

Berichte und Diskussionen

Hansmichael Hohenegger*, Antonio Lamarra, Riccardo Pozzo Johann Reinhold Grube's Opposing Remarks on Kant's *Nova dilucidatio*

<https://doi.org/10.1515/kant-2022-2022>

Abstract: This paper presents a transcription of a handwritten Latin text, along with its translation into English, that was identified only very recently in the Kongelige Bibliotek in Copenhagen while preparing the new critical edition of Kant's *Nova dilucidatio* (PND). The text consists of remarks by Johann Reinhold Grube, composed in his role as opponent at Kant's disputation for the *venia legendi* on 27 September 1755. Grube's interleaved opposing remarks on Kant's *dissertatio metaphysica pro receptione* contain precious starting points for new lines of research, since they vividly exemplify the point of view of one of the participants in the debate, a perspective that is rarely documented. In addition to informing us about how the disputation itself was carried out and which traditional rhetorical techniques were used, these remarks offer a compelling glimpse into the immediate reception of Kant's first thoughts on logic and metaphysics, giving scholars access to an ingenious reaction to Kant's stance on the theory of judgment.

Keywords: Disputation, Grube, judgment, Leibniz, logic, metaphysics, rhetoric

1 Finding

On 25 April 2020, we came across an important finding during our search for original prints while preparing the critical edition of the *Nova dilucidatio*, to be

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

included in the *Neuedition* of Kant's printed works.¹ We retrieved two copies of the first edition of the *Nova dilucidatio*, which, like many other Kantian texts, was assumed to have been lost in World War II.² This finding can be regarded as the most recent – perhaps minor, but with interesting and new implications – episode in the history of the retrieval of Kant's lost manuscripts and prints.³

On 14 May 2020, we received the first copy from the Latvijas Universitātes Akadēmiskā Bibliotēka in Riga (Copy R – Riga). Since the pandemic-related hygiene measures in force in May 2020 meant that we could not use the scanner, the librarian, Dr. Aija Taimiņa, kindly took pictures of each of the pages in the


1 Kant, Immanuel: *Gesammelte Schriften: Abteilung 1 – Neuedition: Vol. 1*. Edited by Hansmichael Hohenegger, Antonio Lamarra, Anne Pollok, Riccardo Pozzo, Thomas Pulte and Thomas Sturm. Berlin/Boston, in preparation. We express our gratitude to Mirella Capozzi, Steffen Dietzsch, Jacqueline Karl, Hanspeter Marti, Werner Stark and Christine Vogl for their insightful remarks on parts of this paper. Responsibility for any shortcomings remains our own.

2 The editors of the first important edition after World War II, directed by Wilhelm Weischedel, lamented that they could not possibly prepare a new edition of both the *Nova dilucidatio* (PND) and the *Monadologia physica* (MonPh) on the basis of their original prints because, due to the war, no copies were to be found. At the time, the copy of the PND that was available to the editors at the Prussian Academy of Sciences (presumably Arthur Warda's copy, which was owned by the Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Königsberg) had gone missing – together with a great number of Kantian volumes, manuscripts, and documents – as a consequence of a failed attempt to preserve *Kantiana* in wartime Berlin. See *Immanuel Kant's Werke in zehn Bänden*. Edited by Wilhelm Weischedel. Darmstadt 1968, vol. 1, 1004: "Was die beiden lateinischen Abhandlungen 'Principiorum primorum cognitionis metaphysicae nova dilucidatio' und 'Metaphysicae cum geometria iunctae usus in philosophia naturali, cuius specimen I. continet monadologiam physicam' angeht, so waren die Originaldrucke (1755 und 1756) trotz umfangreicher Nachforschungen nicht zu beschaffen, Neudrucke sind zu Lebzeiten Kants nicht erschienen." Until January 2021, the database on the early modern history of universities published by the Arbeitsstelle für kulturwissenschaftliche Forschungen in Engi (cf. <https://www.forschungen-engi.ch/datenbanken/koenigsberger-universitaetsschriften-und-promotionen-1544-bis-1905>, visited on 7 September 2021) recorded the original editions of both PND and MonPh – which have now been duly registered – as missing.

3 Cf. Stark, Werner: "Zum Verbleib der Königsberger Kant-Handschriften: Funde und Desiderate". In *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 39(3), 1991, 285–293. To name a recent example, the interleaved copy of the fourth edition (1757) of Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten's *Metaphysica*, on which Kant had written the *Reflexionen über die Metaphysik* that Erich Adickes would go on to transcribe and publish in volumes XV and XVII–XVIII of the Akademie Ausgabe, was found in Tartu and can now be consulted on the website of the Tartu Ülikooli Raamatukogu, <http://dspace.ut.ee/handle/10062/32369>, visited on 7 September 2021. See Kant, Immanuel: *Neue Reflexionen: Die frühen Notate zu Baumgartens "Metaphysica"*. Edited by Günter Gawlick, Lothar Kreimendahl and Werner Stark in collaboration with Michael Oberhausen and Michael Trauth. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 2019. On Gottlob Benjamin Jäsche's (1762–1842) role in bringing Kant's own copy of Baumgarten's *Metaphysica* and Georg Friedrich Meier's *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre* (1752) to Tartu, cf. Capozzi, Mirella: *Kant e la logica: Vol. 1*. Napoli 2002, reprint 2013, 133.



Latvijas Universitātes Akadēmiskā Bibliotēka Rīga – Shelfmark: Dissertationes varii argumenti
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Det Kongelige Bibliotek København – Shelfmark: UA ÆS Fls 4° (Filos., 2340 kvart 42246), frontispiece

library's stacks with her mobile phone. The second copy reached us from the Kongelige Bibliotek in Copenhagen (Copy K – København) through the mediation of Martin Rosie and Maja Schepelmann of the Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften a few weeks later, on 26 June 2020.

To our great surprise, we discovered that Copy K contained 11 annotated interleaved pages, in Latin, of preparatory notes for the speech by one of Kant's three *opponentes* (*Opponentenrede*); a unique scribble on another page in German *Kurrentschrift*; and finally, written on the frontispiece, the names Johann Daniel Funck⁴ and Johann Bernhard Hahn.⁵ It can be assumed that someone (the hand-

⁴ Johann Daniel Funck (1721–1764), a very close friend of Kant's and a member of the inner circle of Kant's academic "family", having married the young widow of Martin Knutzen (one of Kant's most influential teachers). Funck was not a philosopher but rather a lawyer and *Privatdozent* of law at the Albertina since 1749. In the handwritten entry on the frontispiece, his academic title is "HE. D.", i. e., *Herr Doktor*, unlike Hahn, who is referred to as "HE. P. Hahn", i. e., *Herr Professor*. He was the author of an inaugural disputation held on 5 April 1749 that could not be retrieved for autoptic examination; cf. Komorowski, Manfred: *Promotionen an der Universität Königsberg, 1548–1799: Bibliographie der pro-gradu-Dissertationen in den oberen Fakultäten und Verzeichnis der Magisterpromotion in der Philosophischen Fakultät*. München 1988, 18, n. 75. A few other dissertation titles can be found on the internet, as well as a *Vorlesungsankündigung*, whose frontispiece reads: *Johann Daniel Funck, beyder Rechten Doctor, zeigt seine Sommervorlesungen an, und machet einige nöthige Erinnerungen*. Königsberg 1750. Cf. also Arnoldt, Daniel Heinrich: *Vorgesetzte Zusätze zu seiner Historie der Königsbergischen Universität*. Königsberg 1762, 91; Vorländer, Karl: *Immanuel Kant: Der Mann und das Werk*. Edited by Rudolf Malter and Heiner F. Klemme. Hamburg 1993, 130–140; Kuehn, Manfred: *Kant: A Biography*. Cambridge/New York 2001, 110–112, 149. Johann Daniel Funck is not to be confused with another young friend of Kant's, Johann Friedrich von Funk, for whom Kant wrote a eulogy in 1760, *Gedanken bei dem frühzeitigen Ableben des Herrn Johann Friedrich von Funk* (GAJFF); AA 02: 39–44.

⁵ Of Johann Bernhard Hahn (1725–1794) we know that he received his doctorate on 4 November 1744 and had been teaching eloquence and history with the rank of *professor extraordinarius* at the Albertina since the Summer Term of 1749; cf. Komorowski: *Promotionen*, 80, n. 644; Oberhausen, Michael and Pozzo, Riccardo: *Vorlesungsverzeichnisse der Universität Königsberg (1720–1804)*. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1999, 181. He was the son of the theologian and orientalist of the same name, Johann Bernhard Hahn (1685–1755), who was the rector who had welcomed the 16-year-old Kant to the Albertina in the Summer Term of 1740. It was Hahn's father who, after Kant had submitted his dissertation *pro gradu* (*Magister Promotion*) *De igne* (Di) on 17 April 1755 and had passed his *rigorosum* on 13 April 1755, delivered a formal speech in the *auditorium maximum* before Kant held his own speech *On the Easier and on the More Rigorous Presentation in Philosophy* (the manuscript of which has gone missing); cf. Borowski, Ludwig Ernst: *Immanuel Kant: Sein Leben in Darstellungen von Zeitgenossen. Die Biographien von L. E. Borowski, R. B. Jachmann und E. A. Ch. Wasianski*. Edited by Felix Groß, with an introduction by Rudolf Malter. Darmstadt 1993, 8; Vorländer: *Kant*, 75–76 and Steffen Dietzsch: *Immanuel Kant: Eine Biographie*. Leipzig 2003, 58. The printed invitation – not a certificate (*Urkunde*) – to the academic celebration on the occasion of Kant's promotion indicates 12 June 1755; cf. Komorowski: *Promotionen*, 82, n. 661, Dietzsch: *Kant*, 59. Cf. also Marti, Hanspeter: "Frühneuzeitliche Dissertationen der Universität Königsberg". In *750 Jahre Königsberg*. Edited by Bernhart Jähmig. Marburg 2008, 271–302, here 274 f. It is certain that the handwritten entry on the frontispiece of Copy K of the PND refers to the homonymous son and not to the father, since the latter died on 8 July 1755, a few weeks before Kant's disputation. Hahn wrote two *dissertationes physico-metaphysicae* on the

writing does not seem to belong to the author of the opposing remarks) recorded these two names on the title page of Copy K (to the right of the printed names of the respondent and the three opposing students) to indicate their participation in the disputation. We thank Werner Stark for informing us that the title pages of disputations usually only included the printed names of the students, which would explain the handwritten recording of the names of the senior opponents.⁶

The opposing remarks were written in Latin, with the exception of the above-mentioned scribble, one *captatio benevolentiae* to the public (if.^v > 5: 12–13), and the transcription of verses 8–10 of Albrecht von Haller's poem *Ueber eine Hochzeit* (1731). Apparently, the remarks were written on the eve of the discussion of Kant's *dissertatio pro venia legendi* by one of the students who participated in the disputation.⁷ As is clear from the text, most of the arguments put forward by the opponent had been fortified by prior discussions with Kant, and possibly with the other opponents, the respondent and the two young professors, who – we can assume – were expected to speak after the young opponents had presented their remarks.

That the owner of the interleaved volume was one of the *opponentes*, namely Johann Reinhold Grube,⁸ is a plausible hypothesis for at least two reasons. First,

theory of sounds and colors, mostly as compilations of existing materials. Although a professor of history and rhetoric, he had been interested in philosophical topics (however, he did not stand out as a philosopher) since his dissertation *Methodus mathematica ab abusu vindicata, praeses Conrad Theophilus Marquard*. Königsberg 1741 (in his presentation, Marquard characterizes Hahn as “*albae gallinae filius*”), which he defended in order to receive the Stipendium Oelmannianum. As a professor, Hahn continued to delve into philosophical issues. We know that he was *praeses* for the dissertation of Jacob Heinrich Meltzer, *Principium rationis sufficientis, ab obiectionibus vindicatum*. Königsberg 1759, which is interesting insofar as it undertakes a fundamentally undemanding and traditional defense of the principle of sufficient reason, which Kant had already questioned in 1755. As regards the Stipendium Oelmannianum, cf. Arnoldt, Daniel Heinrich: *Ausführliche und mit Urkunden versehene Historie der Königsbergischen Universität: Zweyter Theil*. Königsberg 1746, 15.

6 The opponents mentioned on the title page are the officially announced students. It can be assumed that Funck and Hahn were so-called “extraordinary opponents,” who were not announced. On the rituals connected to disputations in Königsberg, cf. Arnoldt, Daniel Heinrich: *Ausführliche und mit Urkunden versehene Historie: Erster Theil*. Königsberg 1746, 181.

7 The records of the *Facultas Philosophica* (volume V, 194) (see AA 01: 565) confirm that “M[agister]. Kant dissertatio metaphysica pro Receptione in Fac[ultatem]. Phil[osophicam]. de primis cognitionis principii” was held on “d[ie]. XXVII. Sept[embri].”

8 Johann Reinhold Grube (1733–1790) was the son of a lawyer of the same name. He pursued a military career and became captain and adjutant of General Woldemar Hermann Graf von Schmettau (1719–1785); cf. *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie* 31 (1890), 641–642. Information on him is available due to the intermediary service he took over between General von Schmettau and Gotthold Ephraim Lessing; cf. Vogl, Christine: “In dem ‘Müntzcabinete des H. General L.

Grube had been working in Copenhagen since 1773 and bequeathed his library there.⁹ Second, a preliminary comparison of the interleaved handwritten remarks (of various lengths) with later handwritten documents of his seems to suggest that they were written by the same person.¹⁰ Another possible candidate for authorship is Christoph Abraham Borchard, who is named on the frontispiece as the *respondens*. Since he is specifically mentioned in the remarks as their recipient (together with Kant), however, we can rule this out.¹¹

The discovery of Copy K helps to shed light on paradigm shifts in the history of universities as regards the complex relations between orality and writing.¹²

v. Schmettau': Die Münze des Chabrias und ein neuentdecktes Begleitschreiben an Gotthold Ephraim Lessing". In *Aufklärung* 25, 2013, 305–341.

9 The auction catalogue of Grube's library was printed in Copenhagen: *Fortegnelse paa de Bøger, som har tilhørt afg. Hr. Capitain Grube, og som skal sælges ved Auct.* København 1790. We thank Bruno Berni for providing us with a scan of this list of books belonging to Grube, which is very helpful for reconstructing his personality. His was a very rich library, revealing Grube as one who had remained curious over the years, especially about issues concerning religion, politics, school reform, and the study of various languages (especially Latin). Among the library's philosophical texts are works by Reimarus, Lessing, Mendelssohn, and Herder. The catalogue mentions two copies of Kant's PND, recorded as number 8, "Principiorum primorum cognitionis metaphysicæ nova dilucidatio. Disputatio Imman. Kant. Regiom. 17 (sic)," and number 9 (sect. *in quarto*), with the indication "Ead. Dissertat." [i. e., the same dissertation]. Interestingly, the library also contains unpublished manuscripts. Among these is a translation from the Latin titled "Joh. Reinh. von Grube, Anfang einer Uebersetzung der Jahrbücher des Tacitus. Mscript" (n. 22 *in quarto*) and a German grammar book, also annotated by Grube (n. 546, sect. *in octavo*).

10 We express our gratitude to Christine Vogl for comparing the handwriting in Copy K with later documents written by Grube in support of the hypothesis that the texts were written by the same person.

11 Of Christoph Abraham Borchard (acme 1755) we presently know very little, although his *Stammbuch* is still preserved. It contains a quote by Sallust written down by Kant on 5 November 1758; cf. Stark, Werner: "Kantiana in Thorn". In: *Kant-Studien* 76 (3), 1985, 328–335, here 329. We are grateful to Werner Stark for informing us that Borchard was matriculated at the Gymnasium in Thorn on 20 April 1752; cf. *Matricula discipulorum torunensis gymnasii academici 1600–1817: Pars secunda (1718–1817)/Metryka Uczniów Torunskiego gimnazjum akademickiego 1600–1817. Czesc druga (1718–1817)*. Edited by Zenon Hubert Nowak and Janusz Tandecki. Toruń 1997, viii, 269–561. The Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz in Dahlem (Repository: GstAPK, XX. HA, EM 139 a, n. 40) also contains a request from Borchard's father for permission to maintain his residence in Thorn.

12 Cf. Marti, Hanspeter: *Disputation und Dissertation: Kontinuität und Wandel im 18. Jahrhundert*. In *Disputatio 1200–1800: Form, Funktion und Wirkung eines Leitmediums universitärer Wissenskultur*. Edited by Marion Gindhart and Ursula Kundert. Berlin/New York 2010, 63–85, 64: "In der Regel kann das Verhältnis von Wort und Text, vor allem wenn eine lange Zeitspanne zwischen Rede und schriftlicher 'Objektivierung' liegt, nur aufgrund von Quellentexten, die diese Beziehung thematisieren, untersucht werden." Cf. also Weijers, Olga: *Terminologie des Universités au XIII^e siècle*. Roma 1987, 335–365.

Equally fundamental to this history was the slow but progressive abandonment of Latin in both teaching and academic rituals. Eventually, by the end of the eighteenth century, thesis defenses had mostly been replaced by the submission of a manuscript, which was then to be subject to a public disputation.¹³

As Meelis Friedenthal, Hanspeter Marti, and Robert Seidel observe, it is important to remember that the term *dissertatio* “rarely denotes a dissertation or thesis in the modern sense of an original piece of research written by a young scholar; rather, it signifies the printed theses presented for defense. These prints are sometimes talked about metonymically as *disputationes* and, less frequently, as *disquisitiones*, *discursus*, or the like. The authorship of a dissertation is not always easy to determine, since in different times and places it can be attributed to either the supervising professor (*praeses*) who presided over the disputation or to the student (as *respondens*) who was required to respond to the objections of opponents (*opponentes*) and thus to defend the thesis in question.”¹⁴ Defenses were elaborate academic ceremonies in which the issue of authorship was important, because it was indeed an examination, but not supremely important, if one considers that the publication and discussion of a *dissertatio* served as a self-affirmation of the university as an academic body. From the perspective of the sociology of knowledge, it is important to highlight the role of the dedicator and the dedicatee, who sometimes funded the *actus academicus* (printing and refreshments) – a tradition that still needs to be looked into on a case-by-case basis.¹⁵ When a *respondens* is indicated on the frontispiece next to the name of the *praeses*, this does not necessarily mean that he was the author of the text. For example, although Borchard’s name appears at the end of the dedication of the *Nova dilucidatio* to a notable figure who was important to him, General Hans von Lehwaldt,¹⁶ we know for certain that he was not its author. Looking at the *Wahre Schätzung* (1747), it is not impossible to imagine that, at 23 years of age, the

13 Friedenthal, Meelis, Marti, Hanspeter and Seidel, Robert: *Early Modern Disputations in an Interdisciplinary and European Context*. Leiden 2021, 8. See also Marti, Hanspeter: “From Oral Disputation to Written Text: The Transformation of the Dissertation in Early Modern Europe”. In *History of Universities* 19 (2), 2004, 129–187; Pozzo, Riccardo: “Kant’s Latin in Class”. In *Reading Kant’s Lectures*. Edited by Robert C. Clewis, Berlin/Boston 2015, 160–175; Marti, Hanspeter: “Disputation und Dissertation in der Frühen Neuzeit und im 19. Jahrhundert – Gegenstand der Wissenschaftsgeschichte?” In *Vernakuläre Wissenschaftskommunikation: Beiträge zur Entstehung der modernen deutschen Wissenschaftssprachen*. Edited by Michael Prinz and Jürgen Schiewe. Berlin/Boston 2018, 271–292.

14 Friedenthal, Marti, Seidel: *Early Modern Disputations*, 8.

15 See Philipp, Michael: “*Politica* und Patronage: Zur Funktion von Widmungsadressen bei politischen Dissertationen des 17. Jahrhunderts”. In *Disputatio (1200–1800)*, 231–268.

16 General Hans von Lehwaldt (1686–1768), cf. *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie* 18, 1883, 166–167.

recently graduated Kant may have initially intended to develop his argument in the form of a short Latin dissertation, which for reasons of expediency or because the topic was indeed demanding eventually became a 240-page book in German. The cost of printing was shared by Kant and his maternal uncle Richter,¹⁷ while the dedication to Kant's *Gönner* patron, Johann Christoph Bohlius,¹⁸ was meant as a token of gratitude for having supported his studies.

Regarding Kant's four Latin academic texts, the question of authorship does not arise – not even for the handwritten *De igne* (1755), which served him well in the examination.¹⁹ The *De igne* was held in public and kept in the university archive as a manuscript. Why did it remain handwritten? First, at the time, printing was not a prerequisite for disputations defended at the Philosophical Faculty in Königsberg.²⁰ Second, as Kant declares in the text, the *De igne* is a “*primae lineae theoriae*” that deserves a much richer treatment, which Kant did not deliver – except perhaps several years later, at the end of his philosophical *Laufbahn* in his remarks on ether in the so-called *Opus postumum*.²¹ Hence, Kant was apparently more interested in obtaining an academic promotion than in sharing his work. The frontispiece is eloquent: Kant presents himself as *auctor* and *defensor*; the academic ritual was, in this case, reduced to a minimum. The third Latin disputation, the *Monadologia physica* (1756), was a *dissertatio publica pro loco habenda*. It was the fulfillment of the academic requirement to apply for Martin Knutzen's chair

17 Cf. Borowski: *Immanuel Kant*, 21n. Kant's affluent uncle Richter – a *Fabrikant* or *Schumachermeister* – also took care of the expenses related to his promotion as *Magister*. Cf. Reicke, Rudolph: *Kantiana: Beiträge zu Immanuel Kants Leben und Schriften*. Königsberg 1860, 48.

18 Johann Christoph Bohlius (1703–1785), cf. Irrlitz, Gerd: *Kant Handbuch: Leben und Werk*. Stuttgart 2015, 76–77; Dietzsch: *Kant*, 56.

19 Cf. Hartenstein, Gustav: “Einleitung”. In *Immanuel Kant's Werke: Sorgfältig revidirte Gesamtausgabe in zehn Bänden*. Edited by Gustav Hartenstein. Leipzig 1838–1839, vol. 8, xviii. On Kant's so-called *Doktorurkunde* see AA 13: xxxi.2–8. It may be useful to note that the Islamic augural formula for prayers and writings – “in the name of Allah”, *bismillah*, بِسْمِ اللّٰهِ – written at the top of the invitation to Kant's academic celebration is found at the beginning of a number of academic writings from eighteenth-century Prussia. Its appearance on Kant's document is likely attributable to the *decanus* who issued the invitation, Johann Bernhard Hahn (see note n. 5), a professor of oriental languages. Cf. Bobzin, Hartmut: “Immanuel Kant und die ‘Basmala’: Eine Studie zu orientalischer Philologie und Typographie in Deutschland im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert”. In *Zeitschrift für arabische Linguistik* 25, 1993, 108–131. Kant mentions the *bismillah* twice: in AA 15: 07.02 and AA 25: 256.04.

20 Cf. Marti, Hanspeter: “Immanuel Kant und die Disputation als traditionelle Unterrichtsform.” In *Vestigia Prussica: Forschungen zur ost- und westpreussischen Landesgeschichte*, Bd. 3. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2022, in print: “Gedruckte Promotionsdissertationen, die denn auch als solche deklariert sind, gab es in Königsberg während der ganzen frühen Neuzeit nur an der medizinischen, juristischen und theologischen Fakultät.”

21 Cf. *De igne* (Di); AA 01: 371.05. On Kant's theory of ether, see especially OP, AA 21: 206–241.

in logic and metaphysics, which Kant was not given at the time. In the *Monadologia physica*, Kant appears not as *praeses* but as *defensor*. His name is followed by the name of the *respondens*, Lucas David Vogel, and by those of the *opponentes adolescentes ingenui*, Ludwig Ernst Borowski, Georg Ludwig Mühlenkampff, and Ludwig Johann Krusemark. On the other hand, the fact that the dedication is signed by both Kant and Vogel, *defensor* and *respondens*, may also indicate that they shared the expenses. Only with his fourth disputation, the *De mundi* (1770), which was actually a *dissertatio pro loco* (in accordance with the statutes – *exigentibus statutis academicis*), was Kant, already a renowned philosopher, appointed to the chair of logic and metaphysics, this time with his beloved student Marcus Herz in the role of *respondens* and Georg Wilhelm Schreiber, Johann August Stein, and Georg Daniel Schröter in the role of *contra opponentes*, with the dedication addressed to the sovereign Frederick, *patri patriae clementissimo*.

What is certain is that today there are more sources available through which we can gain a picture of what was happening in the “auditorio phil.” (the philosophical lecture hall that also served as a *Kommunität*, i. e., as the *akademische Speisesaal* or dining hall) of the Albertina²² on the morning of 27 September 1755, from 8 a.m. to noon (and perhaps extending into the afternoon), directly from the perspective of those young students who, *uti tua benevolentia fratres* (“as between brothers, thanks to your [i. e., Kant’s] benevolence”) (if.^r > frontispiece: 24),²³ were called on to discuss “the first pure philosophical work of the young scholar”.²⁴

As mentioned above, the handwritten names on the frontispiece suggest that two instructors, Funck and Hahn, the former certainly a close friend of Kant’s, participated as senior *opponentes* later that day and possibly discussed the matter and supported the younger *opponentes*. To fill in the picture of the *actus academicus* in Königsberg, we can fortunately rely on an important example of a senior faculty *Opponentenrede* on Johann Gottlieb Kreutzfeld’s *Dissertatio philologico-poetica de principiis fictionum generalioribus*, for which in 1777 Kant himself served as one of the two professors who, according to the regulations

²² Cf. Arnoldt, Daniel Heinrich: *Ausführliche und mit Urkunden versehene Historie der Königsbergischen Universität: Zweyter Theil*, 44; Goldbeck: Goldbeck, Johann Friedrich: *Nachrichten von der Königlichen Universität zu Königsberg in Preußen und den daselbst befindlichen Lehr-, Schul- und Erziehungsanstalten*. Königsberg 1782, 140.

²³ We use the abbreviation “if.” for *interleaved*, marking each as “r” for the *recto* and “v” for the *verso*, with an arrow indicating the numbers of the printed pages to which they are bound (e. g., “if.^v > 5” means: the Ms. page on the *verso* before page 5 of Kant’s dissertation). One can assume that the first page of the Ms. (if.^r > frontispiece) and the last (if.^v > back cover) served as the cover of the booklet before Copy K received its leather cover.

²⁴ Vorländer: *Kant*, 94.

in force at the time, delivered a speech after the three opposing students G. W. Bück, *Regiom. Bor. J. V. C. S.*, Chr. Dittmann, *Thorunensis S. Th. C.; C. F.* and Nicolai Eichmed, *ad Rastenburg. Pruss. S. S. Th. et Ph. C.*²⁵

2 Description of Copy K

In the original edition, printed by Johann Heinrich Hartung, the *Nova dilucidatio* was preserved in the Riga (R) and Copenhagen (K) copies as a small in-quarto volume (16.3 cm x 19.7 cm) consisting of five sheets (signatures: A–E), hence totaling 40 pages: two (unnumbered) which provide the title page, followed by a dedication to General von Lehwaldt and a further 38 numbered pages, which contain the text of the dissertation, immediately followed on the same final page by Kant's own short list of corrections (*emendanda*).²⁶

An autoptic examination conducted on Copy K on 14 December 2021 confirmed that the title page is preceded by two blank pages (a flyleaf and the first interleaved leaf) and that the last page is followed by two blank pages (the remnant of the first interleaved leaf and of the flyleaf). The flyleaves feature a watermark of their own, which apparently traces back to the bookbinding, which was possibly done later at the Kongelige Bibliotek of Copenhagen when the book was acquired – as documented by the crowned monogram “C7” of Christian VII King of Denmark (1766–1808) on the top left corner of the front cover.²⁷

²⁵ Kant's own *Opponentenrede* is noted down in a quite legible chancery script in the form of lengthy remarks on the *Dissertatio philologico-poetica de principiis fictionum generalioribus*. Königsberg 1777 by Johann Gottlieb Kreutzfeld (1745–1784). Erich Adickes edited this *Entwurf einer Opponenten-Rede* as *Reflexion 1525*, AA 15: 901–934. Kant's interleaved annotated copy is preserved at the Tartu Ülikooli Raamatukogu, <http://hdl.handle.net/10062/24294>, visited on 7 September 2021. Kreutzfeld presented his dissertation in two parts on two different days (25 and 28 February), the first *pro receptione* as *Profess. Poes. Ordin. Design.* and the second *pro loco* as *Profess. Poes. Ordin.* Kant was likely the opponent only for the *Particula II*. Cf. Sdzuj, Reimund B.: “55 Kreutzfeld”. In: *Rhetoric, Poetics and Aesthetics in the Educational System of the Old Empire: Wissenschaftshistorische Erschließung ausgewählter Dissertationen von Universitäten und Gymnasien 1500–1800*. Edited by Hanspeter Marti, Reimund B. Sdzuj and Robert Seidel in collaboration with Karin Marti-Weissenbach. Cologne/Weimar/Vienna 2017, 527–535.

²⁶ Johann Heinrich Hartung (1699–1756) was then still in charge of the typesetting. While sheets A, B, C, and D are fully printed, with eight pages each, sheet E is printed on only six pages, until E3v. As usual, the two remaining pages were used for the frontispiece and the back cover.

²⁷ Cf. <http://wayback-01.kb.dk/wayback/20100504120140/http://www2.kb.dk/kb/missingbooks/marks/monograms.htm>, visited on 7 September 2021.

The interleaving of Copy K features a different watermark from that of the *Nova dilucidatio* (PND) and starts before the two unnumbered printed pages containing the frontispiece (on the *recto*) and its dedication (on the *verso*), continuing regularly, page after page, until PND 38. In total, therefore, in addition to Kant's 20 printed leaves, the volume contains 21 interleaved unnumbered leaves (*recto-verso*), 12 pages of which (if.^r > frontispiece; if.^v > frontispiece; if.^r > 1; if.^v > 1; if.^r > 3; if.^v > 3; if.^r > 5; if.^v > 5; if.^r > 7; if.^v > 9; if.^r > 15; if.^v > back cover, plus a scribble on if.^r > 15) contain written annotations, while the remaining 30 pages are blank.

The remarks appear to be written in two distinct handwriting styles, namely an elegant chancery script (e. g., on if.^r > 3) and a more cursory script (e. g., on if.^v > frontispiece). Kant's printed text contains underlines on the following pages: PND 1 (“vt spero, cum l. 3”; “prolixis studiose suspersedeo ambagibus”; “Iepore omni ac venustate sermonis velut veste detracta”), PND 2 (lines 13–16; 21–23; 24–28), PND 4 (“quam postquam Leibnitius inuentam venditabat”), PND 6 (“Deum non egere ratiocinatione [...] cum omnia obtutui ipsius”), PND 9 (“Veritatis cognitionem rationis semper intuitu niti communi omnium mortalium sensu stabilitum est”), and PND 23 (“etenim ratiociniorum anfractus diuini intellectus”).

It is noteworthy that the final portion of the frontispiece is torn, with the consequence that in Copy K Grube's name and the name of the publisher, the date and place (on the *recto*), and the name of the dedicator Borchart (on the *verso*) are missing. Although the frontispiece may have been torn by accident, a number of other hypotheses are plausible, including the possibility that Grube himself (or his heirs) may not have wanted to document his presence and ownership. Note that the tear also means that Borchart's name does not appear as dedicator on the *verso*, although it remains on the frontispiece in his role as *respondens*. Finally, one could argue that getting ahold of one Kantian autograph would have been a sufficient motive for tearing the bottom of the page, although this is a far-fetched hypothesis, the confirmation of which would require locating, among the extant collections of eighteenth-century German autographs, the missing printed lines featuring Grube's name, the place and publisher, and the year.

3 Style, Argumentative Structure, Synopsis, and Transcription Criteria

As regards the use of Latin, while Grube's discourse is usually formal and academic, it can at times be frank and resolute. In the opening lines, we find jokes and even friendly remarks (e. g., *uti fratres* “as between brothers”). In the body of the text, however, the arguments follow the traditional structure of a syllo-

gistically organized disputation. Of note are a number of playful statements on the Latinized versions of Immanuel Kant's and Christoph Abraham Borchard's names, as well as General von Lehwaldt's name (if.^t > 1: 1–5). His youth notwithstanding, Grube is patronizing at times, e. g., criticizing Kant for being verbose with regard to the difficulties associated with the principle of determining reason while not going substantially beyond Baumgarten (where he writes: *superfluum egisti*, “you did something superfluous”) (if.^v > 5: 5–6). Immediately below, Grube describes Kant's dialogue between Titus and Caius (PND 18–23) as *longus et vere superfluus*, “lengthy and truly superfluous” (if.^v > 5: 7). Finally, Grube goes so far as to correct Kant's orthography when he criticizes the use of *cum* rather than *quum*, which is underlined in his copy (PND 1: 2). Apparently, Grube followed an orthographic tradition that began with Isidore of Seville²⁸ and ended at the close of the eighteenth century, which requires that *cum* (as a preposition) be distinguished from *quum* (as a conjunction). In fact, Kant also followed this non-classical distinction in his own Latin writings, but not in a strict way, as we see in the case cited by Grube.²⁹

As regards the argumentative structure, Grube's remarks are well placed within the tradition of disputational logic, with which he was apparently well acquainted. All syllogisms follow the same pattern: the major proposition consists of a general principle, assumed as self-evident and shared by the interlocutor; the minor consists of a statement of fact or a proposition taken from Kant's text which is much more limited in scope; and the conclusion corresponds to the thesis asserted by Grube. It remains to be noted that Grube often leaves understated either the minor or the conclusion or both. In these cases, he expresses the minor by a simple *atqui* and the conclusion by *ergo*. We can imagine that

28 Isidore of Seville: *The Etymologies: I. On Orthography*. Edited by Stephen A. Barney et. al. Cambridge 2006, xxvii.4, 53: *Cum autem praepositio per C. scribenda est; si autem adverbium fuerit, per Q. Dicimus enim 'quum lego'*. “The preposition *cum* (‘with’) should be written with a C, but if it is a conjunction (‘while’), then it should be written with a Q, for we say *quum lego* (‘while I speak’)”.

29 It must be said that even Joachim Lange's grammar, which Kant used as a student, is not as normative as Grube. He indicates the spelling *quum* for conjunctions but also allows for the spelling *cum*. Cf. Lange, Joachim: *Verbesserte und Erleichterte Lateinische Grammatica mit einem Paradigmatischen und Dialogischen Tirocinio*. Halle ²⁴1738, 100. *Quum* is listed under the adverbs: “einige aber können zugleich zu den *coniunctionibus* und *interiectionibus* gerechnet werden” (ibid. 98) as “*Quum (cum)* wenn, als, da” (ibid. 100); under the prepositions: “*Cum*: mit, neben, samt” (ibid. 105), but also under the conjunctions: “*cum, tum; tam, quam; tum, tum*: sowol, als auch” (ibid. 107). In the first edition of 1707, in the same place, only *cum* is indicated, which means that at the time Lange did not consider it important to distinguish between the preposition and the conjunction.

during the disputation, Grube would have provided a full explication of at least the minor.

A rough table of contents might run as follows: an initial page, which serves as introduction and contains a short speech that the author may have read; three pages containing brief observations concerning the frontispiece, the dedication and the *Ratio instituti* of the *Nova dilucidatio*, in the form of short, loose remarks (and which one can imagine served as notes for Grube's opening address); a second group of six pages devoted to critical arguments that Grube opposed to Kant's text; and a final page with academic salutes. In further detail, a synopsis of Grube's arguments might run as follows:

- if.^v > frontispiece: introduction
- if.^v > frontispiece: on Kant's frontispiece
- frontispiece: names of senior opponents in the margin
- if.^v > 1: on the dedication
- if.^v > 1: on the *Ratio instituti* with mention of Proposition VII (p. 10)
- if.^v > 3: on Proposition I (p. 2)
- if.^v > 3: on Proposition I and Proposition II (p. 3)
- if.^v > 5: on the Scholion of Proposition II (p. 4)
- if.^v > 5: on Proposition IX (p. 14), including the *Confutatio dubiorum* and the dialogue on pages 18–23
- if.^v > 7: on the Scholion of Proposition III (p. 5), with mention of the *Addimenta ad Problema IX* (p. 23–24)
- if.^v > 9: on the *Idem aliter* following Proposition IV (p. 9–10)
- if.^v > 15: scribble
- if.^v > back cover: conclusion

As regards the criteria adopted for the transcription, we should first note that Grube's remarks on Kant's text, although written for the purposes of a public discussion of the *Nova dilucidatio*, are a manuscript text that has the character of a private writing that was not intended for publication. At times, the remarks take the form of a fully structured text that could easily be read before an audience, while at others they are clearly mere talking points. Because of this, in the transcription we deemed it appropriate to follow a generally diplomatic criterion, being as respectful as possible of the author's handwriting, deletions, and additions. Hence, we have changed neither the spelling of words nor the syntactic structure of sentences. Only in particular cases, which we have noted, did we feel it necessary to follow a method that was to some extent interpretative, favoring the broadest understanding of Grube's manuscript.

As is customary, we have expanded the few scribal abbreviations present in the text to indicate the consonantal group *st*, the diphthong *ae*, and the double *m*

and to indicate the preposition *per* and the conjunction *autem*.³⁰ We have written *u* and *v* according to current Latin lexicography (preserving the distinction between the vowel and the consonant or semi-consonant), because in Grube's handwriting it is not always easy to distinguish between *u* and *v*. When Grube is quoting Kant, however, we reproduce Kant's orthography, for example, *vt spero* (if.^v > 1: 1). Note that in the *Neuedition* of Kant's Latin printed works – in compliance with the guidelines agreed among the editors – we have preserved Kant's polygraphism, the peculiar orthography and punctuation used by Kant himself (or the typesetter).³¹ On the other hand, since there is no use of the semi-consonant *j* in the manuscript, even in those cases where the medieval and early tradition would have used it, we have always transcribed with *i*. Those words crossed out by the author which are nevertheless legible have been reproduced and also crossed out in the transcription, while those words that have been rendered illegible have been replaced by ellipses between angle brackets. The words added by the author between the lines or in the margin, indicating a correction or an integration, have been inserted in the text between angle brackets. The square brackets indicate our editorial interventions and have been used to fill in parts of words that are missing in the manuscript or to insert punctuation marks that are themselves absent from the manuscript.

As far as punctuation is concerned, the manuscript is rather inconstant and irregular, at times influenced by German punctuation, at others intended to mark the expressiveness of speech more than the syntax of the written text. In this case, it has seemed appropriate to follow a more interpretative criterion and to orient the punctuation to the syntax of the period and the comprehensibility of the text.

30 The *m* is at times written with a macron (\bar{m}) and hence transcribed as a double *m* (*mm*), e. g., “summo” (if.^t > 1: 4), while *per* is sometimes abbreviated as \underline{p} , but also as *p*. (if.^t > 5: 1 and 11). As in (if.^v > 3: 5), *scil.* is an abbreviation of *scilicet*.

31 The editions sponsored by the Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften began in the nineteenth century with Immanuel Bekker's edition of the *Opera Aristotelis* (continued by Olof Gigon in the twentieth century), followed by, among others, the editions of the works of Gottfried Leibniz and Wilhelm von Humboldt. In 1894, Wilhelm Dilthey initiated Kant's *Akademie Ausgabe* with the intention of providing reliable and comprehensive texts for scholars and students; cf. Stark, Werner: “Die Kant-Ausgabe der Berliner Akademie: Eine Musterausgabe?” In: *Immanuel Kant und die Berliner Aufklärung*. Edited by Dina Emundts. Wiesbaden 2000, 213–224. In Dilthey's time, the Kant-Kommission (of the then Königlich Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin) asked the editors of individual writings to smooth out most of the spelling and syntactic variants. Given that Kant's spelling habits – so claimed the editors of the first volume of the *Druckschriften* published in 1902 – were neither systematic nor consequential, the Kant-Kommission thought it best not to burden readers with obsolete forms (AA 01: 513). Thus, most of Kant's works from 1747 onward were effectively rewritten using the spelling and punctuation that Kant himself had used starting from the KrV, with the result that Kant's intentional or non-intentional variability in orthography and punctuation in the writings prior to 1781 was ignored altogether.

4 Themes

Grube's remarks contain precious starting points for new lines of research, exemplifying the role of disputations in the history of universities in all its vividness, from the point of view of one of the participants in the academic event – a perspective which is rarely documented. The remarks allow us to experience how disputations were carried out and how traditional rhetorical techniques were used. Given the lack of contemporary reactions to the *Nova dilucidatio* – which received neither book reviews nor private reports – they give us important insights into the immediate reception of Kant's first thoughts on logic and metaphysics, providing scholars with access to an ingenious reaction to Kant's stance on the theory of judgment.

Grube's remarks contribute to the current literature on the history of universities by shedding light on the role of orality (*pronunciatio*) and proxemics (*actio*) in an *actus academicus*. In this document, the interaction between the written and the spoken word is of the essence. Interestingly, readers of Grube's remarks ought to interpret the deixis of the pronouns themselves, painting a mental picture of the speaker's likely gestures. We thus gain a clearer understanding of the part of rhetoric that is called *actio*. We must imagine that, when Grube was pinning down indexicals, he accompanied what he was saying with gestures that made the references to those in attendance clear. Perhaps it is not by chance that the text includes interesting occurrences of the use of *tu* and *vos*, which we had to disambiguate in the footnotes due to the homonymy of the English *you*. Hence the importance of keeping track of the singular and the plural of *you*: *tuum* and *vestrum*, where the pronoun *tu* refers to Kant or Borchard, with Grube calling on each of them, while *vos* refers to Kant and Borchard. Finally, on the last page, Grube turns his head to his *praeceptor*, most probably Funck (but also possibly Hahn). In the footnotes, we have tried to clarify the references of personal pronouns.

In terms of the rhetorical techniques it employs, the *Opponentenrede* contains much more than written exchanges. It also contains a substantial number of indications that allow us to reconstruct the dialogue around Kant that took place on the morning of 27 September 1755 (and quite possibly into the afternoon). The reader ought to imagine two parties seated on opposite sides of the *Auditorium Philosophicum*. On one side sit Kant and Borchard, the *praeses* and the *respondens*, and on the other are Möller, Lysius and Grube, the three *adolescentes opposites*, together with Funck and Hahn, the junior faculty who took part in the *actus academicus* informally. Between them would have sat the public, the *universitas nostra*, the academic community of professors and students from all faculties.

Grube will hardly claim a place in the history of philosophy. He was a lawyer, and his philosophical capacities were instrumental to his political-diplomatic

activities. Nonetheless, readers will find in these remarks material for investigating philosophical content. It is not irrelevant that in some passages Grube gives evidence of previous discussions with fellow opponents and with Kant himself in preparation for the event. Grube tells the audience that Kant himself had admitted (*ipse mihi praeterea confessus est*, “you yourself admitted to me”) that the long dialogue on freedom and the principle of determination (PND 18–23) was superfluous (if.^v > 5: 7).

Grube’s references to Kant are numerous and precise. He starts by quoting exactly from Kant’s title: *de cognitionis nostrae principiis* (if.^r > frontispiece: 2). It is interesting to note that the remarks are mainly addressed to the first part of the *Nova dilucidatio*, i. e., to the frontispiece, the dedication, the *Ratio instituti*, and the first section of the text, while other parts of Kant’s text are mentioned only as a consequence of those that are addressed to the first part of the text. It is plausible that – the *Nova dilucidatio* being composed of three sections – the *opponentes* decided to divide their tasks by directing each of their own remarks to one of the sections.

The text contains explanations as regards defining logical and metaphysical truths, the alleged synonymy of *proposition* and *truth*,³² and whether the principle of identity is a simple proposition (if.^r > 3).³³


There are also objections to Kant’s text. Where Kant writes, for example, that God cannot *egere ratiocinatione* (“he does not need reasoning”) (AA 01: 391.26 f.), Grube argues that God also syllogizes: “Reasoning is the thought of the relation

32 The synonymy of *proposition* and *truth* was at the time a widely discussed doctrine. See, e. g., Knutzen, Martin: *Elementa philosophiae rationalis seu Logicae cum generalis tum specialioris mathematica methodo in usum auditorum suorum demonstrare*. Königsberg/Leipzig 1747, pars generalis, sectio I, § 4: “*propositio* s. *enunciatio* est iudicium vocibus expressum.” The critical Kant would reject it by arguing that no judgment is possible without words; cf. Capozzi, Mirella: “Why Language Matters to Kant’s Philosophy and Logic”. In *The Court of Reason: Proceedings of the 13th International Kant Congress*. Edited by Camilla Serck-Hanssen and Beatrix Himmelmann. Berlin/Boston 2021, 97–116.

33 The question of the plurality of logical principles was taken up by Kant on several occasions. In the first phase, represented by the PND, the principle of identity is bipartite (one for affirmative truths and the other for negative truths), while the principle of contradiction is “*nisi definitio impossibilis*”. In *Die falsche Spitzfindigkeit der vier syllogistischen Figuren erwiesen* (DfS), the two types of truth correspond, respectively, to the principle of identity and the principle of contradiction. In a third, critical, phase (in which Kant separates formal logic from transcendental logic), the principle of sufficient reason is also understood, together with the principle of the excluded third, and, obviously, the principle of contradiction (which is one with the principle of identity), as completely formal. For an outline of the different stages and the reasons for these changes in the history of Kant’s development, cf. Capozzi, Mirella: “Kant and the Principle of Contradiction”. In Ead.: *Scritti su Kant: Raccolta di seminari e conferenze*. Edited by Hansmichael Hohenegger. Morrisville, N.C. 2014, 253–265.

of two judgments; since indeed the relations between two judgments cannot be thought *without reasoning*; it follows that anyone who thinks has need of reasoning” (if.^r > 7: 2f.).

Most interestingly, in his youthful ingenuity, Grube challenges Kant on a matter that would shape the latter's future remodeling of the relation between logic and metaphysics: the theory of judgment, the germinal cell of transcendental philosophy. While arguing that judgment is a relation between terms (concepts) and reasoning is a relation between judgments – since the relations between two judgments cannot be thought without reasoning – Grube concludes that anyone who thinks needs reasoning. Quite surprisingly, Grube invites Kant to deliver a new definition: *Si definitio non placet, aliam suppeditare debuisses* (“If you do not like this definition, you should provide another one”) (if.^r > 7: 9). Grube would not receive an answer until some years later, when Kant set out his theory of judgment in the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*.



Transcription of the interleaved Ms. in Copy K

[if.ʹ > frontispiece]

- 1 Impetrata a Te, Nobilissime Praeses, dubiorum ~~meorum~~ quae contra acutissimam
- 2 tuam, de cognitionis nostrae principiis, commentationem, mihi in mentem venirent,
- 3 publice tecum communicandorum, venia mihimet ipsi maxime gratulor. En
- 4 privatis nostris quidem colloquiis iam perspectum habebis, me Philosophorum
- 5 Iurgia, si non prorsus omnino, saltem cum quasi quadam miseratione
- 6 delectare. Quum vero animus tuus ab vago omni litigandi pruritu³⁴
- 7 [a]bhorrens iam dudum mihi innotuerat et ex hac ipsa tua <...>
- 8 dissertatione iterum pateat; urbanitatis sane praecepta offenderem, si,
- 9 quae a sinistris istis aliorum dogmatum interpretibus prava
- 10 committuntur, a Te itidem commissura sperarem. Odio ipse profanum
- 11 illud Philosophorum vulgus prosequeris, quod nescio quo veritatis strenue
- 12 indaganti indecoro fastu, illa ~~eontendit~~ <contemnit> omnia, quae
- 13 compendiis suis a puero edoctis non continentur, principia. Sed
- 14 quid me diutius inter plebeium illud eruditorum genus commoror?
- 15 quum in te, doctissime Praeses, virum invenerim, qui veritatis
- 16 investigandae non omnem solum extendit operam, sed et eos pati docuerit,
- 17 qui in tuas partes ire recusant. Quid valeant humeri mei imbecilles,
- 18 quid ferre detrectentur? Tibi magis notum erit quam mihi ipsi. Semper viribus
- 19 meis diffidere assuevi, et me ipsum sane ignorarem, si hoc temporis momento,
- 20 de illis plus quam iis inest sperarem rarem rarem. Vides igitur, Clarissime Praeses,
- 21 quod Tibi de dubitatiunculis meis ~~sperandum~~ <expectandum> sit.
- 22 Respondentis egregie docti mihi succurret amicitia, qua,
- 24 uti tua benevolentia fratres, ea quae privatis lucubrationibus
- 25 ex dissertatione vestra subvenerunt dubia, proponam, quae ut
- 26 serena fronte accipiatis a Vobis, Resp.³⁵ honor.,³⁶ omnibus precibus impetratum <volo>.


³⁴ PND 1; *Ratio instituti*: “dummodo acerbitas absit et litigandi pruritus.” AA 01: 387.11–12.

³⁵ Resp[ondentes].

³⁶ honor[atissimi].

[if.^v > frontispiece]

- 1 Ad titulum quaedam.
- 2 Principior[um]. haec sunt obscura nam dupliciter explicari potuerunt
- 3 (<...>, Habenda³⁷)
- 4 Num Tibi, respondens egregie docte, adeo certissimum
- 5 est: parentes tuos, te Abrahamum et non Abramum
- 6 simpliciter nominandum statuisset[?]
- 7 Quare Nomen meum ita deformasti ut me Reinholdum
- 8 appellares; ad formam Michael Michaelis ulterius
- 9 concludas Immanuelis hinc etiam latina terminatione
- 10 in nominis tui scriptione uti debuisti.



Detail from the frontispiece

[frontispiece]

- <HE[rr]. D[octo]r. Funck>
 <HE[rr]. P[ro]fessor. Hahn>

[if.^r > 1]

- 1 Perillustri Gubernatori nostro adhuc Titulus Reverendissimi
- 2 debetur, ob equestrem ordinis teutonici dignitatem.

³⁷ The first word within the brackets was crossed out and is no longer clearly legible. With reference to the frontispiece, the following word, “habenda”, indicates where and when the dissertation was to be held.

- 3 Ioannis nomine non utitur, sed Hansei.
- 4 Epitheta Gravissimi, Meritissimi, et vigilantissimi summo
- 5 exercituum duci sunt indecora.

[if.^v > 1]

- 1 Iam initio dissertationis vestrae in ratione instituti vox vt spero
- 2 non placet quippe Philosopho maxime indecora, qui pro-
- 3 positi sui exitus certissimus esse debet.
- 4 Cum est per Qu scribendum.
- 5 Argumentis suis omnem leporem ac venustatem sermonis
- 6 velut vestem detrahere,³⁸ moratoribus nostris temporibus est in-
- 7 decorum. Sed veritas instar matronae. Nam hanc vero de-
- 8 ceret omnium visui se nudam exponere uti vetula exe-
- 9 briosa.
- 10 Qui ipse fatetur pro convicto habetur, et ego modestiae
- 11 caussa me non amplius circa matronam denudatam retardabo.
- 12 Qua ratione interpretaberis Prop. VII. p. 10

[if.^r > 3]

- 1 Iam initio, Disputantes honoratissimi, mihi non videmini ratione proces-
- 2 sisse³⁹
- 3 quum, principii primi simplicitatem demonstraturi, veritates in affir-
- 4 mantes et negantes dispesceritis,⁴⁰ et hoc ipso veritatis et proposi-
- 5 tionis vocabula pro synonymis habueritis, quae tamen inter se
- 6 maxime differunt. Quum autem hoc ficulneo argumento fundamento
- 7 vestra demonstratio nitatur, ut sublato eo ipsa corruat necesse est:
- 8 ut me vero disputandi methodo adstringam, sententiam meam se-
- 9 quenti includam Syllogismo.
- 9 1, Quicumque terminis maxime a se diversis quos pro Synonymis
- 10 habet, demonstrationem suam nititur, non solum regulas

38 Almost literal quotation of the Kantian text. The sentence: “lepore omni ac venustate sermonis velut veste detracta” is underlined. Reference to PND 1; AA 01: 387.05 f.

39 Reference to a passage underlined in the *monitum* that opens Section I, PND 2; AA 01: 388.03: “non sibi videntur via ac ratione processisse.”

40 PND 2; AA 01: 388.11 f.: the beginning of Proposition I.

- 11 demonstrationis offendit, sed revera nihil agit.
 12 Atq. Vos terminis habetis a notiori. Ergo.
 13 a, Maior non indiget probatione, quia Regulae demonstrati-
 14 onis requirunt ut demonstrandis praemittantur principia, ut
 15 terminis certus tribuatur Significatus, ut consecraria legitime deducan-
 tur[.]
 16 qui itaque haec omittit non demonstrat.
 17 praeterea initio <Sect. I.> promisistis Vos definitiones pervulgatas
 retinere velle.⁴¹
 18 b, Minoris sibi recte expetiit probationem Respondens clare doctus,
 quam membro-
 19 tenus demonstratam, sequentibus extra omnem dubitationis aleam
 ponam.
 20 Imo⁴² dixi quod Vos, D. H.,⁴³ terminos maxime a se diversos synonymice
 21 adhibueritis. in propositionis Imae⁴⁴ demonstratione scribetis.
 22 Contendo ut.⁴⁵ hoc loco Veritatis et Propositionis conceptus confundistis,
 23 nam l. veritas Metaphysica in dissertatione metaphysica ita sumenda
 24 est: convenientia entis cum principiis catholicis (non dico catho-
 25 lico); quod definitio ista recte se habeat, omnes uno ore con-
 26 fitentur Philosophi: quum autem Veritas Negativa discon-
 27 venientia entis cum principiis catholicis, definienda foret,
 28 sane iocosum esset, veritates ad bina adversa genera conveni-
 29 entiae servant et disconvenientiae, hinc tantum dari veritates
 30 metaphysicas affirmativas cuilibet apparet.

[if. v > 3]

- 1 2, si veritates logicas hoc loco intelligendas velitis; dupliciter ita
 respondebo.
 2 1, vos in Prop. I. non de veritate logica tantum, sed et de omnibus in
 genere

⁴¹ Again, reference to PND 2; AA 01: 388.04–06, *monitum* in Section I: “satiis duco, quas pervulgata cognitione stabilitas et rectae rationi consonas habemus definitiones et axiomata, huc non denuo transcribere.”

⁴² To be read: *primo*.

⁴³ D[isputantes]. H[onoratissimi].

⁴⁴ To be read: *primae*.

⁴⁵ To be read: *autem*.

[if.' > 5]

1 Probabo Minorem per discursum: Resolvamus., D. H.,⁴⁹ notiones in proposi-
 2 tionibus Identitatis occurrentes, tali ratione: Aliquid est quod, qua
 3 existentiam, est possibile. Existentia est complementum possibilitatis
 4 internae, Possibile est quod non involvit contradictionem, Contradictio
 5 est simultanea eiusdem rei et affirmatio et negatio, omissis caeteris
 6 notionibus quae allatas definitiones ingrediuntur, Propositio Principii
 7 Identitatis ita erit exprimenda: Quidquid ita existere potest ut de eo
 8 non simultanee aliquid affirmetur et negetur, illud est et mutatis
 9 mutandis illud non est. habetis iterum probationem Minoris (p. 6)
 10 5, Quicumque prolixis se studiose supersedere ambagibus promittit.
 11 per verba circa initium rationis instituti vestri occurrenti[a]⁵⁰
 12 et [“]satus duxit[”] secundum verba Sect.1.,⁵¹ ast tamen eiusmodi
 13 protulit quae ad illustrandam tractationem suam non fuerunt directe
 14 sed per ambages tantum, sibimet ipsi contradicit.
 15 Atq. Ergo.
 16 Maior ex ipsis verbis est probanda, et qui id non facit
 17 quod promisit sibi contradicit.
 18 Minorem ex talibus potissimum dissertationis vestrae locis probabo:
 19 1, ex Scholio p. 4 contento quod ad illustrandam dissertationem
 20 tuam nihil facit. Iam de propositione II⁵² potuissemus
 21 maxime esse convicti licet nobis ars ista car[acter]istica⁵³
 22 non innotuerit. et unde habes, clarissime Praeses, Leibni-
 23 tium artem hanc inventam venditasse,⁵⁴ quum libellus iste in quo
 24 de illa egit, post eius mortem demum sit publicatus[?] nam
 25 mortuus est mense Novembri 1716. et sequente anno demum Fr⁵⁵ prodit.

49 D[isputantes]. H[onoratissimi].

50 In Grube's copy of the PND, the sentence “prolixis studiose supersedeo ambagibus” is underlined. Cf. PND 1; AA 01: 387.03.

51 Renewed reference to the *monitum* of Section I: “satus duco, quas ...” PND 2; AA 01: 388.04.

52 To be read: *secunda*.

53 This difficult-to-make-out word – suggests Hanspeter Marti – might be a contraction (*carstica*) of “characteristica”.

54 PND 4; AA 01: 389.36 f.: Proposition II: “de hac arte, *quam postquam Leibnitius inventam venditabat*” (underlining Grube's).

55 The abbreviation *Fr*f could stand for *Francofurti*.

[if.ʸ > 5]

1 2. porro enumeratas tuas ad Prop. IX p. 14 difficultates quae
 2 principium rationis determinantis infestant,⁵⁶ ut et dubiorum con-
 3 futatio⁵⁷ tuo cum aliis continentur Metaphysicae compendiis
 4 et potissimum praefatione Baumgartenii Metaphysicae
 5 suae premissa, hinc actum et per consequens superfluum
 6 existi
 7 3, tum ex longo isto et vere superfluo dialogo qui ab
 8 18 usque ad 23. pagina[m] quinque plagulis continetur.
 9 Ipse mihi praeterea confessus es eum, absque omni defectu,
 10 omitti potuisse;
 11 sed fortasse promissio ista tua sub initio facta tantum
 12 urbanitatis causa dissertationi tuae praemissa,⁵⁸ *Zum Com-*
 13 *pliment ans gelehrte* Publicum, et ipse sane urbanita[te]m
 14 violarem si tuam offenderem et praeterea Iurisprudentiae
 15 mihi operam danti iam dudum tritum illud innotuit.
 16 Superflua non nocent.
 17 Liceat adhuc, disputantes honoratissimi, quaedam circa
 18 formalia dissertationis vestrae monere et quantum ob tem-
 19 poris penuriam fieri poterit tantum per Discursum. (p. 1)

[if.' > 7]

1 3 [= 4], contra verba Scholii p. 6: [“]Deum non egere ratiocinatione[”].⁵⁹
 2 Quicumque relationes idearum et iudiciorum cogitat ad hanc ipsam cogita-
 3 tionem
 4 eget ratiocinatione. per principia Logica.
 5 Deus relationes idearum cogitat. ergo.
 6 Prob. Maioris.

⁵⁶ PND 1, AA 01: 387.18–20: *Ratio instituti*: “Tum de lege rationis sufficientis, quaecunque ad emendatiorem eiusdem et sensum et demonstrationem pertinent, una cum iis quae ipsam infestare videntur difficultatibus allegabo.”

⁵⁷ PND 16, AA 01: 400.03: “Confutatio dubiorum.”

⁵⁸ A reference to the rules of *urbanitas* (and of *observantia*). Cf. PND 1, AA 01: 387.13 f., in the *Ratio instituti*: “neque hoc officii et urbanitatis et observantiae adversum iudicari ab aequis rerum arbitris, uspiam animadverto.”

⁵⁹ PND 6; AA 01: 391.26 f.: Proposition III: “Deum non egere ratiocinatione, quippe, cum omnia obtutui ipsius liquidissime pateant, ... (underlined).”

- 6 Ratiocinatio est cogitatio relationis duorum iudiciorum, quum vero
 7 absque ratiocinatione relationes duorum iudiciorum cogitari
 8 nequeant, sequitur quemlibet cogitantem ratiocinatione egere.
 9 Si definitio non placet, aliam suppeditare debuisses.
 10 Si dicis absque ratiocinatione cogitata isthaec⁶⁰ fieri posse,
 11 ut mihi modum eiusmodi cogitandi suppedites rogo.
 12 Prob. Minoris
 13 Deus omnia secundum leges quasdam licet a se datas gubernat, hinc
 14 modum gubernationis suae ad has regulas confert, licet eiusmodi
 15 collatio in Deo uno quasi momento fiat, tamen collatio est; et
 16 Propositioni vestrae in Additamentis *Prøp Problematis IX.* p. 23,⁶¹ ita
 17 limitatae ambabus manibus album calculum adiicio, quod Deus non necesse
 18 habeat multis arduis⁶² notionum universalium abstractionibus et
 19 combinationibus⁶³ sanctissimae voluntatis suae rata prosequi,
 20 sed quod Deus omnia primo iam intuitu perspecta habeat <salva tamen ratio-
 cinatione>[.]
 21 S[i] non eiusmodi modus utilis uti nos si ratiocinamur. Deinde Deus
 22 ab omnibus pro maximo Philosopho et Sapientissimo habetur et nonne
 23 hinc reverentiae enti illi perfectissimo offendat, Philosophum
 24 non ratiocinantem statuere. (p. 9)

[if.v > 9]

- 1 4, Quicumque veritatis cognitionem rationis semper intuitu niti asseverat
 2 experientiae contradicit. Atq. Ergo.
 3 Prob. Maioris. Communis experientia est, nihil esse in in[te]llectu quod
 4 non antea fuerit in sensu; cui etiam Philosophi adsentiunt,
 5 hinc sensibus privati non earum adipiscuntur veritatum cognitionem,
 6 qua illi qui sensibus praediti imbuuntur. p. 4


60 Grube follows the orthography still used at the time for the pronoun *istic*.

61 PND 23; AA 01: 405.13 f.: “Praesentiae divinae respectu liberarum locus non est, nisi determinata eorum rationibus suis futuritio admittatur.”

62 Reading this word as *arduis* seems plausible, although *arctis* is also possible.

63 PND 24; AA 01: 405.20–22: *Additamenta Problematis IX*: “Neque enim abstractione notionum universalium earumque combinatione et ad eruendas consequentias facta collatione infinitae intelligentiae opus est.”

[if.' >15]



Detail from if.' >15

1 *Gott ist an dem*⁶⁴

[if.v > back cover]

- 1 Iam perveni usque ad umbilicos,⁶⁵ vicesque meas, una cum lam-
 2 pade <tradam> viro acutiori ingenio et magis virili facundia praedito,
 3 Praeceptorum meo Illustrissimo et aestimatissimo. Perget ille
 4 in proponendis dubitationibus quas, pro profundiori sua eruditio-
 5 ne, qua me, uti sol ista lumina minora <minora lumina>, splendore, superat,
 6 [illuminationi] luna, exornavit adornavit. Si ea quae ipse
 7 protuli non omnino displicuerint, gaudeo; Quo uero
 8 pacto placere potest vulgo, potuerint, quae uti communiter primi-
 9 tiae, <nondum> maturaverant? Sufficit <tamen> me, sanioris ingenii viris
 <non omnino im> proba-
 10 ri. Plebis <Vulgi Inanis obtusiorum hominum de me susurros non curo> non
 curo iniectiones et laudes contemno; eum
 11 eum (valet illius mentis diuiniore exemplar sequens:

⁶⁴ German *Kurrentschrift*. Only “Gott” is easily legible. Possible readings of the following scribble are: “Gott ist an dem” (Werner Stark), “Gott ist anders” (Hanspeter Marti), and “Gott ich und mundus” (editors).

⁶⁵ Regarding the expression “usque ad umbilicos,” it is useful to recall that the outer cover of books (*codices*) often featured a copper button (“bullas in librorum tergo”), as an antiquary reminder of the *umbilici* of ancient scrolls (*volumina*) (i.e. the stick around which they were wound).

- 12 Ihr Unterkäufer falscher Ehre [/] Eh[^e] ich mich von euch rühmen höre,
 13 Eh[^e] wol[!]t ich noch gescholten seyn).⁶⁶
 14 ~~Tibi Vestro Disputantes aestimatissimi~~
 15 Tibi, Praeses doctissime, de impetrato Artium Magis[tri]
 16 gradu <et exhibitio eruditionis tuae perfectissimo specimine> eo quo par est
 animi cordisve, gratulor. Nu-
 17 dum Academiae nostrae decus <vitamque tuam musis consecratam>,
 <Fortuna> et ~~Numen Fo[rtunae]~~ melioris
 18 sortis ~~eondonet~~, participem faciat quam, qua saepissime
 19 meritissimos persequi assueuerit viros. Pro exceptis
 22 benevole dubitatiunculis meis Tibi ut et <doctissimo> Respondenti
 23 gratias ago maximas; Vestroque et Auditorum
 24 omnium Favori et Amori me maxime com[m]endatum
 25 velim. Valet.

Translation of the interleaved Ms. in Copy K

[if.^r > frontispiece]

Most Noble President, I congratulate myself most highly on the grace You have granted me to publicly share the doubts that came to my mind regarding your very subtle dissertation *de cognitionis nostrae principiiis*.⁶⁷ Indeed, in our private conversations, you received verification of the fact that Philosophical Disputes if not always then at times delight me with a certain kind of condescension. Since in fact I have already come to know of your abhorrence for any vague itch for contention,⁶⁸ and this is precisely confirmed in this dissertation of yours, I would certainly offend the rules of politeness if I were also to expect of You the kind of malicious behavior that is evidenced by interpreters who are ill-disposed towards the statements of others. With great aversion, you yourself press upon that uneducated multitude of Philosophers who – moved, I do not know

⁶⁶ Haller, Abrecht von: “Ueber eine Hochzeit” (1731). In: *Gedichte*, Zürich 1750, 194, vv. 8–10.

⁶⁷ PND 1–38; AA 01: 385–416, Cambridge 1–45. In the following notes, we will be quoting from the English translation of Kant, Immanuel: *A New Elucidation of the First Principles of Metaphysical Cognition, in Theoretical Philosophy, 1755–1770*. Edited and translated by David Walford and Ralf Meerbote. Cambridge/New York 1992, 1–45. See also *Kant's Latin Writings: Translations, Commentaries, and Notes*. Edited by Lewis White Beck in collaboration with Mary J. Gregor, Ralf Meerbote and John A. Reuscher. Frankfurt a. M. 1986, 47–109.

⁶⁸ PND 1; AA 01: 387.11 f., Cambridge 5, *Ratio instituti*: “provided the criticism is free from bitterness and contentiousness.”

why, by indecent contempt for those who are strenuous investigators of truth – disdain all principles that are not contained in the textbooks from which they have been taught since childhood. But why do I linger much longer among that plebeian kind of scholar, since in you, most learned President, I have found a man who has not only extended the whole endeavor of seeking truth but has also taught us to endure those who refuse to come to our side? How strong are my weak shoulders? What might they be unable to support? You should know better than myself. I am used to always distrusting my strengths, and I would truly not know myself if, at this moment, I were to hope for more than fits them. Hence you see, Distinguished President, what You might expect from my modest doubts.

I am supported by the friendship of the most learned Respondent, whereby – as between brothers, thanks to your [i. e., Kant’s] benevolence – I will propose the doubts that have arisen in the personal reflections aroused by your dissertation, doubts that I pray that You, most honored *Respondents* [i. e., Kant and Borchard], receive with a serene disposition of mind.

[if.ʸ > frontispiece]

Some remarks about the title page.

[A new exposition] of the *Principles*. These [principles] are obscure. In fact, they could be explained in two ways.

(<...> *to be held*)

Whether for you [i. e., Borchard], most learned respondent, it be so absolutely certain that your parents decided to call you Abrahamus and not just Abramus?

Given that you [i. e., Kant] so deformed my name as to call me Reinholdum, then similarly you ought to conclude that, in accordance with the scheme Michael-Michaelis, you should have used the Latin termination Immanuelis in spelling your name as well.

[frontispiece]

< Dr. Funck >

< Prof. Hahn >

[if.^r > 1]

The title of Most Reverend is already due to our illustrious Governor by reason of his rank as a knight of the Teutonic Order.

He does not use the name Ioannes, but Hans.

The attributes of Most Solemn, Most Meritorious, and most vigilant are inappropriate for the supreme commander of the armies.

[if.^v > 1]

Just at the beginning of your dissertation, *in the Ratio instituti*,⁶⁹ I do not like the expression *vt spero*, which is in fact very inconvenient for a philosopher, who must be absolutely certain of the conclusion of his proposition.

Cum must be written with *qu*.

To strip one's arguments of all grace and elegance of speech as a garment⁷⁰ is inconvenient for our more costumed times. But truth is like a matron, who exposes herself, naked, to the sight of all as much as a drunken old woman.

Those who plead guilty are found guilty, and for reasons of modesty I will not linger any longer on the naked matron.

And in the light of this criterion you will understand Proposition VII, p. 10.⁷¹

[if.^r > 3]

Most honorable Disputants, it seems to me that from the beginning you have not proceeded according to reason, since, while preparing to demonstrate the simplicity of the first principle, you have divided truths into affirmative and negative,⁷² and have hence considered as Synonyms the terms "truth" and "proposition", which differ instead in the highest degree. And again, because your proof is based on such a feeble foundation, if that fails, it necessarily ruins itself. In order to

⁶⁹ PND 1; AA 01: 389.02, Cambridge 5: "Purpose of the undertaking."

⁷⁰ Almost literal quotation of Kant's text. The sentence: "having put aside all charm and grace of language, like a discarded garment" is underlined. Reference to PND 1, AA 01: 387.05 f., Cambridge 5.

⁷¹ PND 2; AA 01: 395.04–396.07, Cambridge 15: "There is a being, the existence of which is prior to the very possibility both of Itself and of all things. This Being is, therefore, said to exist absolutely necessarily. This being is called God."

⁷² PND 2; AA 01: 388.11 f., Cambridge 6: the beginning of Proposition I.

stick to the true method of argumentation, I will insert my thesis in the following Syllogism:

1, *Whoever bases his proof on terms that differ in the highest degree and which he takes as Synonyms not only violates the rules of proof but does not actually conclude anything at all.*

But *You take terms ... Therefore.*⁷³

a, The Major does not need proof because the Rules of demonstration require that the principles are premised to the theses to be demonstrated, that the terms are given a certain Meaning, that the consequences are correctly deduced. Hence, whoever neglects these rules is not demonstrating at all. Furthermore, at the beginning of *Section I*, You promised to keep definitions as commonly accepted as possible.⁷⁴

b, The most learned Respondent may rightly ask for proof of the Minor; after having demonstrated it element by element, in the following notes, I will completely remove it from the uncertainty of doubt.

In paragraph 1, I stated, Most Honorable Disputants, that you have used as synonyms terms that are very different. You both write when demonstrating Proposition I.⁷⁵

I contest that in that passage you confused the concepts of Truth and Proposition.

In fact, first, in a metaphysical dissertation, Metaphysical *truth* must be held as the conformity of being to universal principles (I do not mean to one universal principle); that this definition is well constituted all Philosophers unanimously recognize: because indeed, if *Negative Truth* were to be defined as the non-conformity of being with universal principles, it would be completely ridiculous that truths serve two opposite kinds of conformity and of non-conformity; hence it is evident to anyone that there are only affirmative metaphysical truths.

73 Understated conclusion: “Not only does it offend the rules of demonstration, but it does not conclude anything at all.”

74 PND 2; AA 01: 388.04–19, Cambridge 6: “Warning: Since I am particularly concerned to be brief in this treatise, I think it better here not to copy out afresh the definitions and axioms that are firmly established in ordinary knowledge and which are consonant with right reason. Nor do I think it a good idea to follow the example, by imitating their practice, of those who, slavishly bound by I know not what method, only deem themselves to have proceeded in a rational fashion if they have scrutinized from beginning to end whatever they find on the bookshelves of philosophers. I have thought it good to warn the reader of this in advance, lest he take for a fault that which I have done deliberately.”

75 PND 2; AA 01: 388.11–12, Cambridge 6: “There is no UNIQUE, absolutely first, universal principle of all truths.”

[if. v > 3]

2, if you claim that in this passage “logical truths” are meant; I will answer in two ways:

1, that in Proposition I you spoke not only of logical truths but of all truths in general and consequently also of Metaphysical truth.

2, that *logical* truth and Proposition are two completely different things. In fact, logical truth is the conformity of our judgment to the object, while in the Proposition, the judgment is simply expressed through terms, and in no way is it required that this judgment conform to the object. Indeed, even a false Proposition remains a Proposition nevertheless, not so the truth, if the conformity of the judgment to the object is lacking. In fact, even a false proposition remains a proposition, while this is not the case with a truth when the agreement of the truth with the object of the judgment is missing. So, e. g., the Proposition “God is a sinner” is a proposition but neither a logical nor a metaphysical truth, given that the agreement of the object with the judgment is missing.

3, having so demonstrated the proposition that logical truth and Proposition are different and not Synonymous, it would be superfluous to further support this point with you, since your entire demonstration is based on the distinction between negative and affirmative truths. You have therefore the entire proof of *my first Syllogism*.

—

I will also concede that there are two necessary kinds of truth. Perhaps for this reason, should it also be conceded that truths can be distinguished into true and false? If allowed, it should also be granted that there are two first principles, one for true truths and the other for false truths! # # #

But, in order not to sound pedantic, I will abandon this subject and proceed further to challenge your Proposition II.⁷⁶

In this, you affirm that two first principles are needed; what I will grant on your behalf, limiting myself to denying that these principles of identity are to be referred to from here: the *following Syllogism*

4, Any Proposition that implicitly contains a plurality of propositions is not simple.

The Proposition of the Principle of Identity contains a plurality of them. Therefore.⁷⁷

⁷⁶ PND 3f.; AA 01: 389.02–390.29, Cambridge 7–9.

⁷⁷ Understated conclusion: “The proposition of the principle of identity is not simple.”

The Major is made up of the very words of your dissertation. See proof of Proposition I.⁷⁸

[if: > 5]

I will prove the Minor discursively. Let us resolve, Most Honorable Disputants, the notions that intervene in the propositions of Identity, using this procedure: *Something* is what is possible, regarding existence. Existence is the complement of internal possibility, Possible is what does not imply contradiction, Contradiction is the simultaneous affirmation and negation of the same thing without considering the remaining notions that enter the definitions given, the Proposition of the Principle of Identity should be expressed this way: *Whatever can exist in such a way that of it one cannot simultaneously affirm and deny something that it is and, having changed what is to be changed, that it is not.* You again have proof of the Minor (p. 6)⁷⁹

5, Anybody who promises to carefully avoid lengthy delays – according to the words that are found at the beginning of your *Ratio instituti*⁸⁰ and “finds it preferable” *in accordance with the wording of Section I*⁸¹ – but, in illustrating his exposition, expresses himself just in that way, i. e., not directly but only in circuitous ways, contradicts himself.

But ... Therefore.⁸²

The Major can be proven from your very words. And whoever does not do what he has promised contradicts himself.

I will prove the Minor first and foremost from the following quotes in your dissertation:

1, *for the Scholium contained on p. 4*⁸³ that does not help at all to clarify your dissertation. As regards the second proposition, we might already have been convinced, even if we had not been aware of this characteristic art. Whence you learn, most illustrious President, that Leibniz advertised the discovery of this

⁷⁸ PND 2f.; AA 01: 388.13–389.02, Cambridge 6 f.

⁷⁹ PND 6; AA 01: 391.05–07, Cambridge 10: “For it is neither necessary that every truth be guaranteed by the impossibility of its opposite, nor, if truth be told, is in itself sufficient, either.”

⁸⁰ PND 1; AA 01: 389.02, Cambridge 5: “Purpose of the undertaking”.

⁸¹ PND 2; AA 01: 388.04–19, Cambridge 6: “I think it better here not to copy out afresh the definitions and axioms ...”.

⁸² Understated minor and conclusion: “But the author does speak in circuitous ways. Therefore, he contradicts himself.”

⁸³ PND 4; AA 01: 389.33–390.29, Cambridge 8 f.

art,⁸⁴ since the booklet in which he deals with it has been published posthumously? In fact, he died in November 1716, and the following year the booklet was published in Frankfurt.⁸⁵

[if. v > 5]

2, in addition, the difficulties you list in Proposition IX, p. 14,⁸⁶ and that beset the principle of determining reason together with the Refutation of Objections⁸⁷ are contained in yours as well as in compendia of Metaphysics by others, and especially in the preface premised by Baumgarten to his *Metaphysics*; hence this was done already, and consequently you did something *superfluous*.

3, and again from that lengthy and truly superfluous dialogue which is contained in the five pages from page 18 to page 23.⁸⁸ Furthermore, you yourself admitted to me that you could have omitted it without missing it.

Still, perhaps that promise you made in the opening paragraph was premised to your dissertation only out of politeness, *zum Compliment ans gelehrte Public*,⁸⁹

84 Possible reference to Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, *Unvorgreifliche Gedancken* (1717). This essay in the edition of 1717 was part of an anthology of Leibniz's papers: *Collectaneae etymologica illustratiōe linguarum veteris celticae, germanicae, gallicae aliorumque inservientia*. Cum praefatione Jo. Georgii Eccardi. Hanoverae [not Francofurti!], 1717. Grube may have called it *libellus* because he found it in Johann Gottfried Gottsched's separate edition in *Beyträge Zur Critischen Historie der Deutschen Sprache, Poesie und Beredsamkeit: Drittes Stück*. Leipzig 1733, 369–411. In this edition, the possible reference may be found in section 8, on p. 371: "Es haben die Wißkünstler (wie man die, so mit der Mathematik beschäftigt, nach der Holländer Beyspiel gar füglich nennen kann) eine Erfindung der Zeichenkunst, davon die so genannte Algebra nur ein Theil ist. Damit findet man heute zu Tage Dinge aus, so die Alten nicht erreichen können, und dennoch bestehet die ganze Kunst in nichts, als im Gebrauch wohlangebrachter Zeichen." In English: "The artists of knowledge (as, according to the Dutch example, those who deal with mathematics can properly be called) discovered the art of signs, of which so-called algebra is only a part. By means of it nowadays things are discovered which the ancients could not reach, yet all art lies in nothing other than the use of suitable signs." Cf. Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm: *Unvorgreifliche Gedanken, betreffend die Ausübung und Verbesserung der deutschen Sprache*. Edited by Uwe Pörksen and Jürgen Schiewe. Stuttgart 1983, 7.

85 PND 4; AA 01: 389.36f., Cambridge 8: "After Leibniz had advertised the merits of his discovery, men of learning all complained that it had been buried along with the great man himself."

86 PND 16; AA 01: 400.03, Cambridge 22.

87 PND 14; AA 01: 398.11f., Cambridge 20: "An enumeration and resolution of the difficulties which seem to beset the principle of determining ground, or, as it is commonly called, the principle of the sufficient ground."

88 PND 16–23; AA 01: 400.03–405.11, Cambridge 22–31.

89 This phrase in German: "Compliments to the learned public."

and I would really lack politeness if I offended your politeness; finally, to me, one who works in Jurisprudence, the saying that has been common for a long time has become clear: Superfluous things do not harm.

Allow me again, most honorable disputants, to warn about some formal conditions of your dissertation, as much as is possible given the limits of time, by means of a Discourse. (p. 1)

[if: > 7]

3 [= 4], against the statement of the Scholion on p. 6:⁹⁰ “God has no need of reasoning.” Anyone who thinks relations of ideas and judgments needs reasoning for that very thought according to the principles of Logic.

God thinks about the relations between ideas. Therefore.⁹¹

Proof of the Major.

Reasoning is the thought of the relation of two judgments; since indeed the relations between two judgments cannot be thought *without reasoning*; it follows that anyone who thinks has need of reasoning.

If you do not like this definition, you should provide another one.

If you state that such thoughts can occur without reasoning, I ask that you provide me with the modality of such thinking.

Proof of the Minor.

God governs everything according to certain laws that he himself gave; hence his modality of governing compares to those rules; although such a comparison in God occurs almost at the same instant, it is still a comparison and to your proposition as expressed in the *Supplements to Problem IX* (p. 23)⁹² I add a white pebble with both hands⁹³ provided it is thus limited: that God does not need to accompany the decrees of his most holy will with many difficult abstractions and combinations of universal concepts;⁹⁴ but also that God has already foreseen everything from his first intuition <without prejudice however to reasoning>. But not in the same viable modality we use when we reason. In the end, God

⁹⁰ PND 6; AA 01: 391.26, Cambridge 10: “God has no need of reasoning.”

⁹¹ Understated conclusion: “God has need of reasoning.”

⁹² PND 23; AA 01: 405.13f., Cambridge 30: “Divine foreknowledge is only possible in respect of free actions if it is conceded that their futurity is determined by their own grounds.”

⁹³ The metaphor of adding a white pebble comes from the voting practice in Roman Law. Here, it clearly means that Grube is in full agreement with Kant.

⁹⁴ PND 24; AA 01: 405.20–22, Cambridge 30: *Supplements to Problem IX*: “Nor does the infinite understanding need to abstract universal concepts, or combine them together.”

is considered by all to be the highest Philosopher and Most Wise; and in this case, would it not offend the reverence of the most perfect being to declare him a non-reasoning Philosopher? (p. 9)⁹⁵

[if.^v > 9]

4. Anyone who claims that the knowledge of truth of reason always rests on intuition contradicts experience. But. Therefore.⁹⁶

Proof of the Major. It is a common experience that there is nothing in the intellect that was not previously in the senses; on this also Philosophers agree, that hence those who are deprived of the senses do not acquire knowledge of those truths with which those who are equipped with the senses are endowed. (p. 4)⁹⁷

[if.^r > 15]

God is to whom

[if.^v > back cover]

Now I have come to the end; and I will pass over my turn by giving the relay to a man furnished with more acute intelligence and more mature eloquence, to my Most Illustrious and highly esteemed Preceptor.⁹⁸ He will go on to present doubts that he has prepared due to his [i. e., Funck or Hahn] deeper erudition, thanks to which he surpasses me, just as the sun surpasses the lesser stars in splendor and the moon in brightness. If the remarks I made have not entirely displeased, I will be delighted. How could things that are not yet ripe, as occurs with first fruits, be

⁹⁵ PND 9; AA 01: 394.03 f., Cambridge 30: "It has been established by the common opinion of all mortals that knowledge of truth is always based upon an intuition of the ground."

⁹⁶ Ibid. A possible integration of the understated minor and conclusion: "But the knowledge of truths of reason does rest on experience. Therefore, there is a contradiction." Cf. Thomas Aquinas: *De veritate*, q. 2 a. 3 arg. 19; Locke, John: *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, bk. II, 1.

⁹⁷ PND 4; AA 01: 389.33 f., Cambridge 8: "Here we have a sample – a trifling one, it is true, but not one which is wholly to be despised – of the art of combining signs."

⁹⁸ When Grube here speaks of his own preceptor, he does not necessarily mean Kant. He may have turned his head either to Funck, the professor of jurisprudence, who like Grube had studied as a jurist, or to Hahn, a professor of rhetoric, due to the reference to a man of eloquence.

appreciated? It would be enough for me that men of a deeper wit did not totally disapprove of me. I am not concerned about the murmurs I may receive from the dullest of the Inane Vulgar. I do not care about invectives, and I disdain praise (*the following example of that most sublime mind applies:*

*You broker of false honor,
Instead of being praised by you,
I'd rather be scolded.)*⁹⁹

I congratulate you, most learned President, for having achieved the degree of *Magister Artium* and for having shown a most perfect example of your erudition, which matches your mind and heart.

Let Fortune offer you, pure glory of our Academy, and your life devoted to the muses, a better fate than that which often happens to accompany the worthiest of men. For welcoming my modest doubts with kindness, I extend my deepest thanks to You and the most learned Respondent. I wish to be highly recommended by the Favor and Love of You and of all the Auditors. Good health to you!

⁹⁹ Haller, “Ueber eine Hochzeit”, vv. 8–10. The verses are in *Kurrentschrift*; the translation is ours.