
Empires and Nations from the Eighteenth to the Twentieth Century

Empires and Nations from the Eighteenth to the Twentieth Century: Volume 2

Edited by

Antonello Biagini and Giovanna Motta



Empires and Nations from the Eighteenth to the Twentieth Century: Volume 2 Edited by Antonello Biagini and Giovanna Motta PRIN 2009

This book first published 2014

Cambridge Scholars Publishing

12 Back Chapman Street, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2XX, UK

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Copyright © 2014 by Antonello Biagini, Giovanna Motta and contributors

All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner.

ISBN (10): 1-4438-6017-4. ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-6017-8

As a two volume set: ISBN (10): 1-4438-6363-7, ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-6363-6

Editing: Antonello Battaglia, Martina Bitunjac, Alberto Becherelli, Anida Sokol, Roberto Sciarrone and Alessandro Vagnini

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Part IV: Colonial Politics and the Age of Empires

Chapter Ten Models of European Colonial Empires

The Impact of British Policy on the Institutional System of the Khanate of Kalat (North-West India, 1870–1914)	3
The First Tunisian Crisis (1864)	2
The British Empire in South Africa, 1875–1881: A Case Study in the Changes of Imperial Thought	8
Imperialism of Kaiser Wilhelm II: Perspectives and Historiography of German Südpolitik	30
"The Moro Problem": Race, Religion and American Colonial Empire in the Southern Philippines, 1899–1939	36
Defensive Modernization and Self-Induced Colonialism	15
Colonialism through Emigration: Italian Politics in Latin America between Nationalism and Commercial Expansion from Crispi to the Rise of Fascism	55
The Russian Attempt to Colonize East Africa	52

Chapter Eleven Models of Decolonization

South Sudan: An Outlier in Postcolonial African Nation-Building? 73 Ole Frahm
The Challenges of a Postcolonial Nation: The Azerbaijani Democratic Republic (1918–1920)
The First Failures of the UNO in Palestine: The Partition Plan, the Creation of the State of Israel and <i>Nakba</i>
Iraq and the Oil Cold War: A Superpower Struggle and the End of the Iraq Petroleum Company (1958–1972)
The Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan as a Continuation of the Imperial Policy of Tsarist Russia
The Intellectual Property Protection System in the African French and British Colonies during 1945–1989
Chapter Twelve Economic Development and Economy of Inequality
German Capital in Georgia at the End of the Nineteenth and the Beginning of the Twentieth Century and its Importance
Development Strategies between Italy and Romania after the War and the Birth of the Romanian-Italian Commercial Bank: A Historical Overview
Social Integration in the Context of Regional Economic Integration (on the Example of the South Caucasian States)

Reconfiguring Romanian Architecture by the Second Half of the 1950s: Soviet Models and Local Economic Practices
War and Empire: Portuguese Africa and the War Economy (1914–1919)
Companies and Firms in the "Italian Somalia" (1960–1970)
Part V: Empires and Nations in South and Eastern Europe
Chapter Thirteen Southeastern Europe
Early British Discursive Constructions of Montenegro (1840–1880) 185 Ana Živković
The Fundamental Rights of the Albanian Population of Chameria in Front of Greek Municipal Law and International Law 1913–1926 192 Blerina Sadiku
The Greek Orthodox Community of Mytilene: From the Multiethnic Symbiosis in the Ottoman Empire to the Greek State, 1908–1912 200 Maria Mandamadiotou
Chapter Fourteen The Habsburg Empire and Nationalities: The Case of Romanians
Reflections on the Political Culture of the Romanians from Transylvania and Hungary (1848–1914)211 Vlad Popovici
The Ecclesiastical Elite in the Romanian National Movement from Transylvania during the Semi-Liberal Period (1860–1865)

How the Liberals Monopolized Cultural Nationalism Infusing Politics with National Ideology in Romania at the Turn of the Nineteenth Century	231
The National Question in Transylvania in the Period Around the Ausgleich	243
From Protest Petitions to Parliamentary Action: The Attitude of the Leadership of the Nationalities in Hungary in Regards to the Minister Ágoston Trefort's Magyarization Policy	248
Politics and Parliamentarism: The Romanian Political Elite from Transylvania between Vienna and Pest (1860–1871)	258
Coming Late to the Party: Romania's Accelerated Modernization between 1859 and 1916	266
Chapter Fifteen The Great War: Roots and Consequences	
Germany's Next War: Assumptions and Military Strategies of the German Army in 1905	277
Montenegro in Italian Foreign Policy during the Balkan Wars (1912–1913)Slavko Burzanović	284
The Italian <i>Intelligentsia</i> and Armed Intervention in the Great War: The Debate on Cultural Magazines <i>La Voce</i> , <i>Edizione politica</i> and <i>L'unità</i> , <i>Problemi della vita italiana</i>	290
Religious and Ethnic Identities in the First World War Macedonia: Perspectives from the Holy See's Diplomacy	299

Drafting the Hungarian-Yugoslav Border: A Short Overview	19
Ethnic Conflicts in Cilicia and the Turkish War of Independence 1918–1922	9
Reconstruction Projects of Romanian and Hungarian States after 1918	8
Chapter Sixteen Europe between the Two World Wars	
From the Second to the Third Reich: Foreign Policy and International Relations	7
Aspects of Political Cooperation between Italian and German Communists during the Period of the Weimar Republic	5
Diplomacy and Propaganda in Romania (1918–1946)	1
The Perspectives of the Monarchy in Interwar Romania: From the Constitutional Monarchy to Right-Wing Totalitarianism 36 Paul-Ersilian Roşca	52
Regional Security Pacts in Southeast Europe between the Two World Wars	'1
Chapter Seventeen Rethinking the Adriatic Question in the Twentieth Century	
Between War and Revolution: The Adriatic Question and D'Annunzio in Fiume, Building a New Italy (1918–1920)	'7

Yugoslav-Italian Relations and the Adriatic Issue in the Late 1918 and the Early 1919
The Eastern Adriatic in the Croatian National Revival
The Trieste Question and the 1948 Elections in Italy: An Assessment of the National and Foreign Propaganda
The Last Risorgimento: Riots in Trieste in 1953
Part VI: Communism, the Cold War and their Consequences
Chapter Eighteen Communism in Europe: Selected Case Studies
The Failure to Cope with Socialist Realism in the Soviet Union of the 1930s (Andrei Platonov)
Nationalism and Socialism in Romania: The Case of Nicolae Ceauşescu's Cult of Personality
Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej and the Roots of the Romanian Dissidence Inside the Communist Camp
National Interests and International Communism: The Romanian Communists Advocating "Allargamento" (1967–1973)
Environment, Real Socialism and Sustainability in Russia
Environment, Pollution and Eco-Nationalism in the USSR

Chapter Nineteen Clashing Empires in the Cold War Era

Outer Space: A New Dimension for the Application of the Principle of Balance of Power during the Cold War	477
The Fear and the Solution: Yugoslavia between the Soviet Threat and the Western Military Aid (1948–1958)	487
Socialism and National Sovereignty: Some Reflections about the "Brezhnev Doctrine"	496
Imperial Legacy and Cold War Rationale: The Anglo-American Diplomacy and the Falklands War in 1982 Davide Borsani	507
The End of the Cold War and New Challenges to Democracy	519
Chapter Twenty The Post-Cold War Era	
The Debate on the German Nation after the Fall of the Berlin Wall: Critical Opinions about the Reunification	529
The Czech Republic and the Modern Czech Nation	537
The Alibi of Memories: Political Idealism, Culture and Ideology in Post-Communist Countries	546
Poisoned Support? A Hypothesis on US Policy Towards Yugoslavia, 1981–1991	554

The Defeat of Democratic Yugoslavism in Bosnia-Herzegovina: The Alliance of Reformist Forces of Yugoslavia	563
Between Nations and Empires: Contemporary Reflections on Central Europe	575
Soft Power and its Influence on the Developing Countries	582
The Romanian Struggle for Détente inside the Warsaw Treaty (1955–1965)	590

THE LAST RISORGIMENTO: RIOTS IN TRIESTE IN 1953

MICHELE PIGLIUCCI

Introduction

One of the main propagandistic goals of the Italian Kingdom's entry into World War I against the Central Empires was to conquer Trieste, the final path of Italian unification. When Italy lost World War II, the city of Trieste was occupied by Anglo-American troops and stayed under military control for nine years, until a diplomatic decision about the borders between Italy and Yugoslavia was not reached. A "cold war scenario" was established in the city during the military occupation: the Yugoslav secret service's agents worked to organize a "fifth column" to set up a Yugoslav invasion of the city, while the Italian secret service's agents secretly trained Trieste's youth (and Fascists too) to defend the city with NATO weapons hidden in it. In this context a civil disorder took place on November 3–6, 1953 in which English policemen were compelled to attack the protesters, killing six and injuring dozens of people.

Cold war scenario in Trieste occupied for nine years

When Italy lost World War II, Yugoslav Partisans, led by Marshal Tito, engaged in a military race to liberate the city before the Allied troops; this was called "the race to Trieste." Yugoslavs freed Trieste before the Allied troops with the purpose to gain a geopolitical advantage in the area. Tito, in fact, wanted to establish a great Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that would include also Trieste; with the motto "Trst je naš" (Trieste is ours) Yugoslav troops occupied the city from May 1 to June 12 1945, terrorizing the Italian population whom they considered responsible for fascism. The Yugoslav occupation ended on June 12, 1945, when Tito left the city to the Allied troops after an agreement with General Alexander.

Two years later, the Treaty of Peace assigned the entire region of Venezia Giulia to Yugoslavia except for a strip of coastline that included Trieste, Capodistria and some other towns with the majority of the Italian population. On this strip of land not assigned to Italy or Yugoslavia an independent state called the Free Territory of Trieste was established. It was composed of two zones with a provisional military administration: the A zone, which included the city of Trieste and the surrounding area, was under a provisional Anglo-American administration and the B zone, which included the rest of the territory, was assigned to the provisional administration of Yugoslavia. According to the goal of the Treaty of Peace, this territory had to remain independent, led by a president that had to be appointed by the United Nations. But the Free Territory of Trieste was never established officially and a president was never appointed; Italian and Yugoslav diplomacies started to work to convince the Allies that they had the right on the entire territory.

Therefore, a long period of uncertainty about Trieste's future began. The population in the city was divided into three groups: the supporters for the city's return to Italy, the proponents of Yugoslavia and the supporters of the Free Territory of Trieste as an independent state. These three groups were politically organized: the Italian parties were a single block that included all political parties except the Communists, including Fascists, Monarchists, Christian Democrats and the Socialists; the Slavs were a well-organized minority with a secret component linked to Yugoslavia; and the pro-independence block represented a novelty in the political scenario of Trieste. The main pro-independence party was the Fronte dell'Indipendenza del Territorio Libero di Trieste (Independence Front of the Free Territory of Trieste), a new party that gained more than eleven thousand votes in the elections of 1949. The Independence Front collaborated with the Yugoslav formations, which through them hoped to diminish the support for the Italian cause: in fact, the independence of the Free Territory of Trieste could weaken the Italian presence and allow in this way a cultural and economic penetration of Yugoslavia, which would prepare the path for a possible future annexation.

The other pro-independence party was the Communist Party. From 1948, when Tito was expelled from the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform), the majority of the Communists of Trieste remained loyal to the Italian Communist Party and then to the Soviet Union and decided to leave the position of Yugoslav propaganda and to take the pro-independence side. Just a small part of the Communists (especially Slavispeaking ones) remained loyal to Tito and joined a second Communist party, born after the split of 1948 and managed by Branko Babić.

Despite having the same goal, independent parties were divided into two blocks: the Independence Front was allied with the Slav parties and the Communist Party of Vittorio Vidali was linked to Italy and was ready to react with weapons against an eventual invasion of the Yugoslav army. Indeed, while the Italian diplomacy worked to prevent the establishment of the Free Territory of Trieste and to regain the possession of the city, Tito threatened on several occasions to invade the city in order to avoid the area being placed under Italian sovereignty. The Italians knew very well that in case of a Yugoslav invasion the Allied military government would not defend the territory; this widespread feeling was subsequently confirmed in the documents preserved in the National Archives in London.

The Italian government decided to equip the Italian population of Trieste for a defense in case of a Yugoslav aggression. While the chief of staff of the Italian defense was designated to plan the military invasion of Istria, at the same time the Minister of Defense Taviani took the charge of organizing the defense of the city from the inside. The youth of Trieste—and especially the Fascist ones—were brought in convoys to Monfalcone, the first town over the border in Italy, where they were trained to use weapons in special military camps. At the same time, Taviani sent the Partisan leader Enrico Martini Mauri to the city with the task of setting the weapons (secretly brought in the city) and organizing a resistance. Despite the *cold war* scenario, he did not dislike involving in the resistance both the Fascists and Communists, ones who were the most prepared to fight.

At the same time Tito seriously planned to invade the city and organized groups that had to support an eventual invasion from the inside of the city: the so-called fifth column, probably led by the Yugoslav Partisan Franz Štocka, the former head of the city command during the Yugoslav occupation in May 1945.

Civil disorder November 3-6, 1953

In this scenario, a critical political phase stared in Italy: the elections of June 7, 1953 rejected the politics of Alcide De Gasperi, who tried unsuccessfully to create a new government but did not gain a vote of confidence in the parliament. Italy was in a political crisis without a government in a very delicate moment.

The task of setting up a new government was given to Giuseppe Pella, who achieved a parliamentary majority by involving the right wing parties in the Trieste issue. Pella was sure that the only way to solve the issue was the partition of the Free Territory of Trieste: the A zone should be placed under Italian sovereignty; while Italians would lose the B zone.

However, the government was not strong enough to support this solution in front of public opinion: Italians still hoped to regain possession of the whole area. Meanwhile, the more time passed, the more the

situation became complicated for Italy; in local elections of Trieste in 1952, the Independence Front doubled the votes from eleven thousand to twenty-two thousand. So it was necessary to operate quickly to create political conditions for a division between the two territories.

Tito agreed with this aim; for the dictator it was important to guarantee to the Slovenians access to the sea through the possession of the B zone, but he knew that the occupation of Trieste would unleash a war and undermine the balance between the Yugoslavs in his state and the relations with the West

Premier Pella decided to make the first move; on the occasion of a demonstration of former Partisans in Slovenia in a place close to the border with Italy, he decided to mobilize the army, demonstrating their readiness to react to an invasion. This move quickly raised the already high tensions between the two states: Tito reacted by mobilizing troops to the border, and the two states started threatening that they will occupy the city.

The move achieved the expected outcome: Allied diplomacy's offices began to work for a quick solution of the issue to avoid a war in which Anglo-American troops in the city would have been involved. Meanwhile in Yugoslavia and in Italy there were street demonstrations in every city; but in Trieste the Allied military government banned demonstrations for all the parties. This ban was broken by the Yugoslav supporters on October 14, 1953, when a large number of protesters crossed the streets of the city and were tolerated by the British police.

However, violent clashes took place when the protesters started fighting with Italians. And it was just the beginning: on November 3, the city of Trieste was celebrating the patron saint's day and also the anniversary of the entrance of the Italian troops into the city in 1918. This date was the occasion for a big march prepared by the Italian citizens of Trieste with the support of the Italian government, but the British police decided to forbid this event and seized the Italian flag put on a flagpole by the mayor.

The day after, November 4, was the anniversary of the Italian victory in World War I. The inhabitants of Trieste marched again in the city to demand the return of the confiscated flag; new clashes erupted, which were extended throughout the city and lasted late in the night. The next day, November 5, students decided not to return to school after holidays but to march again protesting against the police violence of the day before. Violent clashes with the police erupted; the police decided to respond with weapons killing a fourteen-year-old boy, Piero Addobbatiand, and a sixty-five-year-old man, Antonio Zavadil.

On November 6, the clashes turned into a real riot. The city was crowded with protesters from the early morning; people attacked policemen and set fire to their vehicles. The protesters crossed the whole center of the city, attacked and destroyed the headquarters of the Independence Front and then came to the Unità d'Italia square, where they attacked the headquarters of the police by using guerrilla tactics: they crawled behind the edge of the sidewalk to defend themselves from the gunfire of the police shooting from the roof of the building, then they came close to the building and attacked it with hand grenades.

A student Francesco Paglia disarmed a policeman and tried to shoot, before being hit. The police responded by shooting at people across the square, killing four citizens and injuring dozens. The riot ended just when the square was occupied by US troops—which were respected by the Italians. The US troops replaced the policemen and interposed themselves between the protesters and the building.

In three days, riots had caused six deaths and dozens of people were injured. After the riots, the police department was dismantled and many had to leave the city forever. In Italy, newspapers gave prominence to the clashes and people were sure that a resolution to the issue was quickly needed. In a few months, on October 5, 1954, the Memorandum of Understanding of London was reached; it was the agreement on the division of the Free Territory of Trieste between Italy and Yugoslavia. The city and the A zone were assigned to Italy, while the B zone was given to Yugoslavia.

The role of the Yugoslav secret service

Who organized these clashes? The British government was convinced that the Italian secret service had planned and staged the clashes with the goal to force the Allied command to seek Italian intervention and, in this way, to pass the administration of the city to them.

Indeed, historical documents prove that Premier Pella had been privy to the organization of a big march in the city, even that he had sent money for this, but it is difficult to think about an Italian strategy of tension because clashes could cause a war with an uncertain outcome. Pella had wanted surely a large demonstration but not a serious riot.

But certainly someone wanted riots in Trieste. A few days before, certain persons under the guise of Italian agents hired some members of the gang of the Cavana quarter to turn the marches into violent clashes, giving them Yugoslav money in exchange. Our opinion is that the Italian secrete service was not behind these clashes for several reasons: the riot

was more valuable to Tito than to the Italian cause and we can observe in private documents that no one in the Italian government knew about this operation, neither in Rome nor in Trieste. In the following days several people went to the office of the Italian delegation in Trieste demanding their reward, but they were turned away by the workers.

After all, General Winterton, the head of the Allied military government in the city, claimed that the Yugoslav money given to the Cavana gang members had not come from the Italian government but from an unknown source. It is possible to suppose that agents of the Yugoslav secret service had organized these clashes to force Pella to agree with the split of the territory. Cavana members could have been hired by Yugoslav agents to begin the riot, believing that they were hired by the Italian service.

It is just a theory. We know that in these demonstrations there were students, workers, children, women, pensioners from Trieste; thousands of people clamoring for freedom of their city. Fifty-one years later Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, the Italian president of the republic, reminded the public about this event by giving a gold medal to the memory of the killed people, recognizing the Trieste riot as a real last step of the Italian Risorgimento. As in the past, Trieste was the city in which the Italian Risorgimento was concluded for the second time.

Bibliography

Amodeo, Fabio, and Mario José Cereghino 2008. *Trieste e il confine orientale tra guerra e dopoguerra*. Udine-Trieste: Editoriale FVG.

Belci, Corrado. 1989. *Trieste, memorie di trent'anni (1945-1975)*. Brescia: Morcelliana.

Borsatti, Ugo. 2003. Trieste 1953: i fatti di novembre. Un film di Ugo Borsatti. Trieste: Lint.

Cappellini, Alessandro. 2004. *Trieste 1945-1954: gli anni più lunghi.* Trieste: MGS Press.

Cattaruzza, Marina. 2007. L'Italia e il confine orientale. Bologna: Il Mulino.

Cerceo, Vincenzo. 2004. *Trieste, novembre 1953: una contro lettura.* Trieste: La Nuova Alabarda.

Chicco, Gianni. 1993a. *Le finalità e le attività della Public diplomacy ed i fatti del 1953 a Trieste*. Trieste: Edizioni Italo Svevo.

—. 1993b. Trieste 1953 nei rapporti USA. Trieste: Edizioni Italo Svevo.

- Committee for the defense of the Italian character of Trieste and Istria. 1953. Trieste Novembre 1953, Facts and Documents. Trieste: Committee for the defense of the Italian character of Trieste and Istria.
- Dassovich, Mario. 1989. *I molti problemi dell'Italia al confine orientale*. Udine: Del Bianco Editore.
- De Castro, Diego. 1981. La questione di Trieste. L'azione politica e diplomatica italiana dal 1943 al 1954. Trieste: Lint.
- De Leonardis, Massimo. 1992. La diplomazia atlantica e la soluzione del problema di Trieste (1952-1954). Napoli: Edizioni scientifiche italiane.
- De Robertis, Antonio Giulio Maria. 1983. Le grandi potenze e il confine giuliano. Bari: Laterza.
- De Szombathely, Gabrio. 2000. *A Trieste sotto 7 bandiere 1914-1954*. Trieste: Edizioni Italo Svevo.
- Gon, Diego. 2004. *Il problema di Trieste 1945-1954*. Rome: Centro militare di studi strategici.
- Grassi, Livio. 1966. *Trieste Venezia Giulia 1943-1954*. Trieste: Istituto storico divulgativo.
- Licciardello, Nino. 1954. *Ero a Trieste: cronaca vissuta degli eccidi del novembre' 53*. Catania: Ed. Tip. Camene.
- Longo, Luigi. 1954. *I comunisti italiani e il problema triestino*. Trieste: Edizioni del PC-TLT.
- Maranzana, Silvio. 2003. *Le armi per Trieste Italiana*. Trieste: Edizioni Italo Svevo.
- Millo, Anna. 2011. La difficile intesa. Roma e Trieste nella questione giuliana 1945-1954. Trieste: Edizioni Italo Svevo.
- Novak, Bogdan. 1973. Trieste 1941-1954. Milano: Mursia Editore.
- Parlato, Giuseppe. 2007. *Trieste nella politica italiana (1945-1954)*, Trieste: Comune di Trieste.
- Pigliucci, Michele. 2013. Gli ultimi martiri del Risorgimento. Gli incidenti per Trieste Italiana del novembre 1953. Trieste: Edizioni Mosetti.
- Pupo, Raoul. 1989. Fra Italia e Jugoslavia. Saggi sulla questione di Trieste. Udine: Del Bianco Editore.
- —. 1999. *Guerra e dopoguerra al confine orientale d'Italia 1938-1956*. Udine: Del Bianco Editore.