large number of deserted copper mine tailings dump and construction waster covers a large area of grassland. These wastes may contain large quantities of dangerous substances, such as heavy metals, which are an additional potential dander and threat to the fragile grassland ecosystem. Animals can be poisoned directly by mine products and residuals. Bioaccumulation in the plants or the smaller organisms they eat can also lead to poisoning: Horses, goats, and sheep are exposed in certain areas to potentially toxic concentration of copper in grass (Pyatt, Gilmore, Grattan, Hunt, & McLaren, 2000, pp. 771-778).

Mining compensation assumed enormous importance for the local herdsman. Based on existing compensation standard, they can get three kinds of compensation by mining enterprises. The first part is 4.74 yuan/mu/year of grazing prohibition fee. The second part is the 2.53 yuan/m² of grassland occupation subsidy. However, this standard is limited to herdsman near copper mines. Moreover, compensation for land use is opaque, weak, and poorly regulated. As a result, the compensation that herds received was worth a small fraction of its value and most herdsman did not believe that it was reasonable and can make up for the loss of their livelihood. In our survey, 65.79% of herders stated that they were not satisfied with the amount of compensation they received, while 34.21% of herdsman were of the opinion that they satisfied with the compensation (see Figure 2).

Grassland is the material basis for the development of pastoral areas and is the living protection of herdsman. Although mining in URB has been enhanced the governmental revenues, the herdsman's livelihood was threatened by mining. Many herds were unhappy about the mining. According to the survey of the opinions of local herds, 56.41% of herdsman disagreed mining in grassland. Only 32.05% of the surveyed herdsman agreed (see Figure 3).

WTP Analysis

Table 2

Willingness to Pay

| | Frequency | Percentage |
|----------------------------|-----------|------------|
| WTP ≥ Lowest bid (100) | 78 | 62.4 |
| 0 < WTP < Lowest bid (100) | 17 | 13.6 |
| WTP = 0 | 30 | 24.0 |
| Total | 125 | 100.0 |

From Table 2, out of the 125 successfully completed respondents, and 24 percent were invalid responses. We note that out of 76 percent that reported positive WTP, 13.6 percent reported WTP values less than the minimum/lowest presented bid. In terms of payment level, the average WTP per household is 641.18 yuan per year; the result shows that mean WTP for the sampled households is estimated to be 641.18 yuan. The reasons for willingness to pay are as follows: Improving the ecological environment is closely related to personal life; for the good environment of the next generation, it is a response for them to protect the environment. The reasons for the unwillingness to pay are as follows: The destruction of the environment is caused by the mining enterprises and should be borne by the enterprises; the ecological environment belongs to public affairs and should be borne by the government; the respondents had low income and heavy family burden and could not afford to pay.

Based on the principle of random sampling, we can therefore use the result to calculate total willingness to pay for the relevant population in URB.

$$N(\overline{wtp} - t\mu\overline{wtp}) \leq N\overline{WTP} \leq N(\overline{wtp} + t\mu\overline{wtp})$$

In the above formula, \overline{wtp} is the mean WTP for the sampled households; \overline{WTP} is the value for environmental losses in the mining area of URB; t means probability degree; $\mu\overline{wtp}$ is the standard error of mean. With the 95% confidence interval, \overline{WTP} is estimated to be 641.18 yuan annually with interval estimates of 326.72 yuan and 1,053.71 yuan. We expand the \overline{WTP} estimate for the model without covariates to the population value here. Based on the government figures, there were 24,597 households in mining area of URB in 2017. Multiplying this by the mean WTP and annualizing it yields a total of approximately 15,771,104.5 yuan with interval estimates of 8,036,331.84 yuan and 25,918,104.9 yuan. If the ecological restoration period is 20 years, the whole environmental losses within mineral exploitation in URB will be between 160,726,637 yuan and 518,362,098 yuan.

Conclusions and Implications

The mineral resources in the grassland of IM have helped to drive China's prosperity. Meanwhile, the grassland is and continues to be an important source of livelihood to the herdsman in terms of livestock support and income generation. However, mining in grassland has exerted a negative influence on herds' livelihood. The eco-compensation fee can only compensate the external costs insufficiently. Herds have a right to expect fair compensation within mining. How to calculate reasonable compensation value is the key to this problem.

The main objective of this study was to obtain estimates of WTP values for the environmental pollution by mining in the pastoral area of URB. The study shows the main environmental problem within mining exploitation included water pollution, dust, vegetation degradation, and waste pollution. At least 76 percent of respondents had willingness to pay for environmental loss. This WTP has been estimated at 641.18 yuan annually. The estimate of WTP to relevant herds in the mining area of URB was 15,771,104.5 yuan annually. Combined with the results of this study, we propose following policy recommendations.

First, the environmental disruption and pollution which is caused by mineral exploitation in grassland is closely related to the ineffective compensation and the lack of environmental right. Thus, the key to solve the problem is to set up the real paid use system of mineral resources and property right system of environment. The state needs to regulate the existing irrational distribution pattern by the tax and other means. Some countermeasures and proposals should be proposed, including building the legal system on interest compensation of the mineral exportation in grassland, determining collecting channels, standards, and methods of the compensation funds, improving impact assessment system of mining environment and establishing a special management department for grassland ecological environment in mining areas, constructing the administrative compensation system on environmental damage of mineral enterprises and the transferring payment system on ecological compensation of mineral grassland.

Second, the current compensation mechanism of mineral exploitation in the pastoral areas should be reformed and should make the livelihood of animal husbandry a priority. According to the results of our study, the existing problems are that there is no intermediary to play a key role in reaching the eco-compensation agreement and the compensation standard does not include the opportunity costs. Especially, the principle of proximity compensation ignores the integrity of the ecology and the vulnerability of animal husbandry and has no long-term consideration for the sustainable livelihood of pastoralists. A three-dimensional compensation mechanism for the mineral exploitation, which mainly consists of livelihood compensation, intergenerational

compensation, and ecological environment compensation, should be established in the mining area. The governments should develop relevant policies to improve the income of herds within mineral exploitation.

In conclusion, this study demonstrated the applicability of the CVM to the issue of the compensation for herds within mining in grassland. The empirical results from this study suggest some important ideas and may act as a good foundation for many more studies on the ecological and environmental compensation within mineral exploitation in the pastoral area of IM.

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The Revival of Ancient Hebrew Words With the Revival of Israel

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In this study, all the words in the latest edition of the Hebrew Even Shoshan Dictionary (2003) were scanned and ancient words that were not used continuously throughout the Hebrew strata—used in Modern Hebrew in their old or new meaning—were collected. After finding the appropriate words, we examined their incidence in the Gur dictionary (1946) to ensure that the new meanings had not existed then. We have determined the scope of usage by general knowledge and Google Search. The 99 ancient words with new meanings were identified, 39 of which are foreign, according to this distribution: 31 biblical words, 44 words of the Sages, and 24 medieval words. In parallel with the 70 years of Israel's independence, many ancient words were reintroduced with new modern meanings, to answer the need to create terms for the institutions of the sovereign state and for the masses of Jewish immigrants who spoke foreign languages. Most of the words are from the Mishnah period, the last period in which Hebrew was a living language and adopted foreign words from the developed and advanced cultures of its day. The article presents the innovations of words in different fields, explains it, and answers another questions.

Keywords: revival of Hebrew words, revival of Israel, ancient words, loanwords, neologisms

The Revival of the Hebrew Language

This article presents the results of research into the revival of ancient Hebrew words in Modern Hebrew, in the 70 years from the establishment of the State in 1948 through 2018.

First, we discuss the revival of the Hebrew language itself, a phenomenon without parallel in the history of languages or peoples. Bar-Asher (2002) distinguished between the revival of Hebrew literature approximately 270 ago in the Age of the Enlightenment, when Hebrew works spread across Europe, and the revival of spoken Hebrew starting in 1881, in the wake of Eliezer Ben-Yehuda's immigration to the Land of Israel. Cohen (2005) described Biblical Hebrew as a linguistic paragon for the generations preceding the Enlightenment, and argued that this norm was later changed by Mendele Mocher Sforim, who incorporated all registers of the language into his work, paving the way for numerous other writers who adopted his literary style. Nonetheless, some purists took pains to base the grammar of Modern Hebrew on Biblical Hebrew. This canon, however, gradually eroded with the growing perception that the "correct" use of Hebrew need not exclude post-Biblical registers. Since Hebrew was reinstated as the primary spoken language of the Jews, the Hebrew Language Committee strove to base its linguistic decisions and innovations on all its registers, and the committee's current incarnation, the Academy of the Hebrew Language, has continued that tradition. In his article entitled "Numerous Achievements and a Few Failures in One Hundred Years of Shaping the Hebrew Language" (1991), Yannai surveys the

endeavor of planning the language. He explains that one of the aims of its revival relates to sociolinguistics, namely, to stamp out the rift and hostility that existed at the beginning of the 20th century between Sefardi and Ashkenazi Jews, and to help fashion a united society in Israel based on brotherhood and unity.

Morag (1990) divided the timeframe of the revival of Hebrew as a spoken language into three sub-periods, aligned with the Zionist endeavor of immigration and settlement: The first is between 1882 and 1918, encompassing the First World War; the second ends with the establishment of the State in 1948; and the third continues to the present day. The beginning of the third period is marked by waves of mass immigration that brought with them speakers of many different languages. Although these immigrants found a broad and solid foundation of Hebrew, their influence on the vernacular was extensive: In 1948, 75% of the population spoke Hebrew, but by the end of 1950, only 60% did so¹.

The changes in native Hebrew accelerated in the latter half of the second and throughout the third of Morag's three periods. This can be attributed not only to the influence of the large numbers of immigrants but also to some internal developments, and is in line with what was happening in other languages at the same time. Harshav (1990) explained that during the second period, Hebrew became the foundation of society in all walks of life, and during the third period, beginning with Israel's establishment, Hebrew became the language of a country responsible for the linguistic foundation of all its institutions and systems.

How the Academy of the Hebrew Language Creates New Words

The first institution responsible for the revival of Hebrew was the Hebrew Language Committee, established in 1890, followed in 1953 by the Academy of the Hebrew Language. The Hebrew Academy continued the Committee's mission and practices based on the same methodology, which is described by Bahat (1987) and Bar-Asher (1996). Bahat enumerates eight methods—four of which we relate to here:

1. To use a root that already exists in one of the conjugations or patterns, e.g., “taḥbir” (syntax) and “taḥbura” (transport) from the existing root *ḥb*”r (to join, to connect).

2. The “Pines method”² of reviving ancient and obsolete words by assigning them a new meaning, e.g., *ekdaḥ* (handgun), *totalḥ* (cannon), *margema* (mortar).

These two methods are different ways of drawing from inside the language, or as Bar Asher put it, “yesh miyesh” (creating an entity from another entity).

3. Importing foreign words—a strategy which has resulted in the proliferation of prefixes and suffixes in Hebrew morphology³. Bar-Asher terms this principle “lexical importation” from foreign languages.

4. Blends—creating a new word by combining two existing words, e.g., *madḥom* (thermometer) from *mad* (meter) and *ḥom* (fever).

Bar-Asher does not mention the fourth method, but instead presents the third method employed by Ben-Yehuda: “Yesh me'ayin” (creating something from nothing), by which he means the coining of new roots

¹ Eldar (2009, p. 540) presented data collected in a 1916-1918 population survey, indicating that 40% of participating Israeli Jews used Hebrew as their primary language, while the other 60% used 104 other languages for oral communication (predominantly Yiddish and Arabic). The most telling evidence from this survey is that toward the end of Turkish rule, for the majority (75%) of young Israelis in the settlements and in Tel Aviv, Hebrew was the primary language.

² Yehiel Michal Pines, who was one of the founders of the Hebrew Language Committee and also renewed a small number of words in Hebrew.

³ For salient examples, see Schwartzwald (2001, p. 273), who argues that along with the non-concatenative derivation, which has been a prevalent rule in all registers of Hebrew, including Modern Hebrew, linear formation has become more and more frequent in lexical innovation.

that do not exist in the language as a way of creating neologisms. This method appears in Bahat's list at nos. 5 and 8 (Bahat, 1987). Ben-Yehuda asserted that the typical Hebrew three-consonant root enables the creation of new roots by changing the order of the letters. Bar-Asher notes that this method is prevalent in Modern Hebrew, in which four-consonant roots are created from three-consonant roots, as in *tfk''d* from *pk''d*; new roots from non-Hebrew words, such as *tlp''n* from telephone, and roots from notarikons (acronym) such as *doḥ* from *din veḥešbon* and other derivatives (*ledaveaḥ*, *medaveaḥ*, etc.).

In our opinion, three of the ways presented above are accepted naturally among Hebrew speakers after 70 years of Israel's existence as a sovereign state, but the question is why a living and vibrant Hebrew needs to revive ancient words. Nowadays, Hebrew is developing easily, and new words are often born spontaneously and naturally, but while the Hebrew Academy continues to renew words, and according to Nir (2004), about 50% of them are accepted into the language, the chances that ancient words will be accepted are lower. In his study, Nir found that language speakers reject words that are not transparent, and it is well known that ancient words are often far from transparent, so why do the members of the Hebrew Academy risk reviving them? As we see it, this was appropriate for the period of the beginning of the revival of the spoken language, in which there was a great demand for new words, but it is not suitable for contemporary Hebrew. Moreover, it is known that some of the ancient words that were revived are borrowed words. Why add even more foreign words when their numbers are growing almost uncontrollably? Some examples: *darga* (rank) from Aramaic, *avir* (air) from Greek, and *safsal* (bench) from Latin.

In order to resolve this difficulty, we decided to examine the extent of the use of revival of ancient words in the 70 years of modern Israel's existence. This examination brings with it a need to shed light on other aspects of the issue: In what areas of life were more ancient words revived? What was the main linguistic layer from which the words were taken? How many of the revived words were loans? And from which language were most of them loaned? All these questions are addressed in this study; the last two necessitate some background to the phenomenon of borrowing words that has always been the norm and has increased the lexicon of the Hebrew language.

Loan Words in the Hebrew Lexicon

Yannai (1991) wrote of the need to bridge the gap between a language exposed to the influences of languages that are inherently different in character and modalities of expression, and Hebrew's thousand-year old linguistic legacy. Moreover, he believes it must do so without cutting off the language from its sources and while enabling it to meet the needs of future generations. Ben-Hayim (1953, p. 42) argued that by importing and absorbing new meanings—a process that has existed over many centuries—our language has incorporated new and regenerating content. This flexibility readied Hebrew for reinstatement as a spoken language that fulfills all the communicative needs of Israel's residents, and adapts itself to new circumstances as required. Thus, a revived language that preserves Biblical grammatical patterns and features differs from Biblical Hebrew in terms of denotations and content, just as the material circumstances and spiritual preoccupations of an ancient Jew differed from those of our contemporaries. This process, which was at a standstill while Hebrew served for written communication alone, has not yet ended: It is the decisive factor in linguistic innovation in a variety of areas. Ben-Hayim (1953, p. 81) further contended that it would be inconceivable to interfere with the natural evolution of a spoken language by prescribing a standard; a more productive approach is to cultivate the

language in all its aspects—one of which is the lexicon, in which he suggests reviving words according to the needs and requirements of the speakers.

Avineri (1964, p. 339) maintained that from the beginning of the revival of spoken Hebrew, there have been conflicting attitudes to international words: Eliezer Ben-Yehuda and his adherents strove for the eradication of all foreign words from Modern Hebrew, but many writers sought them out. Between these two extremes, according to Avineri, our language has fortunately negotiated a middle path. He points out that foreign words are relatively common in the Talmud and Midrash, even more so than in Modern Hebrew—and a few foreign words can even be found in the Bible, e.g., *pitgam* (proverb—Aramaic), *parbar* (suburb—Persian), and *psanter* (piano—Greek). A similar line of argument is followed by Tur-Sinai (1928, p. 10), whose book reviews lexical borrowings in the Biblical period. He shows how foreign words were absorbed into Hebrew following historical upheavals—invasions of the Holy Land and interactions between speakers of different languages who lived side by side with the Jews. During that period, Hebrew incorporated words mainly from Akkadian, and during the Egyptian exile, also from Egyptian. Aramaic is the successor to Akkadian, which held sway at the time of Abraham, who came from Padan Aram (1928, p. 21). Its influence on Hebrew intensified when Aramaic became the official language of the Babylonian Empire and subsequently of the Persian Empire. It was the official language of great governments, whose rule spanned vast territories from India to Africa, and was also deemed “the professional language used by the experts” (1928, p. 31). Aramaic influenced Hebrew to such an extent that it became the second language of the Jews, on a par with Hebrew. Bar-Asher follows a similar line in his article (1996) dedicated to the linguist Eliezer Meir Lifschitz, who suggested that the gaps in Hebrew be supplemented first of all from Aramaic, rather than Arabic as Ben-Yehuda had proposed. Lifschitz gives several reasons for this: First, in the past, Aramaic influences on Hebrew evolved naturally, and the two became sister languages. Second, from the outset, Aramaic was lexically and pragmatically close to Hebrew. Third, the borrowing of Aramaic words was not an artifice, but occurred in a gradual process that spanned an entire historical epoch. And finally but crucially, Aramaic and Hebrew words are so linguistically proximal that to a Hebrew speaker they do not even feel foreign⁴.

Stratified Modern Hebrew

Rubinstein (2010) estimated the number of lexical entries from all Hebrew registers that are listed in all Hebrew dictionaries at approximately 45,000, including loanwords, and the number of loanwords found in the Modern Hebrew literature period to date at about two thousand.

In what follows, we present findings of three linguists who conducted lexical research on Hebrew materials encompassing the lexicon and texts from different periods. Sivan (1982) collected all lexical innovations from the time of the first immigration wave during Turkish rule up to the First World War, including words that were revived or adapted to the needs of the time. The lists he compiled include the name of the innovator but not the etymology of the word. Sarfatti (1991) analyzed the lexicon of Modern Hebrew in a corpus of spoken or close-to-spoken language after transcription, journalistic and academic language, and found it to contain a majority of words from the Bible and the Mishna. He writes that spoken language contains

⁴ Or (2016, p. 224) described discussions that took place in the Hebrew Language Committee regarding the question: From which language would it be more appropriate to borrow features and elements—Aramaic or Arabic? Opinions differed, and while many were in favor of Aramaic, apprehensions were voiced that the very close affinity of Aramaic to Hebrew presented a threat to the purity of the latter.

more Biblical words, in contrast to academic language, which contains more medieval Hebrew derivations. Moreover, new elements are scarce in spoken Hebrew, but are more prevalent in journalistic language and theoretical language⁵. Sarfatti also says that there are more Biblical words in spoken and journalistic language than in academic language.

The third researcher, Schwartzwald (1995), checked the number of words in the Hebrew lexicon across all historical periods. She cites the following results:

- Biblical period: 22%
- Sages (Mishnaic period): 21%
- Middle Ages: 17%
- Lexical innovations [revived words]: 40%

However, when she investigated consecutive texts in Modern Hebrew across all historical periods, based on Even-Shoshan (1970, p. 3062, as cited in Schwartzwald, 1995), the picture that emerged was altogether different:

- Biblical period: 65%
- Sages: 16%
- Middle Ages: 5%
- Lexical innovations: 14%

To account for these disparities, Schwartzwald explains that many of the Biblical words passed into the Language of the Sages and then to the later periods. She contends that the words revived in Modern Hebrew filled a gap but do not constitute a substantive portion of the lexicon, nor are they a distinguishing feature of Modern Hebrew. Modern Hebrew, she concludes, comprises words from all periods, and is also influenced by other languages, spoken by Jews and non-Jews alike. These and other studies have dealt with different periods of Modern Hebrew. In fact, all of the studies dealt with Modern Hebrew, but no research has hitherto been devoted to the 70 years since the establishment of the State. Furthermore, in the studies described above and other related researches, all the words were examined: Sivan checked a certain time period; Sarfatti and Schwartzwald studied all the words in a specific corpus; and Schwartzwald also investigated all lexical entries across all registers. The latter two researchers established the etymology of the words based on the period in which the word is first attested in Hebrew. Yet, no research has so far checked the ancient words that were not in continuous use across successive historical periods, and were revived or were given a new meaning during the existence of Israel as an independent State.

Method

The present research encompasses all headwords that are nouns in the latest (2003) edition of the *Even-Shoshan Hebrew Dictionary*. A list was compiled of all ancient words that were not in continuous use over successive periods of time, and which in Modern Hebrew has either retained their old denotation or received a new one⁶.

⁵ Nir (1989, p. 10) likewise revealed a link between genres and registers, on the one hand, and lexical borrowings, on the other. He contends that in fiction and poetry, borrowings are scarce, while in journalistic reports, commentary, and advertising, they are more common. He points out that apart from the actual need for a particular word, lexical borrowings fulfill a socio-psychological function, namely, keeping abreast with the global world in general and its various trends and fads.

⁶ Only words from classical Hebrew which ceased to be used in spoken Hebrew were chosen, or words from the Middle Ages that were not used in Modern Hebrew until the establishment of the State.

To complete the picture until 2018, the study reviewed 42 issues of *Academ*, a newsletter published by the Hebrew Academy between 2003 and 2018. After identification, the relevant words were checked in the Gur Dictionary, published in 1946, to ascertain that the modern meanings did not yet exist. The extent of current usage was gauged using general knowledge and Google searches. Although the historical dictionary of the Ben-Yehuda project is more comprehensive and accurate than other dictionaries, it is not organized as a conventional dictionary; instead, a given word is entered and the result is citations from all written sources throughout the ages. (The Ben-Yehuda project is not yet complete, and the results do not yet include all Modern Hebrew literature). Furthermore, it gives only the meanings arising from those texts, whereas conventional dictionaries also give meanings that are not taken from texts but are standard in the spoken language (and therefore appear without citations). Nevertheless, when a need arose to access more detailed sources of words, the historical dictionary was used.

Methodological Problem

The inclusion or non-inclusion of headwords in a dictionary is usually at the discretion of its lexicographers. This makes it difficult to attain maximum accuracy in research such as this. Nevertheless, the research indicates a broad swath of ancient words that have been renewed in the 70 years of modern Israel's existence. It also reflects trends in the actions of the Hebrew Academy and the influence of the public on the language.

It should be noted that the transcription reflects the original pronunciation of the ancient Hebrew.

Results

The study identified 99 ancient words with new denotations, many of them loanwords. Most of them took on a more modern but related meaning of the original word, and 10 of them were revived together with their ancient meanings, e.g., kira (stove) and karkov (cornice), gad (luck), gofan (font), mišra (syrup). It is important to emphasize that later in the discussion, when we look at the contribution of the loanwords found in the study, we mean words borrowed by Hebrew in ancient times and having an ancient denotation, and for which, after a long period of disuse, that meaning has been retained today or the words have been given a new meaning⁷.

The Areas in Which Many Words Were Revived

Relations between the State and citizens. 17 words: 'agra (fee), 'omna (fostering), 'asimon (token for public phones), 'arnona (land tax), guvayna (reverse-charge call), darkon (passport), hatkana (arrangement), ħilut (asset forfeiture), matsa' (political platform), miškan (building with an official purpose), qayamut (sustainability), qneset (the Israeli parliament), meli'a (plenum), qalpi (ballot box), si'a (faction), še'ilta (parliamentary question), and tsir (diplomatic representative).

Food and cooking. 11 words: kira (stove), maḥmetset (sourdough), 'atir (rich), 'iltit (salmon), tefiḥa (souffle), šilgon (ice lolly), 'askala (grill), revixa (roux), saharon (croissant), mišra (syrup), and mat'amiya (restaurant for light food).

Army and police. 11 words: 'efod (flak jacket), bardas (hood), ḥaziz (firecracker), maḥboš (incarceration), memugan (armor-protected), seger (closure, clasp), sexem (score used to sort candidates), rexeš⁸ (procurement), balder (messenger), miflag (department in the police), and ḥoger (soldier).

⁷ In the interpretation of ancient and renewed words we have noted all the possible meanings.

⁸ Rexeš as verbal noun already existed at the time of the Hagana organization, but after Israel became a sovereign state, it was adopted also in commerce and referred to goods purchased.

Technology, computers, and online communication. 8 words: pigum (action to check software), pelet (computer output), sever (cyber), gofan (font), biyuš (shaming), 'atar (site), meḥolel (generator), and tisa (flight).

The distribution of words by period:

- Biblical Hebrew: 31
- Sages (Mishnaic) Hebrew: 44
- Medieval Hebrew: 24

Findings Related to Lexical Borrowing

In all, 39 loanwords were identified, of which one is from an assumed source and two are from an unknown source (all the loanwords comprising 40% of the total). The languages from which the words were loaned:

- Aramaic: 29
- Greek: 5
- Syriac: 1
- Latin: 1
- Italian: 1⁹
- Unknown: 2¹⁰

Table 1 contains 15 of the 99 words found. The remaining words can be found in the appendix (see Table A).

Table 1

Examples of Revived Words and Their Denotations in Earlier Periods and in Modern Hebrew

| Word | Ancient denotation | Modern denotation |
|---------|---|--|
| Arnona | S: a tax collected from residents by the Romans | Land tax only |
| 'atar | S: Mainly in Mishnaic Hebrew: place | Mainly in archeology: site; building site; computer site |
| Balder | S: Messenger | Postman; agent on a secret mission |
| Biqta | S: Shack; hut | Cable hut—in communications and electronics |
| Bardas | S: An item of clothing mentioned in the Mishna | A hood attached to a coat, gas mask for kids |
| Guvaina | S: Collection of debt; demand for and collection of payment | Reverse-charge service |
| Dibuv | M: Speech; whisper | Dubbing (superimposing another language on speech in films) |
| Dardas | S: Slipper, light shoe, rubber overshoe (galoshes) | Smurf—small blue human-like creatures wearing large house slippers (in children's books and films) |
| Darkon | B: Persian gold/silver coin | Passport; travel document |
| Hatqana | S: Installation, setup | Preparing material for printing; issuing regulations or laws |
| hotelet | M: Placenta; the covering of a fetus | Leg warmer |
| ḥaziz | B: A flash of lightning accompanied by thunder | Fire issuing from the barrel of a large firearm; firecracker |
| ḥilut | S: Diagnosis of an infection | Absolute decision; asset forfeiture; salvaging money in a criminal misdemeanor |
| tibua' | M: Moving something here and there, drowning someone or something | Bird-banding (ornithology: from teva'); coining |
| mahboš | M: Bandage, healing | Military incarceration |

Notes. B—Biblical Hebrew; S—Sages (Mishnaic) Hebrew; M—Medieval Hebrew.

⁹ It is assumed that the word “bardas” derives from its place of origin in Italy.

¹⁰ The words “karkov” and “'arnona”.

Discussion and Conclusions

Based on the statistical analysis of Even-Shoshan, 40% of the entries in the dictionary denote lexical innovations, i.e., words that were created since the Enlightenment (Nir, 2004). Some of them were coined based on the principle of “drawing from within the language”—reviving ancient words and either keeping their original meaning or assigning a new one. The present study examined the extent to which this strategy has been used during the 70 years of Israel’s independence, and identified 99 such items. This number is minimal compared to the volume of word innovations since the revival of the new literature, which is estimated in the thousands¹¹. According to Nir (2004), the societal needs posed by changes in reality compelled the Hebrew Language Committee and other public institutions to engage in extensive lexical innovation and create terms that are not found in ancient Hebrew sources—a challenge that was subsequently addressed also by the Academy of the Hebrew Language. We have described¹² the four methods by which the Hebrew Academy has coined numerous words to enrich the language, but it is important to keep in mind that the revival of ancient words is only one of these methods. Moreover, the availability of suitable words is limited, owing to the time elapsed between the classical and medieval Hebrew periods and the establishment of the State, which accounts for the relatively small number of such words out of all lexical innovations.

Most of the revived words belong to the area of the State and its citizens, in which the language of affairs of state developed rapidly in response to the needs of independence [(e.g., *’agra* (toll), *’omna* (fostering a child), *’asimon* (public phone token)]. The second area of identified words pertains to food and cooking, which have been common to human experience all over the world from time immemorial. Most of the words in this sphere have retained their ancient denotations in so far as they designate basic foods, e.g., *’iltit* (Atlantic salmon), *maḥmetset* (sourdough). There is no reason for these words to have changed their meanings, and the same is true for the terms designating utensils that are still in use today, e.g., *kira* (stove), *’askala* (grill). Most of the words pertaining to other areas were adopted with new denotations. This is logical, as the areas themselves had been transformed: military and police: *’efod* (flak jacket), *bardas* (protective hood of a child’s gas mask), *seger* (curfew), and the modern field of technology and computers, in which almost all the revived words have been given a new meaning [such as *pigum* (action to support a learner), *pelet* (computer output), *sever* (cyber)]¹³. The exception is *gofan* (font), which has returned to Modern Hebrew with its ancient meaning.

Sarfatti (2001, p. 272) explained that when two societies speaking different languages come into contact, for whatever historical or cultural reasons, conditions are created in which their languages can influence each other. Sometimes the influence is unidirectional, sometimes mutual—each language gives to the other and takes from it. Usually, the linguistic encounter goes hand-in-hand with cultural interactions, and if one of the cultures is richer and more developed than the other, the linguistic community of the latter imports words from the language of the former. Most of the words (44) identified in the present research originate in Mishnaic Hebrew, followed by Biblical (31) and Medieval (24) Hebrew. Furthermore, in line with Sarfatti (2001, p. 272), most of the words (75) come from two historical epochs: one, during which Hebrew was a living language but its speakers were under the occupation of powerful foreign empires with highly developed cultures, namely, Babylonian, Persian, Greek, and Roman; and the second, when Hebrew was a dead language that served the

¹¹ See p. 160.

¹² See p. 157.

¹³ While this word in Hebrew is formally an acronym (ספר), it is often seen nowadays without the speech marks.

religious and communal purposes of the Jewish Diaspora. During these two epochs, extensive inter-linguistic interactions influenced both the communal life and the culture of the Jews. Moreover, during the Mishnaic and Medieval periods, these spheres of life developed extensively, giving rise to a need for terminology that did not exist in Biblical times. This is the main factor in the proliferation of lexical borrowings, reflected in the findings here: As already noted, 39 out of 99 are loanwords, mainly from Aramaic (29 words). This issue is elaborated in Tur-Sinai (1928, p. 31)¹⁴, who explains that Aramaic was the official language of the regimes whose rule spanned the area from India to Africa, and was considered “the professional language of experts”. In this connection, we have pointed out that the Hebrew Language Committee, and later the Academy of the Hebrew Language, preferred to do as their forebears had done, and borrowed Aramaic words when no ancient Hebrew word was found¹⁵.

When we consider the loanwords in the study (the words highlighted in the appendix), we see that some of them are relatively recent words that the Hebrew Academy has proposed in recent decades, while others were borrowed in the first decades of the sovereign state. The words of the second type were absorbed in speech when many Hebrew speakers, even the secular ones, were close to the language of the sources and enlisted in the effort to renew it. However, over the years, following social processes in Israel, such as the widening gap between religious and secular Jews and a reduction in the preponderance of Jewish studies in schools, there has been a distancing from the Jewish sources that has led to a lack of familiarity with the vocabulary of classical Hebrew. It seems that the members of the Hebrew Academy are aware of this, and have understood that unfamiliar words will not be accepted. They have therefore turned to the revival of ancient words only when they are transparent. In our experience as Hebrew speakers, ancient words that have been revived in the last 30 years, such as *tsantar*, *šeliva*, *seger*¹⁶, are indeed transparent, and Hebrew speakers have been quick to absorb them.

Summary

The study shows that in the 70 years since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, 99 ancient words have been revived. Forty-four of these are from Medieval Hebrew (also known as the Era of the Sages), in which there was a great deal of contact between the Jews and the cultures of the peoples under whose rule they lived. The most prominent area for revived words is state-citizen relations followed by cooking—a universal, military and police, areas that are characteristic of a sovereign state. The other areas are technology, computers, and online communication, in which the rapid emergence of technology in this period demanded a lexical response.

Why did the members of Hebrew Academy risk reviving old words that are usually unfamiliar to Hebrew speakers? The answer is revealed if the 70 years of the State’s existence are divided into two: In roughly the first half of this period, when the proximity of the language speakers to the source language was greater, ancient words were revived even when they were not transparent. In the second half, this trend continued only when the words were more transparent—an essential condition for their absorption in the language. The last finding showed that 39 of the 99 ancient words that were revived were borrowed—29 of them from Aramaic, the language that most influenced Hebrew. Another question was why foreign words are added to the Hebrew

¹⁴ See p. 159.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ See the appendix.

language at a time when their numbers are growing almost uncontrollably, and the answer is that these foreign words had already been absorbed into the Hebrew language and have become an integral part of it¹⁷.

We have seen that of the thousands of words renewed in the language since the Enlightenment, the number of ancient words is very small. This study is not based on a corpus that includes all lexical innovations since the emergence of Modern Hebrew literature approximately 270 years ago. Nevertheless, it is a reflection of the most significant period in the evolution of the Hebrew language, a period in which Israel became a sovereign state and in which the need for words that reflect the modern age has expanded greatly.

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¹⁷ See the end of p. 159, showing the four reasons why words were borrowed from Aramaic.

Appendix A

Table A

List of the Revival Ancient Hebrew Words With the Revival of Israel

| Word | Ancient meaning | New meaning | Comments |
|-----------|--|---|-------------------------|
| 'agra | salary | fee, toll | |
| 'ariax | small brick | small brick | tile (Gur) |
| 'arnona | tax | land tax | |
| 'asda | barge | barge | |
| 'asimon | deformed coin | metal token for public phones | |
| 'askala | ramp | grill | |
| 'askola | school of thought | system | |
| 'asmaxta | promise without obligation from seller | written proof, reference | |
| 'atar | place | Archeological dig site; website | |
| 'avrex | religious scholar | yeshiva student | |
| 'efod | sort of apron worn by the high priest | bullet-proof vest | |
| 'iltit | type of fish | Atlantic salmon | |
| baldar | messenger, postman | agent on a secret mission | |
| bardas | type of fabric in Mishnah | hood, cowl, gas mask for kids | |
| bikta | shack, hut, guest room | guest room | |
| biyuš | causing shame | shaming | |
| dardas | slipper, light shoe rubber overshoe (galoshes) | smurf (children's television) | Talmudic |
| darkon | Persian coin in the Bible | passport | |
| dibuv | speech, whisper | dubbing | |
| diquř | puncture, stabbing | acupuncture | |
| gad | Jupiter, luck, fortune | same meaning | |
| gofan | font | same meaning | |
| guvayna | debt collection, payment | reverse-charge service | |
| hatqana | installation, setup | preparing material for printing; setting regulations and laws | |
| karkov | border, edge; cornice; rim around tool or building | same meaning | Architecture |
| kayamut | durability, sustainability | ability to preserve what exists for future generations | |
| kevuda | luggage, baggage; belongings | same meaning | |
| kira | stove | stove for cooking | |
| kneset | meeting for various purposes | Israel's parliament | Beit kneset = synagogue |
| maħbosh | bandage | incarceration | Military |
| maħmetset | sourdough | tissue culture of bacteria for fermenting milk | |
| maslul | paved road | paved road for travel, racing, and competitions | |
| matsa' | bed (of straw, leaves, rags) | same meaning + political platform | Politics |
| meħolel | dancer | generator | |
| meli'a | entire field | plenum | |
| memugan | extradited | with protection measures installed | |
| merkav | seat of a rider, body (of a vehicle etc.) | fuselage | Aeronautics |
| metujag | adorned with a badge, characterization of breeds | tagged | Computing |
| miflag | division, department | administrative subdivision | Police |
| miška' | clean water from dirt, sediment | residue | |

| | | | |
|---------------------------|---|---|--------------------|
| miškan | dwelling place, seat | building with an official purpose | |
| mišra | syrup | same meaning in cooking | |
| mitslol | diving | sound quality | Music |
| mitsua ⁴ | average calculation | same meaning + move to the middle of the text | |
| nativ | road | lane on a highway | |
| neḥiya | transmission and guidance | guidance of blind person by a dog | |
| neḥušan | copper snake | Apharitis cilissa, a copper-colored butterfly | |
| nemoša | weakling, (slang) | weak in character | |
| neteq | a skin lesions mentioned in the Bible | fuse disconnection | Electricity |
| ʾomna | growth and care | fostering (a child) | |
| pelet | escape | output | Computing |
| phaṭ | reduction in quantity and value | same meaning | |
| pigum | temporary structure that serves as a platform for builders | same + action to check software + means to support a learner | Computing |
| qav | wire, border, drawing between two points (geometry) | same meanings + cable, strategy, bus route, guideline, characteristic | |
| qeta⁴ | section, part; term in engineering, part of a military zone | (slang) "riot" | |
| qalpi | ballot box | noteworthy event (slang) | |
| qayit | summer | same meaning for election | |
| redid | scarf, shawl | summer vacation | Holiday town |
| refida | bedding, insole; lining | shawl | |
| revixa | sauce made of flour and oil | stratus (cloud) | |
| rexesh | horse or donkey for riding | same meaning | |
| saharon | horse or donkey for riding | purchase of arms + goods purchased | |
| sappaḥat | jewel in the shape of a moon or a part of it | croissant | |
| seger | skin disease | psoriasis | |
| sever | device for closing something | curfew, closure + device for closing upper and lower jaw | |
| sexem | facial expression | cyber | |
| si⁴a | amount | score system used for sorting candidates | Only in the IDF |
| suga | group, gang | faction | Politics |
| še⁴ilta | fence, hedge | genre | |
| šelif | question in Halachic discussions | parliamentary question | |
| šeliva | long sack for placing a load on a beast | removable note for a game | Slang |
| šetel | step | combination | |
| šezzer | seedling | graft, implant | Medicine |
| šilgon | braid, weave, bundle | to arrange, to interlace | |
| šimua ⁴ | snowfall | popsicle, ice lolly | |
| šizra | announcement | hearing | Law |
| šniyut | spine | rachis | |
| tefiḥa | duplication | duality, dichotomy | |
| tešer | puffiness, swelling | same + soufflé | |
| tibua ⁴ | present | tip | |
| tisa | drowning someone | banding | Ornithology |
| to ⁴ am | flying | flight | |
| tsantar | harmony, symmetry | matching, reciprocity | |
| tsir | thin pipe for oil | catheter | |
| tsiyun | messenger, angel | same + consul | |
| | gravestone | grave | Religious language |

| | | | |
|----------------|--|--|--------------------|
| ya‘ats | advise, provide consultation | same meaning the phrase reference book | Librarian ship |
| ḥatsran | janitor, caretaker; (medieval) courtier | housefather | |
| ḥavruta | friendship, learning companion | regular study partner in a yeshiva | Religious language |
| ḥaziz | a flash of lightning accompanied by thunder | firecracker | |
| ḥequer | investigation | same meaning | Education |
| ḥemet | leather bag for liquids | water-carrying bag with a tube and a mouthpiece | |
| ḥilut | diagnosis of an infection | asset forfeiture | |
| ḥoger | armored with war tools | low-ranking soldier | Military |
| ḥotelet | placenta | leg-warmer | |
| ḥufša | freedom, no master | vacation | |
| ‘afuts | materials produced from gall-nut processing | sleepy | Slang |
| ‘atir | rich | abundant | |
| ‘inug | pleasure, delight, satisfaction | entertainment, enjoyment | |
| ‘itsum | the middle of | same + sanction | |

Notes. The bold words are loanwords. The list is arranged in the order of the English alphabet, therefore words beginning with the guttural consonants: ḥ and ‘ appear at the end of the appendix.



The Path Choice and Method of Chinese Rural Governance Ethics Research

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The 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China put forward the strategy of Rural Revitalization. Effective governance is the key to rural revitalization. Effective rural governance needs to properly deal with the ethical relationship in the process of governance. The study of rural governance ethics in China includes three kinds of path choices. They are paradigm shift from top-down to bottom-up, organic integration of special and general, and interweaving between tradition and modernity. The paradigm shift from top-down to bottom-up needs to be done by methods, such as the use of the relationship between theory and practice, the change from abstract research to applied research, and the implementation of fieldwork surveys. Special and general organic integration depends on methods, such as the law of contradiction specificity and universality, the cooperation of induction and deduction, the operation of case studies, etc. The interweaving of tradition and modernity requires methods to be realized, such as the negation of negation, moral narrative, and non-intrusive research.

Keywords: rural governance ethics, path choice, method

Introduction

The path of China's rural governance ethics research mainly includes the following three types. Firstly, the paradigm shift from top-down to bottom-up which is accomplished through the use of the relationship between theory and practice, changes from abstract research to applied research, and the implementation of fieldwork. Secondly, special and general organic integration which relies on the laws of contradiction and universality, the cooperation of inductive and deductive, and the operation of case studies. Thirdly, the interweaving of tradition and modernity which is achieved by means of negative negation, moral narrative, and non-intrusive research.

Paradigm Shift From Top-Down to Bottom-Up

The paradigm shift from top-down to bottom-up is the primary path for the study of rural governance ethics in China. The realization of this path needs to be done by means of methods, such as the application of the relationship between theory and practice, the change from abstract research to applied research, and the implementation of field investigations.

The Relationship Between Theory and Practice

The practical viewpoint as the primary and basic viewpoint of Marxist philosophy constitutes the basis for the transformation of the paradigm of rural governance ethics in China today. The change from the top-down to the bottom-up research method is the view of scientific practice. The change of research method from “top-down” to “bottom-up” is a reasonable grasp of scientific practice view.

“The relationship between theory and practice constitutes the fundamental problem of Marxist philosophy” (Zhang, 2015, p. 18). In Marx’s view, practice is the foundation of theory. The construction of all theoretical knowledge is inseparable from the exploration of practice. He emphasizes that “all social life is essentially practiced. Any mystery that leads theory to mysticism can be reasonably resolved in human practice and in understanding this practice” (Marx & Engels, 2009, p. 501). At the same time, Marx also pointed out,

Do people’s thinking have objective truth. This is not a theoretical problem, but a practical problem. People should prove the truth of their thinking in practice, that is, the reality and strength of one’s own thinking, the shore of one’s own thinking. (Marx & Engels, 2009, p. 500)

He believes that people know the world correctly. Its key is whether this understanding can be tested by practice. In turn, all the theories created by human beings must be tested by practice to become truth. The research without practice is not scientific. Of course, while emphasizing the first nature of practice, Marx did not ignore the promotion of theory to practice. He stressed that a theory once which has mastered the masses will also become a material force. As long as the theory convinces people, the theory can grasp the masses. If the theory is thorough, it can convince people. The so-called thoroughness is to grasp the root of things. The root of man is the person himself (Marx & Engels, 2009, p. 11). Marx clearly recognizes the dialectical relationship between theory and practice. It gives methodological guidance for the study of rural governance ethics. The dialectical relationship between theory and practice in Marxist philosophy requires us that the study of rural governance ethics must be transformed from a top-down research approach that focuses on theoretical analysis to a bottom-up study based on concrete practice way. Through rural specific practice, he seeks ethical governance measures. Then, he tests through practice whether the rural governance ethics theory can truly satisfy the villagers’ desires and represent the legitimate interests of the villagers. At the same time, relevant theories have reference to rural practice. It can enrich and improve the ethics theory of rural governance through the theoretical research of predecessors.

From Abstract Research to Applied Research

The transformation of the rural governance ethics research paradigm from top-down to bottom-up is accompanied by changes in the academic community from abstract research to application-oriented research.

Abstract research and applied research are the research fields that often appear in sociology of philosophy. Some researchers fascinated the essence of human social life and were driven to explain it. They like to discover the meaning through the appearance of sly. Pure research in all fields of science is sometimes justified by seeking “pure knowledge” (Al Barbie, 2009, p. 26). At the same time, another group of researchers may be inspired by their research goals. They want to show what they have learned. And they want to put their knowledge about society into action (Al Barbie, 2009, p. 26). The two studies should be in a reasonable equilibrium and serve the community together. But for a long time, influenced by the top-down research method, most researchers disdain or even smash application research. They believe that the so-called applied research cannot be called true science, which leads to serious obstacles to the development of bottom-up applied research.

The results of China's rural governance ethics research in the last century are rare, because the purely academic inquiry represented by meta-ethics or critical analytic ethics has always been one of the mainstreams of Western ethics throughout the 20th century. In China, the voice of "ethics should return to life" and the study of moral life history and daily ethical life, among the research results of a large number of normative ethics and analytical ethics, can only be regarded as a small episode (Wang, 2007a). In the 21st century, more and more researchers are beginning to discover that past abstract research seems to be in a dead end. They cannot be closely integrated with the real society, let alone solving social realities. Under the influence of this background, the research paradigm of philosophy and social sciences began to pick out from the top-down study. It gradually tries to bottom-up research methods. Then, it rise of applied research. The study of rural governance ethics is gradually carried out under the guidance of this research method.

Field Investigation

The field survey is the basic method of the bottom-up research paradigm, which can collect first-hand information very well. It can accurately grasp the problems encountered in rural governance and fully understand the customs of rural society. This has a non-negligible role in the construction of rural governance ethics.

Fieldwork, also known as field research, is a life-long context in which to study phenomena. It collects data in the form of participating observations and unstructured interviews, and through the qualitative analysis of these materials, understands and explains the sociological research methods of phenomena (Feng, 2001, p. 238). This research method first appeared in anthropological research. It was gradually accepted by sociology and other disciplines, and gradually became one of the basic methods of philosophical humanities and social science research. It broke the top-down research method of heavy theoretical analysis and light empirical research that has been formed for a long time. It is a typical bottom-up research paradigm. In general, the field survey requires three stages, "the development of the survey plan and the design of the questionnaire; the field implementation of the field survey; the collation of interview recordings and the data processing and statistical analysis of the questionnaire" (Wang, 2008, pp. 24-30). Each stage is interlocked to form a complete field research data.

The study of rural governance ethics must involve the specific reality of the countryside. The field investigation can meet this demand and help to collect the first-hand information of rural governance. This lays the foundation for theoretical analysis. At the same time, with the expansion of the research area and the dispersion of the research group, the survey often encounters "entry barriers", such as language barriers, local protection, refusal to cooperate, etc. (Zheng, 2003). Faced with these challenges, researchers need to learn to adapt and try to enter the country from multiple angles. This kind of trial process itself is also a field survey of rural governance ethics.

The Organic Integration of Special and General

In the context of China's vast geography, we must follow the special and general organic integration path. The achievement of this research path depends on the laws of contradiction and universality, the cooperation of inductive and deductive, and the operation of case studies.

The Particularity and Universality of Contradiction

Contradiction is the inevitable state of the development of things, everywhere and everywhere. Its

particularity and universality also accompany it. The speciality in the study of rural governance ethics is the particularity of contradiction. However, in general, it belongs to the universality of contradictions. The two complement each other and eventually merge to make the contradictions resolved.

The particularity and universality of contradiction is one of the fundamental methods of cognition. Specifically, the particularity of contradiction means the nature and status of contradiction and the specific forms of resolving contradictions have their own characteristics (X. L. Li, Wang, & H. C. Li, 2004, p. 183). The universality of contradiction is mainly manifested in two aspects. Firstly, contradictions exist in the development of everything. Secondly, there is a contradictory movement from beginning to end in the development of each thing (Mao, 2009, p. 305). The particularity of contradiction contains the universality of contradiction. The universality of contradiction runs through the particularity and is manifested through speciality. At the same time, commonity is the particularity of contradiction as the individuality contains the universality of contradiction. The commonality lies in the individuality. The universality of contradiction runs through the particularity of contradiction. The commonality takes the individuality. The commonality and individuality are connected with each other. Reciprocally, they transform each other under certain conditions (X. L. Li et al., 2004, p. 185).

Our country is vast. Every village has its own customs. There must be differences between different villages. Any kind of rural governance ethics model is constructed on the basis of various regional specialities that cannot be cloned (Wang, 2007a). In this sense, there is an unavoidable contradiction between the speciality of rural governance ethics and the generality that can be universally applied. However, the particularity of the contradiction and the law of universality tell us that the commonality is in the individuality and the personality is taken, between the special and general values of villages that seem to be incompatible. In fact, there is an opportunity for organic integration between them. Any special rural governance path that meets ethical requirements involves the recognition of the respect and value of the rural subject. Although the rural governance models in different regions are different, the purpose of governing the villages is the same. Therefore, in the process of studying rural governance ethics, we must explore the general values behind the villages and strive to achieve organic integration.

Induction and Deduction

No matter it is from the special sum of the village to the general value of the summary or from the general value to the special deductive reasoning of the village, both of them are two specific methods of organically blending the special and general values of the village. They play a pivotal role in the rural governance ethics.

Induction is the discovery of a model that starts from the individual to achieve generality and from a series of specific observations (Al Barbie, 2009, p. 23). At the same time, deduction is a way of thinking, whether it is from the general to the individual, from the logical or theoretically expected model to the observation of the expected model (Al Barbie, 2009, p. 24). Inductive and deductive are just the opposite. Inductive sums up the general law from special. The deduction does push the special existence through general rules. The two are right and wrong and complement each other. They are all scientific methods of understanding things, a combination of the two. This will help researchers to establish a complete and true understanding of the research object. At the same time, in terms of the human cognitive process, it is from individual to general and common. Then, it uses this general and common thing to study new, individual, special things. It complements

and enriches the realization of this common understanding of the essence. Scientific understanding is the process of this cycle, deepening and deepening (X. L. Li et al., 2004, p. 185). Inductive and deductive is the driving force of this process.

The organic integration of village speciality and general value in rural governance ethics depends on the application of induction and deduction. We should fully tap the commonalities between different villages and find the difficulties and solutions that we have encountered in our governance. Then we reason out the ethical principles of rural governance with general value. At the same time, we also need to work hard to translate governance norms of general value into villages of different types. As far as possible, it provides practical guidance for rural governance in different regions, constantly sums up the general value through the village, and then deducts the special village from the general value, and recurs and deepens. In the end they achieve an organic integration of the two. Thus we enrich the study of rural governance ethics.

Case Study

In the face of thousands of different types of villages in China, it is difficult for researchers to find out the general value that can be adapted to all villages. However, according to the case study, it is reasonable to find the village speciality of some villages, and then find the general value of the national rural governance ethics through the method of induction.

As a basic research method of sociological experience research, it is a long history for the case studies. In the past 100 years, through the joint promotion of anthropology and sociology, case studies have become one of the most important research orientations in humanities and social science research (Lu & Li, 2007). In recent years, this method has been favored by applied ethics researchers and has become one of the classic research methods of philosophy and social sciences. For the case in the case study, it also means the system with boundary (Stake, 2005, p. 444). The boundary refers to the difference between a case and another case and its environment (Lu & Li, 2007). The system emphasizes that the components of a case constitute a relatively self-contained unit (Lu & Li, 2007). Research on this bounded system has resulted in case studies.

Although the conclusions of the case study have obvious village specialities, it is not possible to directly become a general value. However, if we describe and analyze a typical village by concrete description, reveal its particularity as a case, and provide valuable information for a comprehensive analysis of the general laws of rural development in China, whether from the feasibility of research methods or the results of research, in terms of reliability, it is worthy of recognition (Wang, 2007b). In the process of Chinese rural governance ethics research, the special value of case study should be correctly viewed. Through the methods of induction and deduction, the relationship between the general value and the general value should be handled to achieve organic integration.

Intertwined Between Tradition and Modernity

As an ancient country with a long history of civilization, the realization of the integration of tradition and modernity is the path that must be realized in the study of rural governance ethics. The resolution of this path requires negation of negation laws, moral narratology, and non-intrusive research.

Negative Negation

The negative law of negation is the inevitable process of the development of things. It is a spiral rise. The traditional experience in the study of rural governance ethics must be a valuable resource for rural

governance. It has played an irreplaceable role in a certain period of time. After the process of “affirmation-negation-negation of negation”, it will continue to provide value support for rural governance.

The negative law of negation shows that intrinsic contradiction or inner negative power promotes the transformation of existing things into their own opposites. It is sure to reach a denial of itself, and then a new affirmation by negation, that is, a negation of negation (X. L. Li et al., 2004, p. 187). Affirmation and negation are two sides of things. They are mutually exclusive and mutually infiltrated. They constitute a dialectical relationship of unity of opposites. Therefore, the negation of negation is a dialectical negation. It is self-denial through the inner contradictory movement of things, that is, denying oneself and self-rejecting to achieve self-movement and self-development. It is the opportunity and driving force for the development of things, and it is the essence of the revolution of dialectical criticism (X. L. Li et al., 2004, p. 188). From this perspective, this dialectical negative view becomes a methodological principle for observing and analyzing all problems (X. L. Li et al., 2004, p. 188). It requires us to look at things from a developmental perspective. In the process of affirmative understanding of things, we need to consider the power of negation at the same time. And we must not only make a one-sided positive understanding.

With the continuous deepening of the modernization process, the rural society in China is no longer described in the Tang poetry and Song poetry. The closedness and stability of traditional local ethics are broken. The marketization process has injected fresh, contemporary, and ethical values into the blood of the new era (Wang, 2010). This provides a contemporary atmosphere for the current research on rural governance ethics. However, we cannot ignore the traditional experience of traditional rural governance ethics. The “Time Breath” is able to provide ethical support for today’s rural governance. To a certain extent, this is inseparable from the negation of the negative experience of traditional rural governance. Therefore, it attempts to completely break with the local ethical tradition. This will only make the new local ethics lose its foundation and become a conceptual framework of empty objects or suspend useless moral preaching (Wang, 2010). Ultimately, it is not conducive to the development of rural governance ethics research. All in all, it is an inevitable choice for the current rural governance ethics research to successfully graft the traditional rural governance experience and modern atmosphere.

Moral Narratology

Moral narratology is a bridge to graft the traditional experience of rural governance ethics and the “temporal atmosphere”. This research method can find a reasonable point of convergence between rural tradition and reality, thus optimizing the status quo of rural governance.

Moral narratology is based on a specific moral context. It is a kind of moral narrative created by combing the moral life experience of a particular moral community or ethical community and the generation and evolution of its moral concepts (Wang, 2007a). This research method has been inspired by McIntyre’s related research. As early as in the 1980s, McIntyre asserted that the moral rationality arguments demonstrated since the Enlightenment in the 18th century must fail. He believed that this movement has led to the interruption of tradition, when people do not have the “bundling” of traditional experience. They have only a fragment of a conceptual framework, and many have lacked the context in which they derive their meaning (McIntyre, 2003, p. 2). Therefore, it is impossible to find the “temporal atmosphere”. Thus the moral rationality argument in this context will inevitably fail.

It is worth noting that “the method of moral narratology is not just a historical morality. Its more critical feature is its contextualist appeal to the unique diversity of human moral life experience and knowledge,

traditional pedigree, and moral knowledge understanding (Wang, 2007a). This can fully reflect the traditional experience of the research object. Of course, this does not mean a compromise to any moral relativism. On the contrary, it emphasizes the relative diversity of human moral life experience itself and the rich diversity of human moral culture traditions (Wang, 2007a). Furthermore, it makes a more reasonable and accurate grasp of the “temporal atmosphere” of the research object. From the point of view, the successful grafting of tradition and modernity in the study of rural governance ethics cannot leave the research method of moral narratology. Therefore, in the study of rural governance ethics in China, the use of moral narratology to graft the tradition and modernity of the research object can not only avoid the phenomenon of the disconnection between reality and history, but also find the historical development context for the research.

Non-invasive Study

In general, the tradition of rural governance ethics is far from the modern one. The respondents may not have a more accurate understanding of this. Even if the respondent is fortunate enough to have a clear memory of this, it is also possible to choose not to tell the researcher the true situation and answer for various considerations. This practice often puts the researcher in a passive state, so that it is impossible to find true traditional experience and “temporal atmosphere”. In turn, the two cannot be successfully grafted, which ultimately affects the research results.

Faced with the above situation, non-intrusive research methods often have breakthroughs. The so-called non-intrusive research method is a method of studying social behavior without affecting the research object (Al Barbie, 2009, p. 24). The advantage of this approach is that it reduces the likelihood that the respondent will deliberately create false information for some reason. It does not require the respondent to directly answer the answer. Instead, it relies on the investigator’s observation and analysis capabilities to arrive at more realistic findings. For example, investigators want to know which seat in a fixed classroom is more popular with students. The usual survey is to find a group of students to conduct a questionnaire or interview. However, students may choose the first row for reasons such as good students prefer to sit in the first row. This will lose the authenticity of the investigation. Non-intrusive research does not require direct inquiry to students. Instead, you can get a more realistic answer by observing which row of tables and chairs are worn out in the classroom.

In the traditional and modern surveys of rural governance ethics, whether the respondents are intentional or indeed vague, if they are wrong, they will affect their successful grafting. Therefore, the introduction of non-invasive research can effectively improve the authenticity of the survey results. This collects more realistic information for rural governance ethics research. Of course, emphasizing the role of non-invasive research is not a denial of interventional research. Interventional research in many places still has its irreplaceable advantages. Only by effectively combining the two will the authenticity of the research results be maximized.

Conclusions

The study of rural governance ethics in China includes three kinds of path choices. They are paradigm shift from top-down to bottom-up, organic integration of special and general, and interweaving between tradition and modernity. The comprehensive use of these paths can effectively improve the ethical research of rural governance in China. It can promote the level of rural governance in China. At the same time, it can promote the modernization of national governance system and governance capacity.

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Confrontation Between America and the Islamic Republic of Iran

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For decades, Iran was a strategic ally of the United States and had been playing a significant role in US strategy in the Middle East region. Yet, the relations between Washington and Tehran have been facing a difficult situation since 1979. For about 40 years, many events have taken place, which are basically rooted in their ideology, strategy, and interests, and have damaged the interaction between the two countries. The new tensions between the two nations have started since May 2019 which have raised many questions and discussions. This paper aims to address whether the tensions between the two countries led to a war. The paper argues that the tensions between America and the Islamic Republic of Iran might be increased but a war would never happen and a peace would never occur, too. In other words, the escalation conflict between Washington and Tehran will not lead the two countries toward a war.

Keywords: United States, the Islamic Republic of Iran, JCPOA, war and peace

Introduction

During the Cold War, there were multi-dimension friendly relationships between the United States and Iran. For decades, Iran, as a US strategic ally, was playing an important role in American strategy in the Middle East, and the Shah regime was fully supported by Washington. The two countries have broken their strategic relations in the aftermath of the Iranian Islamic Revolution since 1979. During the last four decades, there have been a number of conflicts between the two nations which are basically rooted in their ideology, strategy, interests, and discourse. For 40 years, many events have taken place between the two nations that have had negative impact on the relations between them. In particular, the new conflict between the two countries has raised many questions and speculation about the possibility of getting involved in a bloody war.

This paper aims to address this question: Whether tension between Washington and Tehran would lead them to a war? The paper main discussion is that although the historical background, current tensions, and some individual notions may fertilize the ground for a costly war, yet neither side wants a fight as neither side wants a peace.

Iran and US Relations: Moving Towards Hostility

During the Cold War, nobody could imagine a war between America and Iran, since Iran was a strategic ally of the United State. There were multi-dimension friendly relationships between the two countries. Iran was

playing an important role in US strategy in the region, in particular in Washington anti-communism policy containment. To this, the Shah regime was fully supported by the US. Yet, by 1979 Iran's Islamic Revolution and overthrow of the Shah, the situation changed. Gradually, anti-American rhetoric was ramping up in the post-revolutionary Iran's society. In particular, the crisis escalated when the Iranian revolutionary students captured the US Embassy in Tehran in November 1979. Although this movement was marked by the former Islamic Revolution Leader, Ayatollah (Imam) Khomeini, as the "second revolution", the Americans regarded it as a serious threat to their interests. From that time until now for 40 years, the world has been observing a very hostile relationship between the two nations. Today, everybody may think about a bloody war between the two nations. This is because, from a very close friend of America in the region, Iran became a "strategic enemy" of the United States. And America from a supportive ally of Iran became its infinite enemy, the Great Satan. As in his speech on November 5, 1979, Ayatollah (Imam) Khomeini called the United State of America "the Great Satan".

During the past 40 years, in the both countries, political speeches and political literatures have been full of insulting words, swearing, insolent, and threats. The chants of "death to America" became a very popular slogan in many public meeting in Iran during these 40 years. As from the US side, Washington always accuses Iran as a sponsor for terrorism in the region, and as a threat to Middle East peace, and this has become US mainstream policy. During the four decades, the most important incidents that have taken place between the two nations are:

(1) The hostage of more than 50 American diplomats by Iran for 444 days from November 4, 1979, to January 20, 1981.

(2) US multiple systemic efforts including negotiation, using third party countries, managing coup in Iran and managing attack¹ in order to release the diplomats.

(3) Supporting the former Iraq's president, Saddam Hussein, for an imposed war against Iran which lasted for eight years.

(4) Attacking an Iranian non-military airplane in the Persian Gulf zone. Iran Air Flight 655, an Airbus A300, was a scheduled passenger flight from Tehran to Dubai. It was shot down on July 3, 1988 by an SM-2MR surface-to-air missile fired from USS Vincennes, a guided missile cruiser of the United States Navy. The aircraft was destroyed, and all 290 people on board, including 66 children, were killed.

(5) the Iran-gate (Iran-Contra) affair, in which McFarlane came to Iran aiming to negotiate with Iranian officials, it is said that the US aimed to sell weapons to Iran (despite an arms embargo) through Israel and then funnel the funds to aid the Contra rebels in Nicaragua, who were fighting the socialist Sandinista government—with the goal of preventing the spread of Communism. Reagan also hoped the sale of arms might help win the release of American hostages in Lebanon who were taken by Hezbollah (Pearce, 1988, pp. 361-365).

(6) Among US policies towards Iran, the most important and aggressive behavior has been towards its nuclear program. For about two decades, there have been a massive of actions dealing with this project; most of these actions have been undertaken by the United States of America, during different administrations from George W. Bush to Donald Trump. To this, excessive costs and person hours were paid by the Islamic Republic

¹ On April 24, 1980, the United States launched a covert military operation, known as Operation Eagle Claw (Tabas Operation), ordered by former US President, Jimmy Carter, in an attempt to end the hostage crisis, but it was a failed mission.

of Iran and a group of world powers: the P5 + 1 (the permanent members of the UN Security Council—the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, France, and China—plus Germany) and the European Union. A large number of tedious negotiations on the nuclear issue were taken place in Iran and other countries. A large number of diplomats from the US, EU countries, Russia, China, and the Islamic Republic of Iran were moving from time to time and place to place with thousands of hours sitting at the negotiation table.

(7) A more violent action is US withdraw of Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or let say “Amexit”. On May 8, 2018, President Trump announced the decision to withdraw from the JCPOA, accusing the Iranian regime of pursuing a regional agenda of harming core US interests in the Middle East. In fact, Trump withdrew from the JCPOA jeopardized the Obama administration’s and five more countries’ landmark nuclear deal with Iran. In the time of announcing the decision, President Trump labelled the Iranian regime as “the leading state sponsor of terror” and argued that Tehran “exports dangerous missiles, fuels conflicts across the Middle East, and supports terrorist proxies and militias such as Hezbollah, Hamas, the Taliban, and al Qaeda” (Trump, 2018c). He also called the JCPOA as “defective at its core” since to him, it would have allowed Iran to eventually acquire nuclear weapon (an issue which has been repeatedly denied by Iran) capability even if Tehran were to fully comply with its provisions. However, developments since the US withdrawal from JCPOA have created serious doubts about its sustainability and have escalated tensions between Washington and Tehran.

(8) On June 20, 2019, Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’s (IRGC) shot down a US RQ-4A Global Hawk BAMS-D military drone with a surface-to-air missile over the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most vital shipping routes. Iranian officials claimed that the drone entered Iran’s airspace, while US officials claimed that the drone was in international airspace.

Some other incidents have taken place between the two countries. On February 24, 1994 in the Clinton administration era, Washington officially announced “dual containment” strategy aimed at containing Iran and Iraq, isolating both countries regionally, cutting them off from the world economic and trading system (Gause III, 1994). In his 2002 State of the Union Address, former US president Bush labelled Iran and two other countries, North Korea and Iraq as “axis of evil”. On December 5, 2011, a US Lockheed Martin RQ-170 Sentinel Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) was captured by Iranian forces in northeastern of Iran. It was detected in Iranian airspace 225 kilometers from the border with Afghanistan. The Iranian government announced that the UAV was brought down by its cyberwarfare unit which commandeered the UAV and safely landed it. On January 12, 2016, two United States Navy riverine command boats after they entered Iranian territorial waters near Iran’s Farsi Island in the Persian Gulf were seized by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy. On April 8 2019, President Donald Trump announced that the United States is designating Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps a foreign “terrorist organization”.

America Withdraw From JCPOA

For more than two decades, a number of negotiations took place between Iran and six other countries on Iran’s nuclear deal, aiming to resolve what was called by the West “the crisis”. Both sides had their own reasons to sit at the negotiation table. In Iran, there were different ideas about the negotiation and also in the West some, such as Israeli officials and some of American officials, preferred to open fire on Iran rather than to sit at the negotiation table.

In Iran, at least there were three views on nuclear negotiations:

(1) Go for negotiation but do not trust the Western countries particularly the United States;

(2) Do not go for negotiation; it is wasting of time and money and it is useless, there is no hope of negotiations;

(3) Go for negotiation; compared to war and conflict, negotiations are far less costly and it is possible to get result.

In Western countries, particularly America, it was an idea that though negotiations might prevent Iran from further activities in case of Uranium enrichment and, as they continually have said, making atomic bomb, the latter never has been declared by Iranians and always has been denied.

The final fruit of such long, tiredly, and costly negotiations was JCPOA in 2015. There were two different views in Iran and America on JCPOA, President Rouhani called it the end and lift of all limits and sanctions while, previous US President Obama called it the end of Iran's nuclear project.

The Iranian administration was hopeful that the JCPOA would provide a better economic situation as all sanctions would be lifted. President Rouhani affirmed that nuclear deal was a win-win agreement, and believed that the mechanism of this agreement was designed to guarantee that Iran is not loser. From his point of view, Iran's main objectives in nuclear talks were to preserve nuclear rights, to withdraw from the resolution of the Seventh Chapter of the UN and to get rid of all sanctions. The nuclear deal recognized Iran's right to enrich uranium and removal of international sanctions (IRNA New Agency, 2016). To this, Iran soon fulfilled its nuclear obligations under the JCPOA within a few months. Then, Tehran was waiting for other side to comply with its commitments, particularly lifting the sanctions. Yet, nothing seriously happened except a few little moves.

After the US withdrawal from the JCPOA in the months that followed, Washington reimposed sanctions including those targeting Iran's oil, shipping, and banking sectors. Hence, Tehran stepped up diplomatic efforts to convince the European Union, Russia, China, India, and other countries to continue doing business with Iran. In general, despite US pressure on some of these countries, Tehran to some extent received a positive response.

On January 31, 2019, Germany, France, and Britain announced the establishment of a special purpose vehicle (SPV), called the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX), to "facilitate legitimate" trade between the EU countries and Iran (Geranmayeh & Batmanghelidj, 2019). However, the US threat to impose secondary sanctions under the Countering America's Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA, 2017) might prevent European companies from defying US sanctions (Petroff, 2018). Yet, Tehran is also doubtful about the European cooperation and support.

US-Iran New Tensions

It seems there are three main areas in which the US is worried and led Washington to increase its number of troop and military equipment in the Middle East and in particular, in the Persian Gulf, they are:

(1) Iran's nuclear program;

(2) Iran's missiles;

(3) Iran influence in the region.

First and foremost is the Iranian nuclear issue. While Tehran has continuously maintained that its nuclear program is for civilian and peaceful purposes; Washington and its allies in the region refuse to believe that Iran's program is only for civilian purposes. Ali Akbar Salehi, head of Atomic Energy Organization of Iran

(AEOI), in a press conference in June 2018, referred to the second principle and stated “Iran’s nuclear activities, as has always been said, especially by senior officials, are peaceful”. He added,

The basis of these peaceful activities is the *fatwa* (decree) of the Supreme Leader, which explicitly stated that the development, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction are forbidden under Islam and that Iran shall never acquire these weapons, and therefore, we are committed to this principle. (IRI Cabinet Office, 2018)

In 2012, the supreme leader also openly stated that:

The Iranian nation has never pursued and will never pursue nuclear weapons. There is no doubt that the decision makers in the countries opposing us know well that Iran is not after nuclear weapons because the Islamic Republic, logically, religiously and theoretically, considers the possession of nuclear weapons a grave sin and believes the proliferation of such weapons is senseless, destructive and dangerous. (Iranian Press TV, 2012)

However, no independent international agency including International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has corroborated the resistance axes of US-Saudi-Israeli fears in this regard. For instance, the February 2019 IAEA Report on Verification and Monitoring of the Iranian Nuclear Program states that Iran continues to abide by the provisions of the JCPOA and that there is no reason for any doubts on secret or unverified nuclear facilities that might violate Iran’s non-proliferation commitments (Director General Report, 2019). Yet, the US, Israel, and Saudi Arabia refuse to fully believe both the guarantees given by the Iranian government and reports produced by the IAEA, and claim that Iran has secret facilities in violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSC) Resolution 2231. This is while US intelligence agencies recently have noted that Iran is not producing a nuclear weapon despite the US withdrawal from the JCPOA as some American analysts, such as John Dale Grover, an assistant managing editor at *The National Interest* and American analyzer in an amylase in May 2019 have also avowed that “Iran never got a nuclear weapon and still does not have one” (Dale Grover, 2019).

Under the deal, International Atomic Energy Administration inspectors gained access to Iran and Tehran shipped about 98 percent of its uranium stockpile to Russia. Iran also destroyed several of its facilities and got rid of 66 percent of its uranium-enrichment centrifuges. In fact, even after Washington left the deal and reimposed sanctions, Iran has remained compliant. As an April 15, 2019, report by the Congressional Research Service noted, “UN and International Atomic Energy Agency reports since the JCPOA [Iran Deal] began implementation have stated that Iran is complying with its nuclear obligations under the JCPOA” (The Congressional Research Service Report, 2019).

Secondly, the US has raised serious concerns on Iran’s missile program. Iran has a robust military establishment that has developed medium- and long- range ballistic missile capabilities. Washington has repeatedly announced that Iran’s missile development threaten US and its regional allies’ interests. It has tried to illustrate Iran’s missile capability as a huge phobia in the region. Although Iran has improved its missile capability, Tehran has always defined its missile program as a means for its national security and tried to assure the world that since the missiles are not capable of carrying nuclear warheads, no need to be worried (Iranian Press TV, 2017).

The third contentious issue is Iran influence in the region and its support for Hezbollah, Hamas, Ansar Allah, Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Unit (PMU) (al-Hashd al-Sha’abi), and Syria regime. The US and its regional allies see this as a threat to their national security and regional interests, too. While the Obama

administration ignored the concerns of Riyadh and Tel Aviv and continued engaging with Iran, the Trump administration has taken the concerns of US allies seriously. In Trump's view, Iranian influence in the region and support for its regional allies undermine US national interests and threaten Israeli and Saudi Arabia security, and hence should be curbed.

What Is the Final Target of US War Against Iran?

If Washington intends to start a war with Iran the question is: What is Washington motivation for opening fire on Iran? Somebody may refer to Iran nuclear deal; if so, nobody can say that Iran has not been compliant with its nuclear commitments, as mentioned, Tehran quickly complied with its obligations in the case of its nuclear project in Arak, Qom, and Natanz sites. In addition, despite US withdraw from JCPOA, the Iranian government has never said officially that would do the same and leave the deal. Rouhani has stated that his country did not seek to leave the agreement—JCPOA—and called a “new step” within the deal's framework (Berlinger & George, 2019). Tehran has publicized that would continue the JCPOA without America. In an interview with CNN in August 2018, Zarif had stressed that Iran nuclear deal would continue without Washington's presence (Paton Walsh, Bozorgmehr, & Abdelaziz, 2018). To this, Tehran has been working with the EU countries, Russia and China on the JCPOA. The idea of using war as a means to stop Iran's nuclear program is mostly encouraged by Israel and its lobbies in America and Trump is following that notion, since to the Israeli officials, JCPOA was a bad agreement, and would enable Iran to be weaponized.

If somebody connects the war to the issue of “regime change”, the crucial question is that changing a regime in a country is the people's rights or other countries' duty. It is clear that in any society, people themselves have rights to decide about their own government not others from out of the society. To this, for sure the United State does not have right to force regime change in any country, as Jens David Ohlin, professor of law at Cornell Law School, criticized some Americans, stating: “some American nationalists and hawks think we should ignore international law because we have the political power and military strength to get away with it” (Ohlin, 2019). As Bolton openly asserted that Washington should make a decision on government in Iran, “the declared policy of the US should be “the overthrow of the mullah's regime in Tehran” (Goodenough & Benhassain, 2017). Therefore, if America is responsible for “regime change” in any country around the world including Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela, the question is: If one day, in America, changing the regime will be necessary, which country would be responsible for handling “regime change” in the United States?

It seems that “regime change” is a code or name for a game which Trump administration is playing with Iran and even North Korea as some analysts has referred to “regime change” as a Trump game (Jansen, 2019). Indeed, the US administration is using Iran nuclear deal as a means to make “regime change” possible in Iran and at the same time Washington is manipulating “regime change” as a strategy to get rid of Iran nuclear deal. According to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, the United States is currently pursuing a “regime change” in Iran, and the Warsaw Summit was part of this policy to build an anti-Iran coalition (Bakhshalizada, 2019).

David S. Cohen, former Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, believes that “regime change” in Iran would serve US interests (Cohen & Weinberg, 2019). Mike Pompeo also reportedly told a group of Iranian-American community leaders, the United States' best interest is “a non-revolutionary set of leaders leading Iran” (Mosavian, 2019). Therefore, one can recall that “regime change” is a means for protection of American interests not a way for providing a better government for the Iranians, as some of the Americans point to his. It means that the Iranian should pay the costs of protecting US interests.

Is It Possible a War?

The recent US moves in the region have raised the issue of war between America and the Islamic Republic of Iran. Yet, what can be understood from Iran side is that for Tehran, war is not possible as the supreme leader has declared on recent US-Iran tension: “Neither talks nor war”; this statement has been repeated several times by him. In addition, many officials in Iran have publicized similar notion, emphasizing that Iran would never go to war. In fact, the war cannot provide Iran’s national interests and will make the situation much worse.

The recent US steps up military deployment in Iran’s neighborhood, and dispatches the US Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier strike group and a bomber task force to the Middle East, which have been marked by the Iranian leaders as a psychological warfare and regarded as a provocation aimed at drawing Iran into a military conflict (Iranian Diplomacy, 2019).

As from the US side although, at least there are two general opinions in the Trump administration policy towards Iran, one group who may be called warlords normally suggest Washington to go to war, and another group does not propose war as a solution to the dispute. In other words, it has become increasingly clear that the Trump administration is divided over the objectives of its Iran policy and the role that military threats or force should play in achieving them. In the center of first group are John Bolton, US National Security Advisor, and Mike Pompeo, both believe that war is a solution to Iran crisis. Trita Parsi, leader of the National Iranian American Council wrote on Twitter: “People, let this be very clear: The appointment of Bolton is essentially a declaration of war with Iran. With Pompeo and Bolton, Trump is assembling a War Cabinet” (Mackey, 2018). In fact, President Trump’s two most hawkish aides, national security advisor and secretary of state, seem to be spoiling for a fight and baiting Iran into taking an action that would provide a pretext for a military strike with potentially catastrophic implications.

To prove such warlike motive, one can take a look at these series of declarations by Pompeo. He has claimed:

On May 12th, [2019] Iran attacked four commercial ships near the Strait of Hormuz. On May 14th [2019] Iran-backed surrogates attacked by armed drones-struck two strategically important oil pipelines into Saudi Arabia. On May 19th [2019] a rocket landed near the US Embassy in Baghdad. On May 31st [2019] a car bomb in Afghanistan wounded four US service members, killed four Afghan civilians, and wounded bystanders.

He added “This was the attack carried out likely by the Taliban. This is plain dishonesty calling Taliban a proxy of Iran” (Mills, 2019). First of all, Iran has vigorously denied any involvement in those attacks and even Tehran has condemned such horrible events. It was reported by *Wall Street Journal* that Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif denied Iran was involved in the attacks (Youssef & Egbali, 2019). Secondly, no sufficient evidences have been provided to support the assertions that Iran has been behind those attacks. Thirdly, through these claims, Pompeo has pointed out two important issues: One is that Iran is too powerful and has wide influence in the region as the region and in particular, the Persian Gulf is an American military base; it is said that the US has 36 military bases in the region, and absolutely under control of US Navy with fully military equipped and weaponized machine; Saudi Arabia is a country which is fully supported by America as Trump in October 2018 claimed that Saudi Arabia and its King would not last “two weeks” in power without American military support (Trump, 2018d). Afghanistan, in reality, is ruled and controlled by American forces. The second issue is that by emphasizing on Iran role in those attacks indeed, Pompeo has confirmed that America which is claimed to be the sole superpower, as Huntington marked after the collapse of

the Soviet Union, is not too strong to prevent Iran from those attacks. Yet, these assertions by Pompeo indicate that he, as a member of the War Cabinet, is struggling to justify war against Iran through resorting to any means.

In addition to the War Cabinet, there is a new warlike in the region, a new war group, which is called “B-Team”, a few people in America and in the region who repeatedly talk about war with Iran. This war group of “B-Team” includes John Bolton, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates crown prince Mohammed bin Zayed, who are pushing the US towards war, in spite of the Trump’s campaign promise not to get involved in expensive foreign wars. However, the president keeps saying he wants to talk to the Iranians and get them back to the negotiating table to cut a better nuclear deal and to force Iranian concessions on its regional behavior and ballistic missile program. The secretary of defense and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, meanwhile, seem worried that Washington is on a path toward war with Iran and skeptical that additional US deployments to the Persian Gulf are warranted.

The first group is more adapted to Israel’s hostile policy towards Iran, as Prime Minister Netanyahu continuously encourages the US government for opening fire on Iran. Mike Pompeo and John Bolton are in this group, however, Mr. Pompeo, in his talks with Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in the Russian city of Sochi, said “US does not seek war with Iran” (Kramer & Pérez-Peña, 2019). Of course, he added “We have also made clear to the Iranians that if American interests are attacked, we will most certainly respond in an appropriate fashion” (Kramer & Pérez-Peña, 2019). This means he has not completely rejected the war. John Bolton has the same approach or even tougher, on May 5, 2019, he issued a stark warning to Iran. The United States, he announced, would deploy the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group along with a bomber task force to the Persian Gulf, “to send a clear and unmistakable message to the Iranian regime that any attack on United States interests or on those of our allies will be met with unrelenting force”. The United States, he continued, “is not seeking war with the Iranian regime” but is “fully prepared to respond to any attack” (Kahl, 2019).

Bolton had been pouring forth warlike rhetoric against Iran for many years before his appointment as national security advisor in April 2018. Indeed, he has been obsessed with Iran for a long time, as Peter Beinart, Professor of journalism at the City University of New York, in June 2019, referred to this by stating: “for more than a decade, he’s consistently promoted war with Iran” (Beinart, 2019). In 2015, when the Obama administration was negotiating the nuclear deal, he wrote in a New York Times op-ed back: “To Stop Iran’s Bomb, Bomb Iran” (Bolton, 2015). In 2017, Bolton gave a speech at a conference in Paris organized by the People’s Mujahedin of Iran—a militant opposition movement and once classed as a terrorist group by the US and EU. He stated at this event that “before 2019 we here will celebrate in Tehran”, and “Ayatollah Khomeini’s 1979 revolution will not last until its 40th birthday” (Goodenough & Benhassain, 2017).

More significantly, in his role as national security advisor, Bolton asked the Pentagon to draw up military options for an attack on Iran—provoking considerable disquiet amongst senior officials. On February 11, 2019, the 40th anniversary of Iran’s Islamic Revolution, Bolton used the White House’s official Twitter account to tell the Supreme Leader of Iran: “I don’t think you’ll have many more anniversaries to enjoy” (Bolton, 2019). Yet, despite such a notion, the Iranians did celebrate the 40th anniversary of their Islamic Revolution.

But what is important is that in America also a war with Iran is regarded unnecessary and harmful to US interests (Dale Grover, 2019). United States Central Command (CENTCOM), while condemning any talk of

war, stated: “We have no interest in engaging in a new conflict in the Middle East. We will defend our interests, but a war with Iran is not in our strategic interests” (Mills, 2019). Therefore, one can say that despite the War Cabinet and the war group encouragement of Washington for imposing a war against Iran, America is not interested in such a fight, for several reasons:

(1) Since the United State has had two costly wars and invasions in Afghanistan and Iraq, which have been costing American lives and hundreds of billions of dollars, as it was declared by Trump: “We have spent seven trillion dollars in the Middle East and we have nothing except death and destruction” (Trump, 2018b). They still are paying for those wars. Therefore, although Washington regards Iran as a threat, “not one that requires another costly war” (Dale Grover, 2019).

(2) In addition, they are heading for the presidential election next year, if Trump wants to be reelected, by imposing another costly war on the shoulders of Americans he will lose in 2020 election and will leave the White House perhaps forever.

(3) Most significantly is that Iran is not like Iraq or Afghanistan and for sure any war with Iran would be much bigger than those with Afghanistan and Iraq, as president Rouhani called it “mother of all wars”, with much more money and expenses (Rouhani, 2018). Tehran has worked hard to strengthen its national security within a supportive regional framework. If Washington decides to go to war with Iran, this could result in an uncontrollable regional inferno (Saikal, 2019).

However, America may share the costs of the war with its allies, Saudi Arabia and Israel, since they have interests in any fight against Iran, but still the cost of war with Iran is so huge. This is what an American expert, Brain Katz, believes:

Iran has secured influence and footholds in key Middle East theaters and is emboldened to pursue a more aggressive strategy against regional rivals. An ascendant axis poses a formidable test to US strategy in the Middle East, a direct threat to US regional allies and interests, and key challenges for policymakers. (Katz, 2018)

The Americans are aware that Tehran wields influence in the Middle East through its partners and allies. Despite US withdrawal from the nuclear deal and re-imposing sanctions against Iran and more importantly, Iran’s economic woes have not contributed to declining its influence in the region. Iran’s partners and supporters are in countries, like Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, and Afghanistan (Jones, 2019). This was clear to Pompeo as he stated: “If these actions take place, if they do by some third-party proxy, a militia group, Hezbollah, we will hold the Iranian leadership directly accountable for that” (Lee, 2019).

Of course, one can assume that America has also its partners in the region, countries like Israel, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and UAE. These countries can play a role in helping the United States balance against Iran. This is because these countries and the US have a shared interest in containing Iran’s growing regional influence.

Conclusions

Despite attempts of the War Cabinet and the war group to lead Washington to a bloody and costly war with Iran, US will not go to a war against Iran, since the war will not grantee Washington interests and will impose a huge of costs on US nation. Despite, some war quotes, Iran also will not go to war with America, as war never could warrantee its interests. Therefore, the tensions between Washington and Tehran might be escalated but a war would never be happened and a peace would never be occurred, too. In other words, neither

side wants a fight or a peace. Although some experts believe that with the current US administration's confrontational strategy, the option of "No War, No Peace" is reaching an end, the author would say "No War, No Peace" is a strategy for both countries which will be practiced for a long time. This is because Washington and Tehran have good reasons for avoiding war and also have good reasons for escaping from peace.

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